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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The struggle for Democracy in Africa will doubtless take many forms and directions”.'
During the 1990s many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have undergone
significant political changes. These changes can be broadly characterized as transitions
from authoritarian towards more democratic and pluralistic political systems. The main
focus of this thesis is to shed light on some of the many forms and directions these
transitions have taken by undertaking a comparative study of the democratization
process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.
As a result of various internal and external pressures many authoritarian African
regimes embarked on a democratization process in the early 1990s. The internal
pressure for democratization was spearheaded mainly by different elements of civil
society such as trade unions, clerics, students, businessmen and professional
associations. A decisive factor beyond the internal pressure for political liberalization
and democratization were the economic difficulties many countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa experienced during the 1980s. While these economic difficulties varied from
country to country in their severity and were caused by various factors, the Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were imposed by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the early 1980s were one of the factors that
contributed to the economic difficulties many African countries faced during the 1980s.
' Quoted in Shaw 1993: p. 103.
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To comply with SAPs African governments had to sharply devalue their currencies,
reduce public sector spending, impose fees on a range of public services, remove price
controls on basic commodities, and liquidate unproductive state enterprises. The
implementation of these measures in exchange for new loans made it increasingly
difficult for many of Africa’s authoritarian regimes to maintain their extensive
patronage networks and made the monopolization of economic benefits by a shrinking
political class around the president more and more obvious. Furthermore, the social
costs of SAPs delegitimized many African “governments in the eyes of their people and
fueled the spreading of political discontent”.^ In short, SAPs contributed to an erosion
of popular support for many of Africa’s authoritarian regimes during the 1980s. The end
of the Cold War in 1989 decreased the willingness of western donors to support
Africa’s authoritarian governments for strategic reasons and they started to demand
political reforms (i.e. respect for human rights, political pluralism and multiparty
democracy) if the recipients wanted to continue to receive developmental assistance. In
a nutshell, these were some of the developments that brought about the political changes
that will be analyzed in this study in some detail by comparing the democratization
3
process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.
The methodology that will be applied to study the democratization process in
Kenya, Malawi and Zambia is the comparative method. In order to apply this method at
least two cases and two variables are necessary. In contrast to the statistical method.
^ Lancaster 1993: p. 40.
^ See Lancaster 1993: pp. 39-43; Clapham 1993: pp. 430-433; Wiseman 1993: pp. 441-443; Nwokedi
1995: pp. 38-55; and Joseph 1997: pp. 368-372.
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which tries toquantify'** how different variables covary or correlate across many cases,
the comparative method tries to identify or qualify which independent variables (causal
variables) account for the variation in the dependent variable (outcome variable)
without trying to quantify how strong the relationship between these variables is.
Therefore the nature of the comparative method is qualitative and not quantitative. In
other words the focus of the comparative method is to discover empirical relationships
among variables without trying to quantify them. In studies such as this, where the
number of cases is small and the number of variables fairly large, the comparative
method is the best methodological approach to identify which independent variables
explain the variation in the dependent variable. The statistical method is better suited for
studies where the number of cases is large and the number of variables is fairly small.
^
The dependent variable of this study is the trajectory of the democratization
process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s. For analytical purposes the
democratization process will be broken down into three phases, namely, political
liberalization, democratic transition / democratization and democratic consolidation.^
Regarding the dependent variable there is some variation between the three countries. In
short, as a result of the 1991 elections in Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda was
replaced by the presidential candidate of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy
(MMD), Frederick Chiluba. Several opposition parties boycotted the 1996 elections in
Zambia, while the 2001 elections were again hotly contested among various political
parties. After two thirds of Malawi’s voters had favored the introduction of the
This is done by calculating a correlation coefficient such as Pearson’s r.
* See Lijphart 1971: pp. 682-685; Ragin 1987; pp. 12-18; Beyme 1988: pp. 50-68; Aarebrot / Bakka
1992: pp. 51-59; Nohlen 1994: pp. 507-517; and Ragin 1994; pp. 105-153.
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multiparty system in the 1993 referendum, the presidential candidate of the United
Democratic Front (UDF), Bakili Muluzi, defeated the incumbent President Hastings
Banda in the 1994 elections. President Muluzi narrowly won the 1999 elections. In
Kenya President Daniel arap Moi managed to win the 1 992 and the 1 997 elections
against a divided opposition. The main goal of this thesis is it to identify which
independent variables can be used to explain the different trajectories the
democratization process has taken in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.
Among the independent variables to be considered are the type of the ancien regime,
the structure of civil society, the formation of political parties, the elections and the role
of donors.
The comparative method can be best applied to identify which independent
variables account for the variation in the dependent variable in cases that are
comparable. According the Arend Lijphart comparable cases are “cases that are similar
in a large number of important characteristics, but dissimilar with regard to the variables
between which a relationship is hypothesized”.^ Kenya, Malawi and Zambia were
selected for this comparative study, since they can be considered as comparable cases.
Before the democratization process got under way in the early 1990s Kenya, Malawi
and Zambia had quite a few things in common. All three countries were under British
colonial rule prior to independence. In all three countries Britain tried to establish a
political system that resembled the British system to a certain degree before
independence. Soon after they had gained their political independence they changed
* The meaning of these terms will be delineated in chapter 3.
^ Lijphart 1988; p. 55.
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their constitutions and replaced the parliamentary systems introduced by Britain with
presidential systems and the multiparty systems with defacto or dejure one-party
systems. Between independence and the beginning of the democratization process in
the early 1990s all three countries conducted parliamentary elections in fairly regular
intervals and in most of them voters could choose between more than one candidate of
the ruling party.^ The democratization process was preceded by fairly stable
authoritarian and neopatrimonial’° regimes in all three countries. In Zambia President
Kaunda ruled the country from independence in 1964 until 1991. In Malawi President
Banda ruled the country from independence in 1964 until 1994. Kenya was ruled by
President Kenyatta from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978 when his Vice-
President, Daniel arap Moi, became his constitutional successor and has ruled the
country since then. Finally, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia have been fairly free of military
interference in the political process and were continuously under civilian rule. Only
Kenya experienced an unsuccessful coup d’etat in 1982. Thus, Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia have many characteristics in common, especially with regard to the period from
their independence until they embarked on democratization processes that took different
trajectories. This means that the characteristics they have in common can be treated as
* Malawi became a dejure one-party system in 1966, Zambia in 1972 and Kenya in 1982.
’ See Hartmann, Dirk 1999: p. 482; Meinhardt 1999; p. 553; and Krennerich 1999: p. 945.
Bratton and van de Walle discern three informal political institutions that characterize neopatrimonial
rule in Africa. First, presidentialism which “implies the systematic concentration of political power in
the hands of one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks”
(Bratton / van de Walle 1997: p. 63). Second, systematic clientelism which means that the president
relied on the reward of personal favors as a means of strengthening his grip on power. Usually, these
favors took the form of public sector jobs within the state and the distribution of public resources
through projects, contracts, and licenses within society. In return for these favors, clients mobilized
political support and showed their loyalty to the president. Third, the use ofstate resources for political
legitimation is a sine qua none for establishing and maintaining extensive clientelist networks
throughout a country. (See Bratton / van de Walle 1997: pp. 61-68).
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background variables, which should not play a significant role in explaining the
variation in the dependent variable. This approach, which Arend Lijphart calls the
comparable-cases strategy, should allow one to identify more easily which independent
variables influenced the trajectory of the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia during the 1990s as against a study of countries where the colonial and
postcolonial history differs significantly from country to country."
This thesis will be structured as follows. Chapters two and three will provide the
theoretical framework for the study of the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi
and Zambia. In chapter two different concepts of democracy will be introduced and the
question raised as to whether particular African concepts can be distinguished from
universal concepts. In chapter three the terms “political liberalization”, “democratic
transition / democratization” and “democratic consolidation” will be introduced and
their meaning in the context of this study will be delineated. Chapters four, five and six
are the empirical core of this study. In them the democratization process in Kenya,
Malawi and Zambia will be analyzed. Each of these three chapters will be structured
along the same lines. First, the historical context for each country is introduced. Then an
analysis of how political liberalization came about will follow and the main actors
behind it will be identified. Subsequently, the formation of political parties, the
multiparty elections and other major political developments such as constitutional
reform efforts will be examined. Based upon this review, the prospects for democratic
consolidation in each country will be assessed. Using the empirical findings of chapters
four, five and six, chapter seven will lay the groundwork for identifying which
" See Lijphart 1988; pp. 54-60.
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independent variables may explain the different trajectories the democratization process
has taken in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s. In the concluding remarks
the author will summarize the main findings and suggest various measures that might
increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY
Many scholars tried to conceptualize or define the term “democracy” over the
past few hundred years. To provide a comprehensive overview of the many different
conceptualizations that emerged as a result of this effort is beyond the scope of this
study. Rather than providing a comprehensive overview, this chapter tries to outline two
different conceptualizations of democracy that can be found in the literature about
democracy. One is a procedural or minimalist conceptualization and the other one is a
substantive or maximalist conceptualization of democracy.*^ Finally, the question
whether there is a particular African conceptualization of democracy will be addressed.
Based upon the writings of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl Larry Diamond,
Juan J. Linz and Seymor Martin Lipset came up with the following procedural or
minimalist conceptualization of democracy:
“Democracy [. .
.] denotes a system of government that meets three
essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among
individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all
effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and
excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level ofpolitical
participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through
regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is
excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties - freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations -
sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and
participation”.'^
'^See Shin 1994: p. 142.
Diamond / Linz / Lipset 1988: p. xvi.
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In addition to the above conceptualization some proponents of a procedural or
minimalist conceptualization of democracy also include an independent judiciary and
civilian control over the military. Furthermore Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn
Karl stressed that elected officials must be able to exercise their powers without the
possibility that their decisions are overridden or reversed by unelected officials and that
the polity must be self-governing meaning national policy decisions do not require
approval by extraterritorial actors such as the World Bank or the IMF."* Proponents of a
procedural or minimalist conceptualization of democracy are of the opinion that their
conceptualization of democracy is universal in its scope and that democracy cannot
exist if the conditions contained in it are not at least met to a certain degree. Put
differently, a political system can only be considered democratic when certain
procedural'^ and institutional requirements'^ are met. In this context it is important to
keep in mind that there can be quite some variation with regard to the degree to which
these requirements are met. For instance, while a country’s constitution contains the
necessary provisions to guarantee in principle that its political system is democratic, the
implementation of these constitutional provisions can vary considerably from country
to country. To take this into account some political scientists differentiate between
See Schmitter / Karl 1991: pp. 81-82.
The main procedural requirements are competition and inclusive participation.
Robert Dahl delineates the following institutional requirements: (i) elected officials who control
governmental policy decisions (accountability); (ii) relatively frequent free and fair elections to select
and peacefully remove elected officials (coercion is comparatively uncommon); (iii) the right to vote
for practically all adults; (iv) the right to run for public office for most adults; (v) an effectively
enforced right to freedom of expression for all citizens; (vi) free access to sources of information that
are different from that of the government (Moreover, such alternative sources of information exist and
are protected by law.); and (vii) the effectively enforced right to found and to become members of
political interest groups and political parties (see Dahl 1989: p. 233; see also Schmitter / Karl 1991: p.
81).
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normative (what should be) and empirical (what is) concepts of democracy.
Furthermore, in the literature about democracy one finds all sorts of adjectives such as
limited, oligarchical, controlled, restrictive, electoral, illiberal, liberal, guarded and
protected, to name just a few, that precede the word “democracy” and that all describe
political systems in which the procedural and institutional requirements outlined above
are met to varying degrees.'^
During the last two decades the procedural or minimalist conceptualization of
democracy has been broadened. While Juan Linz’s conceptualization of democracy
emphasizes the holding of free and competitive elections at regular intervals, other
scholars such as Terry Karl criticized Linz’s conceptualization as too minimalist and
called it the “fallacy of electoralism”.'* They argued that privileging electoral over
other dimensions of democracy ignores “the degree to which multiparty elections, even
if competitive and uncertain in their outcome, may exclude significant sections of the
population from the effective capacity to contest for power or advance and defend their
interests, and/or may leave significant arenas of decision-making power beyond the
reach or control of elected officials”.*^ Karl and Schmitter pointed out that while
elections are a necessary condition for a political system to be called democratic they
alone are not sufficient to justify classifying a political system as a democracy.
Elections “occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly
For a good overview of the different subtypes of more or less democratic political systems see Collier /
Levitsky 1997: pp. 433-451; and Pinkney 1994: pp. 5-17. See also Monshipouri 1995: pp. 15-17;
Harbeson 1998: pp. 39-42; and Reynolds 1999: pp. 20-22.
See Shain 1995: p. 46.
Diamond 1997: p. 8.
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aggregated alternatives offered by political parties”.^® In response to the criticism of
Linz s minimalist or procedural conceptualization of democracy as too minimalist
Larry Diamond developed a very useful typology that differentiates between electoral
democracy, liberal democracy and pseudodemocracy. According to Diamond an
electoral democracy is defined as “a civilian, constitutional system in which the
legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive,
multiparty elections”.^' Diamonds conceptualization of a liberal democracy goes
beyond that of an electoral democracy. In addition to universal suffrage and
intermittent, free, and fair elections, liberal democracy requires according to Diamond’s
conceptualization “the absence of ‘reserved domains’ of power for the military or other
social and political forces that are not accountable to the electorate, directly or
indirectly”.^^ Furthermore, “in addition to the ‘vertical’ accountability of rulers to the
ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, free and fair elections), it
requires ‘horizontal’ accountability of office-holders to one another; this constrains
executive power and also helps protect constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the
deliberative process”. Finally, liberal democracy according to Diamond “encompasses
extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and
group freedoms, so that contending interests and values may be expressed and compete
through various ongoing processes of articulation and representation, beyond periodic
Schmitter / Karl 1991: p. 78.
Diamond 1997: p. 10.
Diamond 1 997
:
p. 11.
Diamond 1997: p. 11.
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elections
. According to Diamond a pseudodemocracy is situated between an
electoral democracy and a purely authoritarian regime. Multiparty elections also take
place in pseudodemocracies in regular intervals, however, in contrast to an electoral
democracy a pseudodemocracy lacks “a sufficiently fair arena of contestation so that
the ruling party may be turned out of power”.^^ In contrast to purely authoritarian
regimes, pseudodemocaracies “tolerate the existence of genuine (not merely artificial,
state-controlled) opposition parties”.^^
In the words of Mahatma Gandhi the essence of a substantive or maximalist
conceptualization of democracy is that “under it the weakest should have the same
opportunity as the strongest”.^^ To achieve this ideal substantive or maximalist
conceptualizations of democracy incorporate social and economic desiderata and
embrace economic equality and social justice.^^ Substantive or maximalist
conceptualizations of democracy do not restrict democracy to the political sphere and
are often referred to as social democracy in the literature. Democracy is considered as a
means to increase equality in social and economic outcomes. To achieve that, a social
democratic political system aims at regulating the market mechanism in such a way so
as to reduce its adverse impact on equality. Social democracies attempt to reduce
Diamond 1997: p. 1 1. See also Diamond 1997: p. 12 for a detailed description of the nine different
components of liberal democracy according to Diamond.
Diamond 1997: p. 17.
Diamond 1997: p. 17. See also Diamond 1999: pp. 7-17.
Quoted after Arat 1991: p. 15.
See Shin 1994: p. 142; and Diamond 1997: p. 5.
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inequalities in society through the provision of basic social services such as health care
and education for all citizens either free of charge or at a relatively low cost.^’
When addressing the question of whether any particular African
conceptualization of democracy exists, many scholars turn to studies of precolonial
Africa. While a great variety of political systems such as highly centralized states and
amorphous non-centralized communities existed in precolonial Africa, Kwasi Wiredu
pointed out that many, possibly all, “traditional African societies were
communalistic”.^® In a communalistic society extended kinship linkages play an
important role in structuring societal relations and individual interests are to be adjusted
to those of society and not vice versa. Wiredu further pointed out that consensus is the
dominant mode of group decision-making in communalistic societies. Deliberation
aimed at reaching a compromise is an important element of a consensual decision-
making system. In such a system for instance the members of a village council would
sit under a large tree and talk as long as necessary to reach a consensus. Based on these
precolonial political traditions of African societies Wiredu proposes that African
intellectuals should get together “to explore the history, rationale, conceptual basis, and
constitutional framework for a nonparty system of politics based on consensus”.^' He
points out that there is a fundamental difference between a nonparty system and a one-
party system. The “former embraces the freedom of political association while the latter
” See Mengisteab 1996: pp. 1 10-1 12; Sklar 1996: pp. 39-40; Huber / Rueschemeyer / Stephens 1997: pp.
323-324; and Mengisteab 1999: pp. 31-32.
Wiredu 2001:p. 171.
Wiredu 2001 :p. 182.
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execrates it”. In Wiredu’s African conceptualization of democracy political
associations play an important role as a forum of discourse and as vehicles of political
education and representation. Furthermore, they mediate between civil society and the
state. Finally, Wiredu points out that political associations motivated by ideological or
specific policy considerations could play an important role in reducing the saliency of
ethnicity in African politics.^^
Based on the existence of consensual decision-making systems in precolonial
African societies Maxwell Owusu argued that the consensus model of democracy^'* is
better suited as the modus operandi for democracy in Africa than the majoritarian
model of democracy.^^ Claude Ake pointed out that the kind of democracy that is
suitable for Africa would have the following four characteristics. First, the people
would have real decision-making power. This would be ensured through a powerful
legislation, decentralization, and “the development of institutions for the aggregation
and articulation of interests”.^^ Second, it would invest heavily in the improvement of
people’s health and education to enable the people to participate effectively in the
political process. Third, it would emphasize individual and collective rights equally.
Wiredu 200 l;p. 183.
” See Wiredu 2001: pp. 171-184.
According to Arend Lijphart the consensus model of democracy aims at “restraining majority rule by
requiring or encouraging: the sharing ofpower between the majority and the minority (grand
coalitions), the dispersal ofpower (among executive and legislature, two legislative chambers, and
several minority parties), a fair distribution ofpower (proportional representation), the delegation of
power (to territorially or nonterritorially organized groups), and aformal limit on power (by means of
the minority veto)” (Lijphart 1984: p. 30).
See Owusu 1992: p. 377.
Ake 1996: p. 132.
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Fourth, it would be as inclusive as possible.^^ Like Wiredu, Owusu and Ake also made
reference to precolonial African societies and traditions, however, unlike Wiredu they
do not make a case for a specifically African conceptualization of democracy. Other
scholars emphasized that while rudiments of democratic practices and principles
existed in various precolonial African societies it would be dangerous to equate them
with advanced forms of democracy.
See Ake 1996: pp. 132-134.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework that will be used to analyze
the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. The framework will be
derived from the literature concerning the study of democratization. This literature can
basically be divided into two different approaches. One is the structural or macro-level
approach. It was developed by Seymour Martin Lipset in the late 1950s and assumes
that certain prerequisites such as economic development, urbanization and increased
literacy rate must be met before democratization can take place.
The “third wave of democratization”^’, which began with the Portuguese coup
d’etat in 1974 and spread from Southern Europe to Latin America during the 1980s and
finally reached Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa by the end of the 1980s and
early 1990s, called the assumptions of the structural or macro-level approach into
question. During the third wave democratization took place in countries that did not
meet the structural prerequisites outlined above. In response to this gap between theory
and empirical reality Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead
developed the agency or micro-level approach based on Dankwart A. Rustow’s article
“Transitions to Democracy”."'® This approach focuses on the transition process from
See Simiyu 1988: pp. 68-69; Schmidt 1994: pp. 236-237; and Nwokedi 1995: pp. 9-12. See also Ake
1991:p.34;Chazan 1992: pp. 113-116; Ake 1993: pp. 242-244; Ellis 1993: pp. 133-134; and
Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 28-31.
Huntington 1 99 1
:
p. 2 1
.
Rustow 1970: pp. 337-363.
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authoritarian rule to democracy and analyses the interaction and choices made by
various actors such as individuals and groups during this process.
The agency or micro-level approach for the study of democratization has been
developed mainly based on studies of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy
in Southern European and Latin American countries. While not all aspects of the agency
or micro-level approach are equally useful for the study of African transitions, given the
different political, economic and social context of African countries, one aspect that is
useful to some extent is the distinction of the democratization process into three
different periods. These are political liberalization, democratic transition /
democratization, and democratic consolidation. These terms, which provide the
theoretical framework for the empirical part of this study, will be delineated below.
3.1 Political Liberalization
Political liberalization entails an easing of repression and the granting or
extension of political rights previously denied by the authoritarian regime. During the
period of political liberalization authoritarian regimes respond to internal and external
pressure and relax controls on the political activities of their citizens. “In such openings,
governments restore previously repudiated freedoms of movement, speech, and
association to individuals and groups in society”."^^ As a result of political liberalization
authoritarian governments become somewhat less authoritarian. Political measures
taken towards this end can include the release of political prisoners and the lifting of
See Pridham 1994: p. 16; Monshipouri 1995; p. 6; and Schmitz / Sell 1999: pp. 23-24.
Bratton / van de Walle 1997: p. 159.
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government censorship. John Healy and Mark Robinson pointed out that these measures
are introduced in the absence of political compromise between the regime and its
opponents, with the result that they are neither guaranteed by the state nor formally
accepted by various interest groups, which gives them a provisional and arbitrary
character
. In the context of chapters 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2 political liberalization is defined
as a step-by-step process that leads to a less authoritarian and more open political
regime and concludes with the formal decision by the authoritarian government to allow
the reintroduction of a multiparty system. Some of the issues to be addressed in the
context of political liberalization are as follows. What role did various internal actors
play during the liberalization process and which ones were most influential in bringing
it about? What role did external actors such as donors play and what impact did political
events in other world regions as well as other African countries have?"*"^
3.2 Democratic Transition / Democratization
The literature that deals with transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy
provides different conceptualizations of the terms “democratic transition” and
“democratization”. Broadly speaking one can differentiate between narrow and broad
conceptualizations of these terms. While the process of democratization encompasses
all three stages (political liberalization, democratization / democratic transition and
democratic consolidation), scholars who utilize a narrow conceptualization of the terms
“democratic transition” and “democratization” such as Bratton and van de Walle focus
Healey / Robinson 1992: 128.
'''' See O’Donnell / Schmitter 1986: p. 7; Mainwaring 1989: pp. 4-8; Linz / Stepan 1996: p. 3; and Bratton
/ van de Walle 1997: pp. 159-193.
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their attention mainly on the founding elections^^ in which ideally an authoritarian
president is replaced as a result of free and fair elections. For them a democratic
transition “can be said to have occurred [..] when a regime has been installed on the
basis of a competitive election, freely and fairly conducted within a matrix of civil
liberties, with results accepted by all participants”.^^ If this is not the case, they speak of
^precluded trunsition when political conditions were unconducive to the construction
of any kind of functioning form of govemance”^^ such as in Liberia; of a blocked
transition when political reforms were launched but never fully realized such as in
Rwanda and Burundi; or of aflawed transition when authoritarian presidents allowed
the reform process to unfold to a considerable extend, but then “exploited the powers of
incumbency to dictate the rules of the political game by manipulating electoral laws,
monopolizing campaign resources, or interfering with the polls”'^^ to ensure they remain
in power such as in Gabon or Cameroon.
Scholars like Joel Barkan and John Harbeson are critical of the temporally
constrained, election-centric conception that underpins Bratton and van de Walle’s
conceptualization of democratic transitions. Harbeson pointed out that their
conceptualization assumes that “democratic elections will ipso facto produce regime
change from an incumbent authoritarian to a new, democratically inclined regime”; that
“initial multiparty elections and/or regime change will ipso facto generate the
A founding election occurs when “for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of
national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions” (O’Donnel / Schmitter
1986: p. 57).
Bratton / van de Walle 1997: p. 194.
Bratton / van de Walle 1997: p. 1 19.
Bratton / van de Walle 1 997
:
p. 121.
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momentum necessary to produce subsequent, broader patterns of democratization”; that
“this momentum will be sufficient to generate the means to fulfillment of this broader
array of democratization tasks in the ‘consolidation’ phase”; that “the initial multiparty
elections taking place at the national level will lead to democratization processes at
subnational levels
;
and that “the polity itself will remain sufficiently stable to sustain
transition and subsequent consolidation phases of democratization”.^^ As the analysis of
the democratization process in Zambia and Malawi, which are considered by Bratton
and van de Walle as having undergone successful democratic transitions, in chapters 5
and 6 will show, these assumptions are not necessarily always reflected by the political
events that unfold after founding elections that resulted in the replacement of an
authoritarian president by a democratically elected one. Therefore Joel Barkan called
for a broader conceptualization of the terms “democratization” and “democratic
transition”. He pointed out that democratization “is fundamentally a process of
institution-building, and not the occurrence or non-occurrence of single events”.^® In the
context of chapters 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3 a broad conceptualization of the terms “democratic
transition” and “democratization” is adopted which considers democratic transition /
democratization in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia as still ongoing. This is evident by the
fact that in all three countries constitutional and other reform efforts are still taking
place. Some of the issues to be addressed in the context of democratic transition /
democratization are as follows. What is the nature of the opposition movement
(cohesive or fragmented)? What role if any did the military play? Along which
Harbeson 1998: pp.42-43.
Barkan 1994a: p. 180.
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cleavages were political parties formed? Were the elections reasonably free and fair?
What efforts have been made so far to reform the constitution and/or electoral laws;
how successful have these efforts been; and who was the driving force behind them?^'
3.3 Democratic Consolidation
As a result of democratic consolidation regime reversal back to authoritarian
rule becomes less likely. Democratic consolidation requires the legitimation and
institutionalization of democratic practices to ensure that democracy becomes “the only
game in town” as Giuseppe di Palma put it. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan proposed a
conceptual framework for democratic consolidation that consists of three dimensions.
First, the behavioral dimension of democratic consolidation requires that no significant
political groups seriously attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government or
try to secede from the state. Furthermore, in a consolidated democracy the government
is no longer concerned about the possibility of democratic breakdown. Second, the
attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation requires that “even in the face of
severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe
that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic
formulas”. Third, the constitutional dimension of democratic consolidation requires
that all actors in the political arena “become habituated to the fact that political conflict
will be resolved according to the established norms and that violations of these norms
See O’Donnell / Schmitter 1986: pp. 7-11; Mainwaring 1989: pp. 4-8; Linz / Stepan 1996a: pp. 3-5;
and Bratton / van de Walle 1997: pp. 194-232.
” Linz / Stepan 1996a: p. 5.
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are likely to be both ineffective and costly”.” In addition to these three dimensions of
democratic consolidation Linz and Stepan argue that five “interconnected and mutually
reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be
consolidated”.” First, an environment conducive to the development of a free and lively
civil society must exist. Second, while civil society can play an important role in
dismantling an authoritarian regime, democratic transition and consolidation requires a
relatively autonomous and valued political society as well in addition to a diverse civil
society. The core institutions of a democratic political society are political parties,
legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and inter-party alliances. In a
consolidated democracy these institutions are well established and accepted by the
overwhelming majority of the population. Furthermore, political parties are mainly
differentiated by ideology or programmatic concerns and not by ethnoregional
concerns. Third, “throughout the territory of the state all major political actors,
especially the government and the state apparatus, must be subjected to a rule oflaw
that protects individual freedoms and associational life”.” This requires a strong
consensus by all major political actors regarding the constitution and “a clear hierarchy
of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal
” Linz / Stepan 1996a: p. 5.
Linz / Stepan 1996a: p. 7.
According to Linz and Stepan civil society refers “to that arena of the polity where self-organizing
groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values,
create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests. Civil society can include manifold
social movements (women’s groups, neighborhood associations, religious groupings, and intellectual
organizations) and civic associations from all social strata (such as trade unions, entrepreneurial groups,
journalists, or lawyers)” (Linz / Stepan 1996a: p. 7).
Linz / Stepan 1996b: p. 17.
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culture in civil society”. Fourth, “there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by
the [..] democratic government”.^® In order for a democratic government to function
well it needs an effective capacity to command, regulate and extract. This is best
ensured if its civil service is competent and recruitment as well as promotion are based
on merit. Fifth, “there must be an institutionalized economic society By that Linz
and Stepan mean a set of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms,
institutions, and regulations that mediate between the state and market. Without a
certain degree of state regulation markets cannot exist. The state must protect public and
private property, establish corporate laws, regulate the stock market and standards for
weight, measurement, and ingredients in order for markets to exist and to function. For
markets to function well market failures must be corrected and their social costs
reduced by the state. Finally, in order for democracy to be sustainable the government
must provide certain public goods such as education, health care, and transportation as
well as some safety net to help citizens hurt by market swings or failures, and it must
take measures aimed at alleviating inequalities. In sum, in a consolidated democracy all
the five conditions mentioned above exist and interact with each other.^°
As has been pointed out in chapter 3.2, the theoretical framework applied to
analyze the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia assumes that
democratic transition / democratization is still ongoing in these three countries, since
Linz / Stepan 1996b: p. 19.
Linz / Stepan 1996b: p. 17.
Linz / Stepan 1996b: p. 17.
See Linz / Stepan 1996a: pp. 5-15; Linz / Stepan 1996b: pp. 14-23. See also
Mainwaring 1986. pp. 1-
23; Diamond 1997b: pp. xviii-xxiii; Bratton / van de Walle 1997: pp. 233-255;
and Schedler 1998. pp.
91-107.
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various reform efforts are still being pursued at different levels in all three countries.
Therefore, in chapters 4.4, 5.4 and 6.4 only the prospects for democratic consolidation
in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia respectively can be discussed. Some of the issues to be
addressed in this context are as follows. What are the prospects for ethnicity to become
a less salient factor in the political process? Can it be expected that in the foreseeable
future political parties will emerge that can be differentiated mainly by ideology or
programmatic concerns and less by ethnoregional criteria? What are the prospects for
the government to play a less predominant role in the economy and for the development
of a sizable middle class and formal private sector as well as for improving literacy
rates? Finally, how likely is it that the legislature, the judiciary, political parties and
civil society will facilitate the prospects for democratic consolidation?
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CHAPTER 4
KENYA
The Republic of Kenya is located in Eastern Africa and covers a total area of
580,367 sq km (224,081 sq miles). Appendix A contains a map of Kenya that shows its
eight provinces as well as major cities and towns. In mid-2001 Kenya’s population was
officially estimated at 30,765, 916. Many ethnic groups live in Kenya. “The Bantu
groups are by far the largest (70%) of Kenya’s population and include the Kikuyu,
Embu, Meru, Kamba, Kisii, Baluhya, Taita, and Giriama. The Nilotics include primarily
Luo [...]; the Nilo-Hamitics encompass the Maasai, Turkana and Kalenjin, while the
Hamitic include the Galla and Somali in the Northeast. Kenya’s largest ethnic groups
are the Kikuyu (21%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kamba (1 1%) and Kalenjin (1 1%).
Together with the smaller Kisii and Meru/Embu, these groups account for 75% of the
population”.^’' The regional distribution of Kenya’s main ethnic groups is as follows.
The Kikuyu mainly live in central Kenya, the Luhya in western Kenya, the Luo along
the shores of Lake Victoria, the Kalenjin in the central Rift Valley, the Kamba cast and
south-east of Nairobi, the Kisii in the south-west of Kenya, and finally the Meru live
east of Mount Kenya.^’^
Decalo 1998: p. 177.
See Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 123; and Morgan 2001: p. 490.
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4.1 Historical Context
After the British colonial administration allowed the formation of political
parties in 1959, two political parties were formed in 1960. On 14 May 1960 the Kenya
African National Union (KANU) was founded. KANU brought together the larger,
more educated, more urbanized, and more politically mobilized ethnic groups of the
Kikuyu, the Embu and Mem, the Luo, the Kamba and the Kisii. Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga
Odinga and Tom Mboya emerged as KANU’s leading figures. KANU’s leaders favored
a strong central government. Various smaller or internally divided ethnic groups “that
had been largely bypassed by the colonial economy, and whose members therefore
tended to be less educated, less urbanized, and less mobilized”^^ and who feared that the
dominance of the Kikuyu and Luo within KANU would submerge their interests and
welfare in an independent Kenya founded the Kenya African Democratic Union
(KADU) on 25 June 1960. KADU brought together the Abaluhya / Luhya of the
Western Province, the Kalenjin of the western Rift Valley Province, the Mijikenda of
the Coast Province and the semi-nomadic populations of the sparsely populated
southern Rift Valley and the remote Northeastern Province. Ronald Ngala and Daniel
arap Moi were KADU’s leading figures. KADU received considerable financial and
administrative support from European settlers who, like the ethnic groups that formed
KADU, feared that KANU members would descend on “their” land after Kenyan
independence. KADU’s leadership was opposed to a strong central government and
favored “a federal form of government called majimho, with six regions, each with its
own legislature, financial and executive power, and control over land, police and
Barkan 1994b: p. 10.
26
administration, and with a weak central government comprising a lower house and a
senate”.^'^
4.1.1 The Kenyatta Era 1963-1978
On 12 December 1963 Kenya gained its independence with Jomo Kenyatta as
Prime Minister. At independence Kenya had a decentralized constitutional structure
with a bicameral legislature that was based on the Westminster model of parliamentary
sovereignty. During the years following independence Kenyatta significantly
transformed Kenya’s political system to “consolidate his personal authority and to
create a government of national unity”. Using a combination of carrots and sticks he
persuaded the members ofKADU^^ to join KANU during 1964 making Kenya a de
facto single-party state. He also initiated various constitutional changes as a result of
which the office of the Prime Minister was abolished and replaced with a strong
executive President in 1964. The bicameral parliament was replaced by a unicameral
67
National Assembly in 1966.
KTUDU’s incorporation into KANU accelerated the process of internal division
between moderate and more radical elements within KANU. The infusion ofKADU
moderates such as Daniel arap Moi into KANU strengthened Kenyatta’ s hand vis-a-vis
the more radical elements ofKANU around Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga
^ Osabu-Kle 2000; p. 155. See also Barkan 1994b; pp. 10-11; Ogot 1995; p. 65; andMuigai 1995;
pp. 166-167.
** Throup / Hornsby 1998; p. 12.
In December 1964 the former deputy chairman of KADU, Daniel arap Moi, became
Minister of Home
Affairs in President Kenyatta’s government.
See Barkan 1994b; p.l 1; Ochieng 1995; pp.107-108; Throup / Hornsby 1998;
p. 12.
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who were critical of Kenyatta’s pro-Western and pro-business policies and who wanted
to nationalize foreign-owned companies and seize settler farms without compensation.
After a series of rigged KANU elections aimed at eliminating supporters of the radical
faction from party posts, Odinga and his supporters^* left KANU in April 1966 and
formed a new political party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). The aim of Odinga and
his supporters was to create a more left-wing party, to oppose the growing
conservatism and Western orientation of the KANU leadership, and to try to replace the
persistently ethnic basis of politics with a cleavage based on ideological, class or socio-
economic grounds”.^^ Between 1966 and 1969 President Kenyatta took various
measures against KPU making it quite clear that he was not willing to tolerate another
party outside KANU. Immediately after the formation ofKPU in April 1966 the
constitution was changed requiring MPs who defected to another party to resign and
face a by-election. As a result of ethnic pressure and rigging, out of the 29 MPs who
had left KANU only nine MPs, mainly Luos from the Nyanza Province, emerged
victorious in the by-elections. The result of this by-election revealed an important
aspect of Kenyan politics. Ethnicity and state power were more important in
determining political preferences than class or ideology. The formation ofKPU brought
an end to the Kikuyu-Luo alliance. Kenyatta replaced it with a new alliance between the
Kikuyu and the Kalenjin by giving the coveted Vice-Presidency to the Kalenjin Moi in
** Odinga’s move was backed by roughly one fifth of KANU’s legislators including many Kikuyu and
Luo.
Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 13.
™ Githu Muigai defines ethnicity as “the consciousness among people with shared cultural and linguistic
roots that gets utilized for political affiliation and mobilization to compete with other groups for scarce
resources” (Glickman 1995; p. 387).
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January 1967. During 1967 and 1968 KPU’s political activities were curtailed in
various ways. KPU officials were detained and harassed, branch registrations were
denied, candidates were disqualified and KPU meetings were interrupted by KANU’s
youth wing. In October 1969 KPU was banned and its leaders detained after a visit of
President Kenyatta to Kisumu in Luoland had ended in violence. The brief existence of
an opposition party from 1966 to 1969 demonstrated “two fundamental features of
Kenyan political culture — the refusal of government to accept challenges to its right to
rule, and the rapid reversion of the constitutional opposition to its ethnic bastion”.’’
While Kenyatta suppressed competition between political parties, as shown
above, he institutionalized a significant measure of competition within KANU as the
central mechanism to allocate and define positions of his elaborate clientelist system
beginning with the parliamentary elections of 1969. All Kenyans were permitted to
participate in KANU’s primary elections as long as they did not challenge KANU’s and
Kenyatta’s monopoly of power. Under this system of semi-competitive elections in
single-member constituencies the KANU primaries were basically local referenda that
gave the electorate the opportunity to confirm or replace MPs depending on their
success in securing state resources. This led to a relatively high turn-over and
reshuffling of personnel within Kenya’s clientelist structures. For instance, as a result of
the 1969 parliamentary elections, 26% of the ministers and 37% of the assistant
ministers lost their parliamentary seats and hence also their ministerial appointments.
” Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 15. See Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp. 12-15.
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The possibility of being repudiated by the electorate ensured that MP’s paid attention to
the concerns of the inhabitants of their districts.^^
In addition to conducting regular parliamentary elections under a semi-
competitive framework the political system established under Kenyatta’s presidency
was also characterized by a professionally run and fairly independent judiciary as well
as a relatively free press and the emergence of an autonomous associational life. Like in
electoral politics, as long as the press and civil society organizations did not challenge
Kenyatta’s authority directly they could serve as a platform for muted criticism of
government policies. Within these norms of permissibility, a broad spectrum of civil
society organizations emerged during the 1970s. These included professional
associations such as the Law Society of Kenya (LSK); economic interest groups such as
the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU); church organizations of various
denominations such as the National Christian Council of Kenya; and ethnic welfare
organizations such as the Gikuyu Embu Mem Association (GEMA) and the Luo Union.
In sum, while “Kenyatta’s Kenya was not democratic, it was nonetheless a relatively
open and resilient system with multiple secondary centers of power and a measure of
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real competition - and hence accountability - at the local and regional levels”.
4.1.2 From Clientelism to Personal Rule - The Presidency of Daniel arap Moi
After President Kenyatta’s death on 22 August 1978 his Vice-President, Daniel
arap Moi of the Kalenjin ethnic group, became his constitutional successor. During the
See Barkan / Okumu 1978: pp. 100-103; Barkan 1992: pp. 172-173; Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp. 15-17;
and Hartmann, Dirk 1999: pp. 476-477.
Barkan 1992: p. 175.
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first ten years of his presidency Moi dismantled the clientelist network established
under the presidency of Kenyatta and transformed it into a system of personal rule. In
order to achieve that goal he adopted an increasingly authoritarian stance. KANU
became an important tool in this transformation. He turned the party “from a bottom-up,
moderating articulator of interests to a top-down instrument of personal control - at the
expense of parliament and other institutions”.^"*
While Moi initially retained several Kikuyu in his cabinet for strategic reasons,
soon after taking office he undertook various measures to undermine the political power
of the Kikuyu establishment. In 1980 he banned all ethnic welfare associations
including the wealthiest of them, the Gikuyu, Embu and Mem Association (GEMA). He
also replaced many senior Kikuyu officials in government with members of his own
Kalenjin ethnic group as a means of gaining greater control over the political process
and to ensure that the will of the central government was enacted in the regions. In early
1982 Oginga Odinga and George Anyona tried to register a new political party, the
Kenyan Socialist Alliance. In response Moi mshed^^ through the National Assembly a
Constitutional amendment bill on 9 June 1982 making Kenya a dejure single-party
state. Subsequently Moi revitalized the stmctures ofKANU and used the party more
and more as a control mechanism for instance by making party membership obligatory
for all civil servants and by using KANU branch organizations to break up clientelist
networks, which were used under Kenyatta to advance ethnoregional interests.
* Brown 2000: p. 206.
The legislation was passed by the National Assembly after only 45 minutes of debate.
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Following an attempted Air Force coup d’etat in August 1982"^^ Moi restructured the
armed forces, further tightened his control over the state, curtailed press freedom and
suppressed any dissent. Political opponents were detained and tortured and critical
university professors were fired. In an attempt to further control and manipulate the
political process in his favor Moi announced several controversial changes of the
electoral procedures in 1986. He replaced the secret ballot in the party primaries with a
queuing system under which voters had to line up behind pictures of each contestant.
Another change stipulated that “candidates receiving 70 percent of the vote at queuing
time would be declared elected”.^^ These changes were applied in the 1988
parliamentary elections and lead to widespread rigging. At least one third of the
electoral contests in these elections were manipulated to ensure that candidates favored
by Moi won. This destroyed the confidence of ordinary Kenyans in the political process
and deprived the National Assembly of its watchdog role vis-a-vis the executive^^. In
his efforts to maximize his control over the political process Moi also reduced the
autonomy of various civil society organizations. In 1989 Moi forced the Central
Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) and Kenya’s largest women’s organization,
Maendeleo ya Wanawake, to affiliate with KANU. In short, during the 1980s President
Moi significantly increased the authoritarian nature of the Kenyan political system. As a
For a detailed account of the coup d’etat and its consequences see Decalo 1998: pp. 242-246.
’’ Barkan 1992: p. 182.
Makau wa Mutua pointed out that queue voting made it much less likely that people would line up
behind pictures of candidates known to be critical of government policies out of fear for government
reprisals (see wa Matua 1992a: p.23).
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result various groups of Kenyan society expressed their desire for fundamental political
changes since the mid-1980s7^
4.2 Political Liberalization
Kenyan churches and lawyers played an important role in bringing about
political liberalization in Kenya. In contrast to the Central Organization of Trade
Unions (COTU) and the national women’s organization, which became auxiliary
organizations ofKANU, the churches, particularly the Roman Catholic church and the
National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) as well as the legal profession
managed to maintain a relatively high degree of independence from the government of
President Moi. On the one hand, Kenyan churches and lawyers occupied a “political
space which government could not interfere with without dragging down the entire
political and ideological facade of constitutionalism and legalism”. On the other hand,
Kenyan churches and lawyers possessed organizational advantages they could use to
protect themselves and others. In contrast to newspapers and leaflets, church sermons
were less subject to state control and bans. During the late 1980s especially younger
clergymen took it upon themselves to preach the Gospel against state oppression.
Furthermore, Kenyan churches like the Anglican Church of the Province of Kenya
(CPK) and the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) are members of international
denominations, whose members in other countries might have drawn international
attention to the Kenyan government if their local representatives would have been
See Barkan 1992: pp. 178-188; Widner 1992b: pp. 133-161; Decalo 1998: pp. 229-255; Throup
/
Hornsby 1998: pp. 26-53; and Brown 2000: pp. 205-208.
Muigai 1993: p. 26.
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harassed or jailed. Like the clergy, Kenya’s legal profession also has international ties,
which were used to draw the attention of the international community to the
imprisonment of Kenyan lawyers. For instance, through periodicals such as the Nairobi
Law Monthly and the Kenyan section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ),
that has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
These organizational advantages provided Kenyan clergy and lawyers with a semi-
protected space from which they were able to criticize the increasingly authoritarian
practices of the Moi regime during the second half of the 1980s. For instance, various
clergymen and lawyers like Paul Muite and Kiraitu Murungi criticized the replacement
of the secret ballot with a queuing system in 1986. Kenyan lawyers and clergymen like
the Rev. Timothy Njoya and Bishop Okullu^' were also among the first to demand
Kenya’s return to a multiparty system.*^
During the year 1990 opposition against Moi’s government grew stronger and
became more broadly based. The politically motivated assassination in February 1990
of Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Robert Ouko,
a Luo who was an outspoken critic of corruption within the Moi government, triggered
widespread protest against the government, especially among the Luo community and
students in Nairobi and the Nyanza Province. Protest songs were recorded and people
started greeting each other with two-fingered “salutes”, the sign of multi-partyism. The
In late April 1990 Bishop Okullu, “emboldened by the recent release of Nelson Mandela and the
legalisation of the ANC in South Africa, [..] publicly stated that only multi-party politics would
guarantee full accountability and transparency” (Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 58).
See Widner 1992a: pp. 214-218; Widner 1992b: pp. 187-192; Sabar-Friedman 1995: pp. 430-440;
Sabar-Friedman 1997: pp. 32- 50; and Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp. 55-58.
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Moi government responded with a violent crackdown and banned all demonstrations
from the beginning of March.*^^ In May 1990 the former Kikuyu cabinet ministers,
Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, demanded Kenya’s return to multiparty democracy
at a press conference. During the following weeks they held talks with leading
politicians of other ethnic groups such as the Luhya Masinde Muliro and the Luo
Oginga Odinga to get their support for their demands. The Moi government felt
threatened by the prospect of Kenya’s three largest ethnic groups joining forces against
it and on 4 July 1990 arrested Matiba, Rubia and Odinga’ s son, Raila Odinga, who were
in the process of organizing a pro-democracy rally in Nairobi. Provoked by these arrests
thousands of people gathered on 7 July 1990*^ at Nairobi’s Kamukunji grounds in
defiance of a government ban and demanded political reforms and respect for human
rights. After police and the paramilitary General Services Unit (GSU) tried to disperse
the crowds with batons and tear gas, riots broke out in Nairobi and several cities of the
Central Province. During the following three days many were killed or injured and
o c
hundreds were arrested. In February 1991 Oginga Odinga announced the formation of
a new political party, the National Democratic Party. Various lawyers and academics
supported him in this effort. However, the government refused to register it, since
Kenya was a dejure one-party state. Subsequently, in August 1991 six opposition
leaders, including Odinga, announced the establishment of the Forum for the
Restoration of Democracy (FORD). They stressed that FORD would not be a political
See Mair 1994: pp. 34/35; Widner 1992b: p.l93; and Thobhani 2000: pp. 6-7.
This day became known as '"Saba Saba, Kiswahili for ‘7/7’ (the date), and carries much political and
symbolic power in Kenya” (Brown 2000: p. 218).
See Widner 1992b: p. 175-176; Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 179-181; and Brown 2000: p. 218.
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party but a pressure group for constitutional reforms and multiparty democracy. The
members of FORD frequently pointed to the political events in Zambia during 1990 and
1991 as an example for Kenya.*^’
As a response to this internal political pressure Moi established the KANU
Review Committee in June 1990 to investigate complaints voiced by the Kenyan
people. During a conference ofKANU delegates in early December 1990 it was decided
to abolish the queue voting system*^ and the 70 percent rule. It was also decided to
readmit to KANU formerly expelled members. In another concession the government
decided to restore the tenure ofjudges. Moi hoped that these rather minor reforms
would let off enough steam and would enable him to avoid further going changes.
During several occasions he made it quite clear that Kenya would remain a one-party
state even so opposition parties had emerged in other African countries like Zambia.
When defending his rejection of multiparty politics Moi repeatedly argued that “the
legalization of opposition parties would usher in tribal conflict and destroy national
unity”.^^ However, he was ultimately forced to change his position on this issue by the
• 89
international donor community.
In May 1990 the U.S. Ambassador in Kenya, Smith Hempstone, made a
statement in which he linked foreign aid to political reform. In July of the same year he
** See Ogot 1995: p. 244; and Hartmann, Christof 1999: p. 182 and 184.
The cancellation of the queue voting system “came as a result of a campaign headed by church leaders,
who cited the abolition of this system as a massive step towards the enhancement of unity in the
country. In addition, they said that they can queue only behind God, thus broadening their stmggle to
include the freedom of opposition” (Sabar-Friedman 1995: p. 452, footnote 35).
Barkan 1993: p. 90.
®^See Muigai 1995: pp. 180-181; and Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 180-181.
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expressed his distress at the detention of Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia and Raila
Odinga as well as other pro-democracy activists. In mid- 1990, Norway, Denmark,
Sweden and Finland were the first of Kenya’s donors to threaten to cut their aid if the
Kenyan government continued to disrespect democratic rights. In response to the arrest
of the editor-in-chief of the “Nairobi Law Monthly”, Gitobu Imanyara, the United
States, the Nordic countries, Germany and Japan threatened further aid cuts in May
1991. Displeased with the worsening political situation in Kenya, the Nordic countries
threatened to cancel aid agreements worth $80 million in July 1991. In September 1991
the Danish government started to carry out this threat by suspending all new aid to
Kenya. In November 1991 leaders ofFORD tried to organize a pro-democracy rally in
Nairobi. Despite the lack of governmental permission, many people gathered in the
streets of Nairobi on 16 November 1991 and demanded the reintroduction of multiparty
democracy. The Moi government detained twelve prominent members ofFORD and
ended the gathering by using heavy force. In response, many of Kenya’s donors,
including the U.S., the UK, Canada, Sweden and Denmark, issued strong written or oral
protests. Germany and the UK recalled their Ambassadors.^® Against the background of
the continued unwillingness of the Moi regime to undertake democratic reforms
Kenya’s donors took bold action against Kenya in November 1991. On 25-26
November 1991 Kenya’s bilateral donors met in Paris. During this Consultative Group
Michael Chege pointed out that Nairobi is home to approximately 160 foreign correspondents,
including CNN. They facilitated that the rest of the world could get first hand information about the
authoritarian practices of the Moi regime (see Chege 1994: p. 60). This might have increased the
pressure on Kenya’s bilateral donors to take some bold action at their meeting in Paris in November
1991.
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meeting*^' they decided “to suspend balance of payments support and other rapid
disbursement aid for six month”'^^ pending the introduction of substantial political and
economic reforms. This decision caused immediate economic problems for the Kenyan
government, including a rapid depreciation of the Kenyan currency, the shilling. It took
the Kenyan government less than a week to react to this decision. On 2 December 1991
President Moi announced Kenya’s return to a multiparty system during a special KANU
National Delegates’ Conference and on 10 December 1991 the Kenyan parliament
repealed Section 2(A) of Kenya’s constitution, which was added in 1982 to make Kenya
dejure a one-party state.
The period of political liberalization in Kenya lasted for about six years. It was
triggered by the increasingly authoritarian character of the Moi regime since the mid-
1980s. Due to their organizational advantages Kenyan churches and lawyers played an
important role during the early phase of political liberalization. The deteriorating
economic situation and the increasing alienation of Kikuyu leaders with the Kalenjin-
dominated regime of President Moi were among the causes that convinced the Kikuyu
politicians Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia of the need to give political liberalization
in Kenya a major push by publicly demanding Kenya’s return to multiparty democracy
in May 1990. In this context Holmquist, Weaver and Ford pointed out that Kikuyu
leaders considered the return to a more competitive political system “as the only way in
This meeting brought together representatives of Canada, Denmark, h inland, France, (iermany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, the African
Development Bank, the European Union, the European Investment Bank, the IMF, and the United
Nations Development Programme. Belgium, Saudi Arabia and the OECD sent observers.
Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 84.
” See Ahluwalia 1993: p. 508; Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp. 84-88; Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 186-
191; and Brown 2000: pp. 222-230.
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which their economic power could be directly translated into political power”.^"'
However, internal actors alone were not strong enough to bring about Kenya’s return to
multiparty politics. One of the reasons for the relative weakness of the internal
opposition is that its social base was limited mainly to the urban middle and upper
classes. Organized peasant and trade union participation was almost entirely absent
during the period of political liberalization. Widner remarked that while the legal
community “could facilitate the flow of information between other social actors, it
could not provide an organizational base. It could not supply cars to send
representatives to speak with farmers in rural areas, for example, or do many of the
other things that a coherent opposition would have to do to coordinate economic actors
and to use that collective leverage to force the president and his party’s leadership to the
bargaining table”.^^ Therefore only the withholding of $350 million in foreign aid by
the international donor community in November 1991 gave teeth to the demand of the
Kenyan opposition for the establishment of a multiparty democracy. The high degree of
aid dependability of the patronage-based regime left Moi no other choice than to
concede to the demands of the donors. He did so rather quickly to gain a strategic
advantage^^ over the opposition in the early stages of the democratization process as
will be shown in chapter 4.3.^^
Holmquist / Weaver / Ford 1994; p. 98.
Widner 1992b: p. 189.
“By deciding to accede to international pressure for greater political pluralism before it was ineviatble,
President Moi had seized the initiative back from FORD, enabling KANU to [...] prepare the multi-
party electoral process to KANU’s advantage” (Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 88).
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Democratic Transition / Democratization
In chapter 4.3 the democratic transition / democratization in Kenya will be
analyzed. First, the formation of major opposition parties after the end of the dejure
single-party state will be examined. Second, major developments in the months leading
up to the first multiparty elections during the 1990s on 29 December 1992 will be
looked at and their results will be analyzed. Third, major political developments prior to
and the second multiparty elections during the 1990s on 29/30 December 1997 will be
examined. Fourth, constitutional reform efforts will be looked at.
4.3.1 The Formation of Opposition Parties
During the course of 1992 various opposition parties^* were formed. However,
only three parties received a significant number of votes during the elections on 29
December 1992. Therefore the following remarks will focus on the formation ofFORD-
Kenya, FORD-Asili and the Democratic Party (DP).
After the legalization of opposition parties on 10 December 1991 the Forum for
the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was the first party to be officially registered as a
political party on 31 December 1991. Since the interim leadership ofFORD was
dominated by Oginga Odinga, a Luo, and Martin Shikuku, a Luhya, some powerful
functionaries of the former Kikuyu ethnic welfare organization GEMA feared that their
interests might not be adequately represented within FORD. Therefore they urged the
Minister of Health in Moi’s government, Mwai Kibaki, to leave the government and
’’ See Holmquist / Ford 1992: pp. 99-102; and Hartmann, Christof 1999: 194-195. For an excellent
overview of the social forces beyond opposition politics in Kenya see Chege 1994: pp. 56-61.
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KANU and to form an alternative political party. After his efforts to push for
substantive reforms within KANU were increasingly frustrated by the Kalenjin inner
circle around President Moi, Kibaki left the government in late December 1991 and
announced the formation of the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP), which was registered
as a political party in January 1992. In contrast to FORD, which brought together
members of different ethnic groups and different ideological orientations, DP was a
fairly homogenous party comprising mainly the Kikuyu elite. The ethnic base of the DP
was mainly among the northern Kikuyu and ideologically the DP was “the party of big
business, favouring economic liberalisation and the privatisation of inefficient
parastatals”.^^ The formation of the Democratic Party effectively undermined a united
Kikuyu opposition to the Moi regime by splitting the Kikuyu between FORD and DP.'°®
While FORD received a lot of support in early 1992'°', which was evident by its
ability to organize a rally in Nairobi in January 1992 that was attended by more than
100,000 people, it ultimately failed to transform itself from a loose coalition of more or
less like minded individuals into a unified and viable political party. Githu Muigai
mentioned three reasons for that. First, there was a generation gap within FORD. The
coalition brought together young, enthusiastic and idealistic activists who sought to
rewrite the ground rules of Kenyan politics with older, more experienced and more
These parties included the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Labour Party Democracy (LPD), the
Kenyan National Congress (KNC), the Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA), the Party of
Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK), and the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK).
^ Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 98.
See Mair 1994: pp. 61-62; Wiseman 1996: p. 135; Oyugi 1997: pp. 49-50; and Throup / Hornsby
1998: pp. 94-100.
In early 1992 the FORD leadership “reflected a wide ethnic base including Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya,
Kamba, and Kisii, and a wide regional base with only Moi’s heartland in the Rift Valley excluded”
(Wiseman 1996: p. 135).
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opportunistic politicians who were mainly interested in becoming Kenya’s next
president. Second, after Kenneth Matiba’s return to Kenya from the UK, where he was
receiving treatment for a stroke he had suffered while in detention, in May 1992 serious
personality differences emerged between him and FORD’s chairman, Oginga Odinga.
Third, the ethnic factor reinforced the personal differences among FORD’s
leadership.’®^
As a result of the inability of its leadership to agree on the procedures for
electing FORD’s officials and presidential candidate, FORD split into two opposing
factions in August 1992. Kenneth Matiba and Martin Shikuku, who favored a direct
vote by the members of the party, led the Muthithi House faction ofFORD and Oginga
Odinga, Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara, who favored an indirect vote through a
delegates’ conference, led the Agip House faction. A campaign by Kenyan churches to
unite the opposition remained fruitless and in mid-October 1992 the two factions were
registered as two different political parties. The Muthithi House faction became FORD-
Asili’®^ and the Agip House faction became FORD-Kenya. FORD-Asili’s ethnic base
was mainly among the southern Kikuyu including the urban and rural poor as well as
the ethnic group of the Luhya. FORD-Kenya’s ethnic base was mainly among the Luo
of the Nyanza province.
See Muigai 1995; p. 182.
Asili means original in Kiswahili.
See wa Mutua 1992c: pp. 35-36; wa Mutua 1992d: p. 58; Africa Confidential, 9 October 1992: p. 4;
Mair 1994: pp. 62-66; Holmquist / Ford 1994: p. 7; Ogot 1995: pp. 247-249; Sabar-Friedman 1995:
p. 446; Wiseman 1996: p. 135; Schmidt 1997; pp. 273-277; Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp. 92-164; and
Brown 2000: pp. 242-246.
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4.3.2 The 1992 Elections
Prior to the elections on 29 December 1992 the Moi regime undertook various
measures to derail the democratization process and to increase its chances of emerging
victorious from the elections. The Moi regime used the state machinery and its financial
resources to ensure that there was no level playing field between KANU and the
opposition parties prior to the elections.
After opposition parties had been officially registered in early 1992, the civil
service, mainly the provincial administration and the police, created many obstacles for
the opposition parties to organize effectively. For instance, the provincial administration
frequently delayed the registration of their local branches. As a result they lost valuable
time in setting up an organizational structure throughout the country. Furthermore in
granting permits for political meetings the district commissioners were clearly biased in
favor of KANU. While the government party frequently held political meetings without
having any permission, the issuing of permissions for political rallies of opposition
parties was frequently denied, delayed or canceled shortly before the meeting was to
take place. Another measure to hinder the opposition to organize effectively was the
“zoning” of parts of the country. KANU declared parts of the Rift Valley and the North-
Eastern Province as “KANU-only” areas and refused the entry of members of the
opposition to these areas. During the voter registration period from 8 June to 20 July
1992 many irregularities occurred. In delaying the issuing of identity cards to younger
voters, who were considered potential voters for opposition parties, the local
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administrations made it impossible for an estimated one million young voters to
register.'®^
Another strategy of the Moi regime to derail the democratization process was
the use of the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) to stigmatize the opposition
parties. KBC s television and radio coverage of the electoral campaign was clearly
biased in focusing “on positive news as related to KANU and negative news as related
to opposition parties”.*®^ Until two weeks prior to the elections any access to broadcast
media was denied to the opposition parties. Only the two daily newspapers “Standard”
and “Daily Nation” tried to remain neutral in giving KANU and the opposition parties
ample coverage. However, the balanced coverage of the print media could not
counterbalance the clearly biased coverage of the broadcast media in a country “where
the overwhelming majority of the people live in rural areas and literacy levels are not
high”.'^^
The Moi regime also boosted its chances to win the elections on 29 December
1992 by amending the Kenyan constitution in its favor. The Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment) Act, which was adopted by the Kenyan parliament in August 1992,
stipulated that a presidential candidate could only win if he received a simple majority
of the total vote and at least 25% of the vote in five of Kenya’s eight provinces. If none
of the candidates was able to meet this requirement, a run-off election between the two
See Barkan 1993: p. 93; wa Mutua 1992b: p.l4; Geekie 1993: p. 15; Muigai 1993: pp. 29/30; and IRl
1993: pp. 19 and 29/30.
IRI 1993: p. 32.
Muigai 1993: p. 31.
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candidates that received the highest number of votes would take place.'"* Furthermore,
the Act stipulated that the president must form the government exclusively from among
members of his own political party and forbade the formation of coalition
1 no
governments.
In another measure aimed at boosting KANU’s chances to retain a parliamentary
majority after the elections on 29 December 1992, the Electoral Commission did not
consider redrawing Kenya’s 188 constituencies / electoral districts that were created in
1987.”® As a result the sparsely populated North-Eastern Province (141,000 registered
voters), a KANU stronghold, contained ten constituencies, which translated on average
into 14,100 voters per seat, while Nairobi (674,000 registered voters)'”, an opposition
stronghold, contained only eight constituencies, which translated into more than 84,000
voters per seat. These flagrant inequalities concerning the degree of representation per
electoral district can be considered to violate chapter III, section 42(3) of Kenya’s
constitution, which states that “all constituencies shall contain as nearly equal numbers
Foeken and Dietz pointed out that the legislation did not specify for instance what “had to be done if
the leading candidate did not meet this requirement” but the one coming in second did or what “had
to happen if after the run-off elections, the two candidates still did not muster the 25 percent clause”
(Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 130). They also pointed out that despite these shortcomings “the bill sailed
smoothly through parliament without any amendments and with only one vote against” (Foeken /
Dietz 2000: p. 130). They further pointed out that there was complete silence from Kenya’s
opposition parties when this bill was passed prompting the Attorney-General to ask: “’Are [the
opposition] admitting that the current president can fulfill that 25 per cent requirement and that any
other presidential candidate cannot?”’ (quoted in Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 130 based on The Weekly
Review, 14 August 1992: p. 15).
See Foeken / Dietz 2000: pp. 129-130; Fox 1996: pp. 605-607; and Kibwana 1998: pp. 225-226. In
contrast to Hartmann, Christof 1999: p. 197; Brown 2000: p. 235; and Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 130,
Kibwana pointed out that “Act No. 6 of 1992 did not bar coalition government even if that was the
intention of some legislators. The language of the clause in question does not foreclose coalition
government” (Kibwana 1998: p. 225).
In 1987, 30 constituencies were added to the 158 constituencies that were created in 1966.
When 30 new constituencies were created in 1987 not a single one was created in Nairobi although
its population increased from 509,286 in 1969 to 1,324,570 in 1989 according to official statistics.
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of inhabitants as appears to the [Electoral] Commission to be reasonably practicable”."^
Moi also refused to reconstitute the Electoral Commission to include persons acceptable
to all parties as demanded by the opposition, preferring instead to leave in place the
commissioners he had appointed prior to legalizing opposition parties."^
Finally, Moi’s government tried to show Kenyans and the world that pluralism
wouldn’t work in Kenya by fomenting ethnic violence in parts of the Rift Valley and
western Kenya. In these areas senior government officials and KANU leaders
encouraged members of Moi’ s Kalenjin ethnic group to beat up the members of the
Luo, Luhyia and Kikuyu ethnic groups, who were believed to be supporters of the
opposition. As a result of the ethnic violence in parts of the Rift Valley and in
western Kenya, thousands of people were displaced and had therefore no opportunity to
register as voters. In response to the ethnic violence the Church of the Province of
Kenya (CPK) released a sixteen-page pastoral letter"^ to the press on 26 April 1992 in
which it outlined the history of the clashes and blamed the government for failing to
prevent them. Holmquist and Ford pointed out that “international criticism was muted
by the rural and seemingly primordial ethnic character of the clashes, their episodic
occurrence, and the absence of a menacing government security force. The clashes
worked a political miracle for the regime. They helped unite fractious Kalenjin
Quoted after Fox 1996: p. 603.
See Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 131; Chege 1994: p. 68; and Fox 1996: pp. 597-604.
' Galia Sabar-Friedman pointed out that the “clashes started as sporadic, local, and unorganized
attacks, involving small numbers of people. As time passed and no police action occurred, the scale
and scope of the clashes increased. Looting, rape, the burning down of entire villages, and killings
became an everyday reality in large parts of the country. Armed gangs of men attacked villagers day
and night with impunity” (Sabar-Friedman 1995: p. 444).
On 22 April 1992, a pastoral letter was read in all Catholic churches of Kenya in which “the Catholic
bishops charged the state with complicity in these atrocities” (Chege 1994: p. 74, endnote 9).
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subgroups while ‘opening up’ land that would be taken over by some Kalenjin and
driving likely opposition voters out of Rift Valley constituencies”."^
In the light of an opposition divided into three main parties and the various
measures of the Moi regime to influence the outcome of the elections in its favor, it is
hardly surprising that Moi and KANU emerged victorious from Kenya’s first multiparty
presidential and parliamentary elections in twenty-seven years on 29 December 1 992.
Moi won the presidential elections with 36.35% of the vote. He was also the only
candidate who received at least 25% in five of Kenya’s eight provinces. The
presidential candidate of FORD-Asili, Kenneth Matiba, came in second with 26.00% of
the vote, while the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, Mwai Kibaki,
finished third with 19.45% of the vote, just before the presidential candidate ofFORD-
Kenya, Oginga Odinga, who received 17.48% of the vote.'" The opposition candidates
together received approximately 3.3 million votes while Moi received approximately
1.9 million votes. As the table in Appendix B and the figure in Appendix C show,
ethnic considerations were the single most important factor in determining voters’
choices. Moi’s support was strongest among his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin in the
Rift Valley Province, and among various smaller ethnic groups in the North-Eastern
Province and the Coast Province. Matiba’ s support was strongest among the Kikuyu
of the Central Province and in Nairobi. He also received a significant amount of votes
Holmquist / Ford 1995: p. 178. See also Africa Confidential, 8 May 1992, p. 2; wa Mutua 1992b: p.
14; Muigai 1993: p. 31/32; Human Rights Watch / Africa Watch 1993:pp. 1-97; Chege 1994: pp. 69-
70; and Mair 1994: pp. 94-103.
These percentage figures have been calculated by the author based on the results as announced in the
Daily Nation on 5 January 1993 (Appendix B).
Moi made offers of Vice Presidential appointments in case of his victory to the leaders of various
smaller ethnic groups like the Kisii, Mem and Kamba to gain their support.
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from the Luhya in the Western Provinee, since is running mate, Shikuku, was from that
ethnic group. Kibaki also received support from the Kikuyu of the Central Province,
however, to a lesser extend than Matiba. As the GEMA torchbearer Kibaki’s support
was strongest among the Mcru and Embu of the Eastern Province. Odinga’s support
was strongest among the Luo of the Nyan/a Province. The table in Appendix D shows
the results of the parliamentary elections by province. KANU managed to win 100 scats
in the National Assembly mainly because of the fact that the electoral districts were not
drawn on an equitable basis. This was to the advantage of KANU, since it received
most of its support in less densely populated areas. FORD-Kcnya and FORD-Asili won
31 seats each and the Democratic Party won 23 scats. Three smaller parties won one
seat each. Like the presidential elections also the parliamentary elections show a direct
relationship between ethnicity and voting behavior. FORD-Asili and the Democratic
Party won most of their scats in the Central Province, which is home to the Kikuyu.
FORD-Kcnya won most of its scats in the Nyanza Province, which is home to the Luo,
and KANU won most of its scats in the Rift Valley Province, which is home to the
Kalenjin."^
4.3.3 The 1997 Elections
While Kenya’s opposition parties became even more divided than they were
prior to the 1992 elections, different elements of Kenya’s vibrant and resilient civil
society joined forces to push for constitutional and administrative reforms prior to
Kenya’s second multiparty elections during the 1990s on 29 December 1997.
Mair 1994: pp. 109-1 16; Muigai 1995: pp. 185-191; Oyugi 1997: pp. 57-66;
and Foeken / Dietz
2000: pp. 126-129.
48
The process of further fragmentation of Kenya’s opposition started after the
death of the leader of FORD-Kenya, Oginga Odinga, on 20 January 1994. Thereafter
the Second Vice-Chairman, the Luhya Kijana Wamalwa, assumed the leadership of
FORD-Kenya. As a result of personal animosities and factional rivalries over tactics
FORD-Kenya experienced three high profile defections. First, the FORD-Kenya MPs
Paul Muite and Kiraitu Murungi together with the fonner director of Kenya’s Wildlife
Service, Richard Leaky, founded a new party called Safina'^® on 13 May 1995. Safina
tried to become a multiethnic platform for refomi. However, its effectiveness as a
political party was curtailed by that fact that the Moi regime refused to register Safina
as a political party until a few weeks before the 1997 elections. Second, also in 1995 the
political scientist and FORD-Kenya MP Peter Anyang Nyong’o joined the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and became its head. By doing so he raised the profile of this
party. Third, as a result of tensions between the head of FORD-Kenya, Kijana
Wamalwa, and Odinga’s son, Raila Odinga, the latter left the party in December 1996
and revitalized the National Development Party (NDP). Matiba’s FORD-Asili was
weakened by defections to KANU. As a result of tensions surrounding Matiba’s call for
a boycott of the 1997 elections Kimani wa Nyoike left FORD-Asili to found a new
party called FORD People. Out of the three main opposition parties that emerged during
1992 only the Democratic Party (DP) was not significantly weakened by defections
except for Chairty Ngilu’s defection to the SDP to become its presidential candidate.
She actually became Kenya’s first female presidential candidate ever. However, DP’s
Safina means the ark in Swahili.
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presidential candidate, Kibaki, was not really weakened by Ngilu’s defection, since he
benefited from Matiba’s boycott of the elections.'^'
As has been shown in chapter 4.3.2 there was no level playing field between
KANU and the opposition parties prior to the 1992 elections. The creation of such a
level playing field through constitutional and other legal reforms became a major goal
of Kenya’s civil society and opposition parties prior to the 1997 elections. Between
1994 and 1997 the efforts to bring about major reforms were led first and foremost by a
politically savvy coalition of various civil society groups. As shown above, Kenya’s
opposition parties were not in a position to push for significant reforms, since jostling
for political advantages and strategies paralyzed and further divided them. In November
1994 the Kenya Human Rights Commission, the Law Society of Kenya and the Kenya
section of the International Commission of Jurists joined forces to produce a “Proposal
for a Model Constitution”. Subsequently they launched “large-scale civic education
campaigns via the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (CCCC) to explain the
model to the public and to compare it with the existing constitution”.'^^ The CCCC
grew rapidly and incorporated more than fifty civil society groups and had an estimated
4 million members by the end of 1997. Subsequently a National Convention Planning
Committee (NCPC) was formed with the aim to convene a National Constitutional
Assembly (NCA). The first of three such NCAs during 1997 took place from 4-6 April
and brought together about 600 participants from Kenya’s political, social, and
economic life. During this meeting agreement was reached in principle on how to
See Ahluwalia 1996: pp. 60-67; Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp. 566-574; Barkan / Ng’ethe 1998: p.42;
and Southall 1998: p. 106.
Kiai 1998: p. 189.
50
proceed with reforms. Prior to the 1997 elections a minimum agenda of reforms aimed
at ensuring free and fair elections should have been implemented and more
comprehensive reforms thereafter. “The NCA mandated NCPC which it re-named
National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) to be its executive arm to implement
these measures
. In response to the efforts of the NCEC to bring about reforms, the
Moi regime refused to talk to its representatives and embarked on a strategy to divide
the until then broad based movement for constitutional and legal reforms that included
various opposition politicians besides many different civil society groups. During May,
June and July 1997 the NCEC organized a series of unlicensed meetings to push its
message of “No reforms, no elections”, which were attended by many people. The Moi-
regime responded to these meetings with unprecedented terror and violence. As a
result of increasing donor pressure' Moi agreed to negotiate a reform package with
MPs while he continued to refuse to talk to the NCEC. The NCEC responded to the
possibility of some sort of compromise being worked out between moderate elements
within KANU and opposition MPs with a continuation of its program of mass action,
demanded that comprehensive reforms be carried out before and not after the elections
and called for the creation of a Constituent Assembly and a parallel government. In an
effort to prevent a further escalation of an already very tense situation, members of
Murungi 2000: p. 76.
“For example, at a May 3 1 rally in Nairobi, as Rev. Njoya led a prayer session, the police used tear
gas to disperse the gathered people. In the ensuing melee, riot police and paramilitaries engaged
reform supporters in running battles. At the subsequent July 7 (Saba Saba) demonstrations, held in 56
cities and towns, an estimated 20-25 people died (Brown 2000: footnote 51 on page 253).
In July 1997 the IMF suspended its $220 million Enhanced Stmctural Adjustment Facility program.
“The World Bank and other bilateral donors followed suit, bringing the total amount in suspended
aid to overU.S. $400 million - more than the total amount of aid suspended in 1991. [...] At the
same time, bilateral donors, led by the United States, publicly urged the government to enter into a
dialogue with the opposition on the matter of constitutional reform” (Barkan 1998: 218).
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Kenya’s religious community distanced themselves from the NCEC and formed the
Religious Community Mediation Team (RCMT). However, RCMT was unable to
facilitate any talks between the government and NCEC representatives, since the former
outright refused such talks. As a result of the “radicalization” ofNCEC many
opposition MPs involved with it left the organization and formed together with other
opposition MPs and moderate KANU MPs the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
(IPPG). By early September 1997 the IPPG had successfully negotiated a package of
minimal reforms to clear the way for the upcoming elections. This reform package,
which was supported by Moi for tactical reasons, included such measures as
“opposition representation on the Electoral Commission, rights to assemble without
police permits, curbs on the powers of chiefs, the possibility of a coalition government,
and equal access by the opposition to the government-run media”. When deciding to
support this reform package Moi hoped that this would take the wind out of the sails of
the NCEC and that it would further divide the opposition in supporters of this package
and opponents who rejected it as not far reaching enough and consequently would boost
his chances of being reelected for another five year term and KANU’s chances of
1 27
holding on to its parliamentary majority in the upcoming elections.
Even so the IPPG reform package was intended to create a more level playing
field for the upcoming elections, the elections on 29/30 December 1997 were, like the
1992 elections, dominated by President Moi and KANU. President Moi and KANU
benefited from the fact that Moi dissolved the National Assembly abruptly on 10
Holmquist / Ford 1998: p. 236.
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November 1997, “barely one day after the last of the IPPG bills became law”.'^* As a
result, the IPPG agreements could not sufficiently level the electoral playing field. For
instance, legal edicts on how to implement the new laws were not in place and even so
the Electoral Commission was enlarged to include members of the opposition it had
already completed all major tasks for the 1997 elections such as voter registration and
the creation of new constituencies.*^^ The fact that the IPPG reforms were fairly
minimal and not even fully implemented by the time the elections took place, together
with the fact that the opposition was even more divided than in 1992 enabled Moi and
KANU once more the emerge victorious from the 1997 elections. Moi was reelected for
a final five-year term with 40.12% of the vote, a slightly better result than in 1992 when
he had received 36.35% of the vote. Like in 1992 he was the only candidate who
received at least 25% in five of Kenya’s eight provinces. Mainly due to the fact that
Matiba of FORD-Asili boycotted the elections, Kibaki of the Democratic Party finished
second with 31 .09% of the vote. Raila Odinga of the National Democratic Party
finished third with 10.92% of the vote, Kijana Wamalwa of Ford-Kenya finished fourth
with 8.29% of the vote, and Charity Ngilu of the Social Democratic Party finished fifth
with 7.71% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections KANU won 107 seats and all
See Kiai 1998; pp. 189-192; Ndegwa 1998; pp. 195-197; Barkan 1998; pp. 217-222; Holmquist/
Ford 1998; pp. 234-239; Brown 2000; 250-255; Murungi 2000; pp. 72-81; Adar 2000; pp. 123-124;
and Schmitz 2001; pp. 160-165.
Ndegwa 1998; p. 205.
When the Electoral Commission created 22 new constituencies in 1996 it did not created a single
new constituency in the opposition stronghold Nairobi for instance and by doing so did not rectify
the already existing malapportionment that favored KANU (see Ndegwa 1998; p. 208).
The results are taken from The Weekly Review, No. 1 174, 9 January 1998, p. 20.
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the opposition parties together won 103'^' of 210 seats. Compared with 1992 the
opposition parties did better in 1997 because its candidates could campaign more freely
in all parts of the country as a result of the IPPG-rcforms. As the tables in Appendix E
and Appendix F show ethnicity basically determined voter’s choices as was the case in
the 1992 elections. Moi and KANU did well among the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley and
among various smaller ethnic groups. Kibaki and DP got most of their support from the
Kikuyu in the Central Province, Nairobi and pockets of the Rift Valley as well as the
Embu and Mem of the Eastern Province. Odinga and NDP did very well only among
the Luo in the province of Nyanza while Wamalwa and Ford-Kcnya did very well only
among the Luhya of the Western Province. The support of Ngilu and the SDP was
mainly limited to the ethnic group of the Kamba in the Eastern Province. While only
about 5,000 domestic observers monitored the 1992 elections, the 1997 elections were
monitored by more than 28,000 domestic observers who were recruited, trained, and
posted to polling stations throughout the country by a coalition of the Catholic Justice
and Peace Commission (CJPC), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK),
and the Institute of Education for Democracy (lED). This positive development
indicates a willingness of various elements of Kenya’s civil society to play a
constructive role in the political process, including the constitutional review process.
DP won 39 seats, NDP won 21 seats, FORD-Kenya won 17 seats, SDP won 15 seats, Safina won
five seats, and four smaller parties altogether won six seats.
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4.3.4 Constitutional Reform
Successful negotiations of comprehensive constitutional reforms involving all
relevant segments of Kenyan society “could lay the foundation for bringing the
democratic transition to a successful conclusion”. While the IPPG reform package,
which was adopted by the National Assembly in November 1997, contained various
positive elements such as the recognition that Kenya would remain a multiparty
republic and the requirement that the president had to appoint the twelve non-elected
members of parliament from all the parties represented on a proportional basis, it left
various issues of great importance untouched. For instance, the IPPG reform package
did not reduce the immense power of the president. Under the current constitutional
framework the president appoints the attorney general and the chiefjustice without
external checks. This greatly diminishes the independence of the judiciary.
Furthermore, “the president is literally above the law”.'^'^ Section 14 of the current
constitution makes it impossible to bring criminal or civil charges against him while in
office. There is no mechanism in place by which parliament could question or remove
the president from office. Comprehensive constitutional reforms must include measures
to strengthen Kenya’s parliament vis-a-vis the president and to increase the
independence and efficiency of the judiciary. Significant electoral reforms must be
another key component of the ongoing constitutional review process. In 1992 and in
1997 Moi was elected while more voters voted against him than for him, since under the
current electoral system a simple majority is sufficient as long as the top vote-getter
See Peters 1998: pp. 51-55; Ajulu 1998: pp. 275-285; Barkan 1998: pp. 223-225; Steeves 1999: pp.
75-81; and Foeken / Dietz 2000: pp. 141-146.
Barkan / Ng’ethe 1998: p. 46.
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receives at least 25% in five of Kenya’s eight provinces. As a result of reforming the
electoral laws the 25% rule should be eliminated, since the population size of Kenya’s
eight provinces varies greatly. Furthermore, an absolute majority (50%-plus) should be
required to elect the president. This would almost certainly result in a run-off election
between the two top vote-getters, which in turn would facilitate the formation of inter-
ethnic alliances. Regarding the parliamentary elections at the very least the severe
malapportionment'^^ of Kenya’s electoral districts needs to be rectified so as to ensure
that each electoral district contains more or less the same number of registered voters.
Furthermore, it should be considered to replace the plurality system with single-member
constituencies with a system of proportional representation or a mixed system. This
would most likely reduce the saliency of ethnicity in the electoral process. Finally, the
issue of decentralization and possibly the creation of a federal framework should be
addressed as well in the context of a comprehensive constitutional review.
In contrast to the period after the 1992 elections, the issue of constitutional
reform was not put on the back burner for some time after the 1997 elections but was
kept pretty much on the front burner by various civil society groups. The IPPG reform
package that was adopted prior to the 1997 elections foresaw a comprehensive
constitutional reform process after the elections. However, this process got caught in
fundamental differences on how to proceed between different stakeholders. On the one
Brown 2000: p. 381.
After the 1992 elections an MP from an electoral district with a high number of voters represented
seven times more voters than an MP from an electoral district with a low number of voters. The
creation of 22 new electoral districts in 1996 failed to address this imbalance
(see Ndegwa 1998: pp.
206-208).
See Muigai 1995: pp. 194-195; Barkan / Ng’ethe 1998: pp. 45-47;
Southall 1998: pp. 1 10-1 1 1; and
Ndegwa 1998: pp. 202-208.
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side there were the KANU hardliners who wanted to make as little concessions as
possible and who therefore wanted to control the entire process. To ensure their control
over the process they wanted to keep it within the parliament where KANU together
with its defacto coalition partner NDP enjoyed a solid majority. On the other side there
were various civic and religious groups organized in the NCEC who were opposed to a
government controlled process and who favored a broad based Constitutional Assembly
and a referendum. In 1998 it looked like that a compromise was found when agreement
was reached to establish a three-tired structure' to undertake a comprehensive
constitutional review. Regrettably, this agreement was short lived. In May 1999 Moi
announced that parliament alone would review Kenya’s constitution and on 15
December 1999 the National Assembly created a Select Committee on Constitutional
Reform to “collect views from the public and propose amendments to the Constitution
ofKenya Review Act”.'^^ In response representatives of the NCEC, the LSK, the
NCCK and the National Council ofNGOs launched a parallel people-driven
constitutional review process, which became known as the Ufungamano'^^ Initiative.
On 3 November 2000 the chairman of the parliamentary Select Committee, Raila
Odinga, revealed the names of the 15 members of the Constitution of Kenya Review
Commission (CKRC). Professor Yash Pal Ghai was selected to chair the CKRC.
However, he refused to “be sworn in by the president without bringing together the
Under this structure besides the Constitutional Review Commission two other bodies were to be
established. The District Consultative Forum (DCF) was to bring together representatives of Kenya’s
sixty-five districts, while the National Constitutional Consultative Forum (NCCF) was to bring
together a broad range of politically active domestic organizations (See Schmitz 2001; p. 167).
Murungi 2000: p. 87.
Ufungamano means “coming together” in Swahili.
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parliamentary and Ufungamano groups”."^® By the end of January 2001 Professor Ghai
finally took the oath of office after the Ufungamano and the parliamentary group had
reached agreement in principle to merge. On 21 March 2001 Ufungamano delegates
voted in favor of uniting with the CKRC."^’ This move was criticized by Prof Kibwana
of the NCEC, Paul Muite of Safina and Prof Anyang’ Nyong’o of SDP. They feared
that CKRC was not sufficiently independent and that KANU and NDP would dominate
its work. During the rest of the year 2001 and the first couple of month of the year 2002
the CKRC has been conducting civic education programs throughout the country. In
late March 2002 it became clear that the CKRC would not be able to finish its work by
the 4 October 2002 deadline. It is not clear yet whether its mandate will have to be
extended until December 2002 or June 2003 and whether the upcoming parliamentary
and presidential elections will take place before or after Kenya has a new constitution.
Before a new constitution is adopted the CKRC will collect the views of the public in
all 210 electoral districts. Then a National Constitutional Conference and possibly also
a referendum are expected to take place to approve Kenya’s new constitution.
4.3.5 Summary
While it initially appeared that FORD might easily win the 1992 elections, this
did not materialize. It didn’t happen because the party split along ethnic lines into
Holmquist /Oendo 200 1
:
p. 200 1
.
It was agreed upon that as a result of the merger the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) would
have 15 members in the CKRC and the Ufungamano Initiative would have 12 members.
See Brown 2000: pp. 393-402; Adar 2000: pp. 124-127; Schmitz 2001: pp. 166-169; and Holmquist /
Oendo 2001: pp. 203-204. For the part covering 2001 and 2002 also various articles in The Nation
and the East African as well as various articles from wire services have been consulted.
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FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya as a result of personal animosities among its leaders
Odinga and Matiba. Except for Safina and SDP, Kenya’s parties were mainly formed
along the ethnic cleavage and besides ethnicity, there is very little that could be used to
distinguish Kenya’s main political parties from each other. Ideological and
programmatic differences are almost nonexistent. Only SDP was somewhat more left
leaning than the other main parties, since it took a more critical position towards
economic reform and the role of the World Bank and the IMF. During the electoral
campaigns in 1992 and 1997 ethnicity was the most important vehicle to mobilize
voters. As a result Kenya’s parties developed strong ethnoregional bases of support.
Neither the 1992 nor the 1997 elections can be considered to have been free and fair. As
has been shown in chapter 4.3.2 the Moi regime severely restricted the ability of the
opposition parties to operate freely prior to the 1992 elections. As a result of the IPPG
reform package Kenya’s opposition parties were able to campaign somewhat more
freely during the last six weeks before the 1997 elections. This might also explain to a
certain extent why they won more seats in 1997 than in 1992. The role of donors can be
best summarized by saying that they “have kept one foot on the accelerator and the
other on the break”. While donor pressure had a catalytic effect on the efforts of
Kenya’s opposition to bring about a return to multiparty politics prior to the 1992
elections and the IPPG reforms prior to the 1997 elections, Kenya’s donors also
prevented more substantive reforms from taking place. Fearing instability Kenya’s
donors resumed aid after the 1 992 and the 1 997 elections, “in spite of the problematic
nature of the polls and the government’s demonstrably weak commitment to
Brown 2000: pp. 284/285.
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democracy”. By doing so donors undermined the efforts of domestic actors to bring
about more substantive changes. Kenya’s vibrant civil society, especially the churches,
played a crucial role in bringing about Kenya’s constitutional review process, since the
mid 1990s."‘^
4.4 Prospects for Democratic Consolidation
The prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya will depend, among other
factors, on the outcome of the ongoing constitutional reform process. A new
constitution that reduces the excessive powers of the president and that establishes an
electoral system that will facilitate more interethnic coalitions would create a more
conducive environment for democratic consolidation. Such an electoral system would
make an important contribution towards transforming Kenya’s current zero-sum game
of ethnic politics “into a non-zero-sum game that many players can join, guided by a
tolerant political culture”. The creation of more interethnic alliances could set in
motion a process of decreasing the saliency of the ethnic factor in Kenyan politics and
of increasing the likelihood of building more and more winning coalitions based on
programs and ideas. Ultimately it could result in a situation in which the choices of
voters are no longer mainly determined by the ethnicity of the presidential candidate but
by the policies and programs he or she stands for.
Brown, Stephen 2001: p. 735.
See Brown 2000: pp. 281-286 and 402-411; Brown, Stephen 2001: pp. 734-736; and chapters 4.3.1
to 4.3.4 of this thesis.
Barkan / Ng’ethe 1998: p. 45.
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The massive civic education campaigns that are being carried out in urban as
well as rural Kenya in the context of the ongoing constitutional reform process can be
considered as a first step to develop a democratic political culture throughout Kenya.
The existence of a large number of civil society organizations with the ability to
nurture, articulate and aggregate the pro-democracy public opinion that undoubtedly
exists in Kenya also increases the prospects for democratic consolidation. While the
involvement of civil society in the democratic process was mainly limited to urban
areas during the first half of the 1990s, the heavy involvement"*^ of various churches in
observing the 1997 elections resulted for the first time in a mobilization of civil society
across rural areas. A further positive development regarding the prospects for
democratic consolidation is the working together of opposition MPs and civil society
representatives in the context of the NCEC and the Ufungamano Initiative on
constitutional reform.
Finally, for democratic consolidation to take place, the Kenyan state needs to
become less influenced by neopatrimonialism. In a neopatrimonalistic system politics
and elections do not revolve around competing ideas and ideologies and “most political
parties can be viewed as ethnoregional attempts to gain control of the state and
distribute its benefits to their home province and supporters”.'"*^ This contributes to the
instability of opposition parties, since its members are easily co-opted by the ruling
party. Decentralization and the development of a stronger private sector could
contribute towards reducing the influence of neopatriomonialism on Kenya’s political
The churches provided over four-fifths of the more than 28,000 local election observers.
Brown 2000; p. 411.
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system. Various political developments such as the ones described above that took place
in Kenya during the last twelve years have increased the prospects for democratic
consolidation. However, it will still take many years before Kenya can be called a
consolidated democracy.*"*^
See Barkan / Ng’ethe 1998: pp. 45-47; and
Harbeson 1998: pp. 167-180.
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CHAPTERS
MALAWI
The land-locked Republic of Malawi is located in Southeastern Africa and
covers a total area of 1 18, 484 sq km (45, 747 sq miles). Appendix G contains a map of
Malawi that shows its three regions as well as major cities and towns. Malawi is
Africa’s third most densely populated country. According to a 1998 census Malawi has
a total population of 9,933,868. 47% of Malawi’s population live in the Southern
Region, 41% live in the Central Region, and only 12% live in the Northern Region.
Malawi is home to various ethnic groups. The Chewa who mainly live in the Central
Region are Malawi’s largest ethnic group (50.2%). The Lomwe (14.5%) and the Yao
(13.8%), who both live in the Southern Region, are Malawi’s second and third largest
ethnic groups respectively. The Tumbuka (9.1%), who live in the Northern Region, are
Malawi’s fourth largest ethnic group. The other ethnic groups are all fairly small.
Despite its multiethnic character Malawi posses a considerable ethno-linguistic
uniformity. 75% of Malawi’s population understand its national language, Chichewa.’^^
5.1 Historical Context
The period prior to the onset of political liberalization in Malawi in the early
1990s was dominated by one person, namely the western-trained medical practitioner
Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Banda returned to Malawi, which was then the British
See Decalo 1995: pp. xi-xvi; Kaspin 1995: pp. 598-602; Meinhardt 1997: p. 54; Decalo 1998: pp.
50-
56; and Hutcheson 2001: p.590.
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Protectorate Nyasaland, on 6 July 1958 after having spent more than 40 years abroad'^'
following an invitation of several young Malawians around Henry Chipembere to lead
the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC). They were looking for an older individual to
mobilize the still age-oriented people of the countryside for the struggle for
independence. They viewed him basically as an interim “front-man”, and hoped that he
“would confine himself to a symbolic role while they wielded real power”. However,
things did not quite turn out as they had envisaged, since they gave him too much
power. Already his return, when thousands of people turned out to welcome him,
indicated that he soon was to become Malawi’s most powerful man for about three
decades. In early 1959 the NAC launched a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience
to push for self-government and to fight for the right to secede from the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (FRN), which was formed in 1953 between Northern and
Southern RJiodesia as well as Nyasaland. In response, the British colonial
administration banned the NAC and imprisoned Banda for more than a year in Southern
RJiodesia. While Banda was imprisoned Orton Chirwa and Aleke Banda founded the
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in September 1959 to replace the banned NAC. The
MCP had a broad base transcending ethnicity. After Banda was released from prison in
April 1960 he was elected head of the MCP and given absolute powers. This enabled
him to transform the party into his personal instrument and to make “Unity, Loyalty,
He studied in the United States for several years. First, he studied at Wilberforce Academy in Ohio
from where he received a BA in History and Politics. Then he studied medicine at Meharry College
in Tennessee and at the University of Chicago from where he received an MD. After some further
studies at the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in Edinburgh he practiced medicine in
Liverpool, North Shields, and subsequently in Willesden, North London where he established a
successful medical practice. Before returning to Malawi he had practiced medicine in Ghana (Decalo
1998: pp. 59-60; and Mchombo 1998: pp. 22-23).
Cullen 1994: p. 12.
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Obedience and Discipline” the sacred tenets of the MCP. In the quest for political unity
the use of intimidation against political opponents soon became the rule. In this climate
of fear supporters of smaller parties'^^ were “regarded as traitors to the nationalist cause
and sell-outs to the British”. Consequently the MCP won a landslide victory in the
1961 elections to the Legislative Council. The MCP received 99% of the vote of the
enfranchised Africans. This marked the beginning of defacto single-party rule. In
February 1963 Nyasaland became self-governing with Banda as Prime Minister. As a
result of the climate of fear created by Banda, Malawi’s smaller parties did not dare to
nominate any candidates for the pre-independence elections in April 1964.
Subsequently, the elections were cancelled, since all MCP candidates would have run
unopposed, and all smaller parties were disbanded. Even before Nyasaland became
formally independent as Malawi on 6 July 1964 Banda had emerged as an autocratic
and dictatorial ruler. His determination to hold on to power and to reject any form of
dissent was echoed in a speech he gave at a political rally in Blantyre in May 1964. In
this speech he said, “. . .This kind of thing where the leader says this but somebody else
says that: now who is the leader? That is not the Malawi system. The Malawi system,
the Malawi style is that Kamuzu says it’s just that, and then it’s fmished”.'^^
The only serious challenge to Bandas’s rule until the early 1990s arose just two
months after Malawi’s independence. It came from some of his cabinet ministers who
had originally invited him back to Malawi to lead the struggle for independence. They
The two smaller parties were the United Federal Party and the Christian Liberation Party.
Brown 2000: p. 124.
Quoted after Cullen 1994: p. 13. See also Kalipeni 1992: 33-34; Cullen 1994: pp. 10-13; Posner
1995: pp. 133-134; Decalo 1995: pp. xvii-xix; Decalo 1998: pp. 58-61; Muluzi 1999: pp.
68-77;
Meinhardt 1999: p. 549; and Brown 2000: pp. 123-124.
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seriously disagreed with Banda on various programmatic and ideological issues' as
well as his leadership style‘^\ As a result Banda dismissed three Cabinet ministers'^*
and one Parliamentary Secretary' on 8 September 1964. Subsequently three other
Cabinet ministers resigned in protest. During an emergency session of parliament the
ex-ministers appealed for support to the people in their constituencies but without
success. Consequently, they went into exile to Zambia and Tanzania. As a result of this
“cabinet crisis” Banda remained forever suspicious of his Cabinet and turned Malawi
into a virtual police state in which any potential opposition was crushed to prevent a
similar crisis. In 1966 Malawi’s parliament, which by then had became a mere rubber
stamp adopted a Republican Constitution with Banda as President and the MCP as
the dejure sole party. In 1971 the parliament unanimously changed Malawi’s
constitution to make Banda President for Life of the MCP and the country. By then
Banda had established total control over the political system. The Preventive Detention
Bill of 1964 and the Public Safety Regulations Act of 1965 enabled him to arrest and
detain anyone whom he considered a threat to his highly personalistic and
For instance they disagreed with Banda’s policy to maintain friendly relations with South Africa,
white ruled Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique, which was still under Portuguese colonial rule.
Furthermore they favored a more rapid Africanization of Malawi s civil service than Banda and they
were much more left leaning than the arch-conservative Banda.
There was a significant age difference between Banda and most of his ministers. He frequently
referred to them as his “boys” and by-passed them when making decisions.
Orton Chirwa, Minister of Justice and Attorney General; Augustine Bwanausi,
Minister of Labor and
Social Development; and Kanyama Chiume, Minister of External Affairs.
Rose Chibambo, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labor and Social
Development.
All MPs were basically hand picked by Banda.
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neopatrimonial regime. An independent judiciary did not exist.'^' A major tool of
Banda’s highly repressive regime was the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). They acted
as Its eyes and ears, especially in rural areas, and assured Banda’s total control over
Malawi’s political life right down to the village level. The MYP were directly
controlled by Banda and by 1987 this paramilitary force had about 60,000 members. In
an effort to further bolster his political dominance, Banda strictly controlled the flow of
information. Under the Censorship and Control of Entertainment Bill of 1968 anyone
who published “anything likely to undermine the authority of, or public confidence in,
the govemment”'^^ could be punished with imprisonment. To implement the Bill the
Malawi Censorship Board (MCB) was set up, which had banned 849 books, 100
periodicals and 16 films by 1975. Malawi’s two main newspapers “The Daily Times’’
and “Malawi News” were owned by one of Banda’s companies and Malawi’s only
radio station, the Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC), was run by the
government. Foreign journalists were not allowed to work in Malawi during most of
Banda’s rule. Finally, freedom of speech and association did not exist and trade unions
and other independent organizations of any significance were non-existent’^^ under
Banda’s autocratic and personal rule that lasted for three decades.’^'’
This is underlined by the following quote of Banda: “No matter what the Judges are saying [1 am] in
charge here, not the Judges” (quote taken from Decalo 1998: p. 67).
Quoted after Cullen 1994: p. 18.
Even Malawi’s churches came under intense scrutiny and were under constant surveillance.
See Chipeta 1992: p. 3; Kalipeni 1992: pp. 34-36; Cullen 1994: pp. 13-22; Meldrum 1995: pp. 57-59
Venter 1995: pp. 154-156; Meinhardt 1997: pp. 57-77; Decalo 1998: pp. 61-95; Mchombo 1998: pp.
23-28; Muluzi 1999: pp. 81-89; Newell 1999: pp. 203-205; and Brown 2000: pp. 125-128.
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5.2 Political Liberalization
Until 1992 opposition to the Banda regime was limited to various exile groups
such as the Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA), the Malawi Freedom Movement
(MAFREMO) and the Congress for a Second Republic (CSR) that were set up by exiled
politicians and intellectual dissidents. However, they did not pose a serious threat to the
Banda regime, since they “had been plagued by mutual suspicion, ethnic rivalry, and
inaction, owing to long years of exile, failed armed rebellion, harassment by Malawian
security agents and lack of international support”.'^^ As a result of the repressive nature
of the Banda regime and the climate of fear that it had created throughout the country,
significant opposition' to the regime did not develop within Malawi until 8 March
1992. On that date eight Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter entitled
“Living Our Faith” in which they inter alia condemned Malawi’s poor human rights
record and called for democratic reforms and greater political freedoms. Furthermore,
they expressed concern about the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor,
the spread of corruption, serious flaws within the educational system and cutbacks in
the area of health-care.'^^ The pastoral letter was read out in all Catholic churches and
Venter 1995; p. 157.
Already in June 1991 representatives of various exile groups, who were inspired by the formation of
the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, formed the United Front for Multiparty
Democracy (UFMD) with the aim of bringing together all the forces of democracy inside and outside
Malawi. Since November 1991 various anonymous letters and pamphlets critical of Kamuzu Banda,
John Tembo and Mama Kadzamira, who were known as Malawi s leadership triumvirate, were
circulating throughout the country. Modem technology such as fax machines and photocopiers were
used to get opposition documents of all sorts into Malawi and to distributed them rapidly,
anonymously and widely within urban areas.
The entire 12 page letter is reproduced in Cullen 1994; pp. 120-130. An edited version can be found
in Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, Vol. 5, No. 8 (May 1992), pp. 20-22.
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16,000 printed copies’^* were distributed. The multiparty elections in Zambia in
November 1991, the international support for democracy after the end of the Cold War
and the growing realization that issues ofjustice and human rights were integral to the
message of the gospel’^^ were among the reasons that prompted Malawi’s bishop’s to
write this letter. Trevor Cullen pointed out that the pastoral letter can be considered “as
the turning point and catalyst in Malawi’s struggle for democracy’’ and that it “acted as
a decisive breakthrough in dismantling Banda’s dictatorship’’.'”^^
Galvanized by the pastoral letter, about 100 Malawian opposition activists from
around the world met in Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, from 20 to 23 March 1992 to discuss
strategies for challenging Banda’s iron-fisted rule. Subsequently, the Interim Committee
for a Democratic Alliance (ICDA) was formed as a pressure group, “whose objectives
were to campaign peacefully for the restoration of basic human rights and democracy in
Malawi”. The secretary-general of the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination
Council (SATUCC), Chakufwa Chihana, was elected as ICDA’s chairman. When he
returned to Malawi on 6 April 1992 to build a broad based movement for democracy
inside Malawi, he was detained immediately by the authorities. His refusal to be cowed
by the fear of detention encouraged many ordinary Malawians to overcome their fear of
the internal security apparatus. Inspired by the criticism of the very low wages paid by
10,000 in Malawi’s main language Chichewa, 5,000 in Tumbuka and 1,000 in English.
Pope John Paul II urged the Malawian bishops to be more concerned with human rights and social
issues during a visit to Malawi in 1989. Subsequently, he called them to Rome, irritated by their
continued silence. Thereafter they started to draft the pastoral letter (Brown 2000: p. 145-146).
Cullen 1994: p.2. See also Cullen 1994: pp. 5-7 and 35-52; Newell 1995: pp. 246-251; and Muluzi
1999: pp. 137-141.
Venter 1995: p. 157.
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the government and the business community in the pastoral letter workers at a textile
factory in Blantyre started a strike on 6 May 1992, which quickly spread to other parts
of the country and included workers in urban as well as rural areas. The expression of
political discontent emerged as an important undercurrent of the strikes. On 7 May 1992
over 6,000 people demonstrated in Lilongwe and demanded Chihana’s unconditional
release and the introduction of a multiparty system. In response, the Banda regime tried
to crush the strikes and demonstrations. Police and paramilitary riot squads used tear
gas and batons to disperse the crowds. In the ensuing violence many were killed or
injured.
While Malawi’s Catholic bishops had basically started the process of political
liberalization, Malawi’s Protestant churches continued it. Soon after the issuing of the
Catholic bishops’ pastoral letter, the Blantyre Synod and the Livingstonia Synod'^^ of
the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) issued a statement in support of the
pastoral letter, which had been declared seditious by the Banda regime'^'*. Their
statement was supported by the World Alliance for Reformed Churches (WARC). In
August 1992 the Christian Council of Malawi (CCM), which represents various
Protestant churches, sent an open letter to the government in which it demanded the
holding of a referendum on a multiparty system. On 28 August 1992 the National
See Chipeta 1992: pp. 3-4; Venter 1995: pp. 157-159; Ihonvbere 1997: pp. 228-230; and Newell
1999: 214-216.
The Central Region’s Nkhoma Synod of the CCAP did not support the pastoral letter and instead
“continued to work with the MCP and portray Banda as ordained by God. In Dowa, the church
excommunicated suspected multiparty sympathizers” (Brown 2000: p. 144, footnote 30).
Subsequently, it was expelled from the CCAP and the Christian Council of Malawi (CCM) that
represented various Christian churches.
The Banda regime threatened with imprisonment everyone found in possession of the pastoral letter.
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Affairs Committee was formed, which was later renamed Public Affairs Committee
(PAC), since the Banda regime expressed objections to the use of the term “national”.
PAC was a broad based coalition of opposition forces that brought together the CCAP,
the CCM, the Catholic church, the Anglican church as well as Malawi’s Muslim
Association, Law Society and Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Various opposition
politicians were part ofPAC as well. PAC “was the very first entirely independent
political body to be constituted publicly in Malawi since the imposition of the one-party
system in 1966”.^^^ In a letter to President Banda the members ofPAC stressed the need
for new democratic structures and respect for human rights and called for a dialogue
with the government on these issues.
During 1992 two important political pressure groups emerged that would
become political parties in 1993 after Malawi ceased to be a dejure one party state. In
September 1992 the formation of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) with Chakufwa
Chihana as its chairman was officially announced. Chihana belongs to the ethnic group
of the Tumbuka that live in Malawi’s Northern Region. AFORD had its roots in the
northern town of Rumphi and its leading members were mainly northern intellectuals.
Many of them had served lengthy prison terms for dissident political activities.
AFORD’s support was mainly limited to the Northern Region. “The emergence of
AFORD gave impetus to the surfacing [in October 1992] of another previously
clandestine opposition group based in the major commercial city of Blantyre in the
[Southern Region]. This was the United Democratic Front (UDF), most of whose
Newell 1999: p. 221.
See Cullen 1994: 65-69; Ross 1995: pp. 101-105; Rwanda 1996: pp. 128-129; Meinhardt 1997: p.
170; Muluzi 1999: pp. 143-146; Newell 1999: pp. 220-221; and Brown 2000: pp. 141-142.
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members were successful businessmen and former MCP leaders who had fallen out
with Banda. The UDF eventually elected Bakili Muluzi, a Yao and a Muslim from the
south, as its chairman
. In short, the two main political groupings that emerged
during 1992 basically reflected the perceived ethnic and regional divisions of Malawi’s
society.
Until 1989 Malawi’s bi- and multilateral donors turned a blind eye to the grave
human rights abuses that were committed by the Banda regime. In the context of the
Cold War, Malawi’s donors appreciated its “staunch anti-communist foreign policy and
espousal of free market doctrines’’.'^’ However, Malawi’s favorable treatment by the
international donor community gradually changed in the early 1990s after the Cold War
had come to an end and Malawi’s strategic importance as a bulwark against
communism in Southern Africa ceased to exist. Human rights NGOs such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch / Africa Watch played an important role in
swaying donors’ perceptions of Malawi. For instance, in October 1990 Africa Watch
issued a report entitled “Where Silence Rules: The Suppression of Dissent in Malawi’’,
which detailed the systematic suppression of dissent by the Banda regime and in
February 1992 Amnesty International issued a report entitled “Malawi; Prison
conditions, cruel punishment and detention without trial’’. In April 1992, Amnesty
International informed the European Community (EC) and Malawi’s bilateral donors
about the attempt by senior MCP officials to kill the bishops who had issued the
pastoral letter. During a Consultative Group meeting held in Paris on 11-13 May 1992
Mchombo 1998: pp. 32-33.
See Cullen 1994: pp. 53-58; Venter 1995: pp. 163-164; Posner 1995: pp. 138-139; Muluzi 1999: pp.
141-143; and Newell 1999: pp. 221-222.
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Malawi’s government requested nearly $800 million in balance-of-payments support.
However, “the donors not only refused to renew such support, but also suspended new
aid [in the amount of $74 million] until significant political reform had been
implemented”,
As a result of Malawi’s high dependency on foreign aid’*', the suspension of
non-humanitarian aid had a very negative impact on Malawi’s economy and Banda
realized that without external support his regime would not be able to survive.
Therefore, he made some concessions in October 1992. On 3 October 1992 Banda
established the Presidential Committee on Dialogue (PCD). Comprised mainly ofMCP
members, the PCD was to engage in a dialogue with the various opposition groups
organized in the Public Affairs Committee (PAC). On 18 October 1992 Banda
announced that “a referendum would be held to decide whether the people wanted to
retain the one - party state or embrace a multiparty democracy”.'*^ In doing so he hoped
to legitimize the one-party rule of the MCP. The negotiations about the modalities of
the referendum took place between PCD and PAC. The Banda regime tried to influence
the referendum process in its favor by announcing a fairly early date (15 March 1 993)
for the referendum, which would have given the opposition very little time to campaign,
and by proposing the use of two separate ballot boxes, one for votes for and one for
votes against the multiparty system. The opposition threatened to boycott the
Cullen 1994; p. 62.
Brown 2000: p. 165. See also Cullen 1994: pp. 62-64; Venter 1995; pp. 159-161; Meinhardt 1997:
pp. 84-86; and Brown 2000: pp. 160-171.
In 1992 foreign aid amounted to 31.5% of Malawi’s Gross National Product (GNP) which was
almost triple the Sub-Saharan African average of 11.1%.
Quoted after Mchombo 1998: p. 33.
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referendum, if it was not held at a later date and if two separate ballot boxes would be
used. As a result of pressure from the United Nations (UN), which was involved in the
preparations, Banda finally agreed to postpone the referendum to 14 June 1993 and to
use only one ballot box and two different ballot papers. While making these concessions
the Banda regime still undertook various measures'^^ to try to ensure that a majority of
the voters would favor the continuation of the one-party system. However, when the
referendum took place on 14 June 1993 63.2% of the voters favored the introduction of
a multiparty system, while 34.5% of the voters favored the continuation of the one-party
system. 2.3% of the votes were invalid. The table in Appendix H and the figure in
Appendix I show clearly that voting took place along ethnoregional lines. The Northern
and the Southern Region, which are home to the Tumbuka and Yao ethnic groups
respectively, voted overwhelmingly for the introduction of the multiparty system while
the Central Region, which is home to the Chewa, Banda’s ethnic group, favored the
continuation of the one-party system. On 29 June 1993 Malawi’s parliament repealed
Article 4 of the Constitution clearing the way for the introduction of a multiparty
system.
Malawi’s churches played a leading role in the political liberalization process.
The pastoral letter of 8 March 1992 was the first public criticism of the Banda regime in
Permissions for rallies of supporters of a multiparty system were frequently denied by the police.
When they took place they were often disturbed by the Malawi Young Pioneers. Supporters of a
multiparty system were intimidated and the state controlled media called openly for the continuation
of the one-party system.
The very low support for the multiparty system in the electoral districts of Dedza and Dowa is a least
partly due to the massive intimidation of voters by the MCP and the MYP who in some cases
prevented voters from voting for the multiparty system. There have also been reports of instances
where plantation workers were threatened with salary cuts or even the loss of their job if they voted
for the multiparty system.
See Cullen 1994: pp. 70-80; Venter 1995: pp. 164-167; and Meinhardt 1997: 185-201.
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more than two decades. Encouraged by the issues addressed in the letter and the return
to Malawi of the opposition politician Chihana, thousands of workers defied the ban on
strikes and took to the streets demanding higher wages, better working conditions and
ultimately also political reforms. However, these politically motivated strikes were
undertaken on an ad hoc basis, since independent trade unions did not exist in the highly
authoritarian and repressive Banda regime. The highly repressive character of the
regime made it impossible for an independent civil society to develop. Therefore, only
external actors were able to force the Banda regime to embark on political
liberalization. Only after the Pope encouraged the Catholic bishops to me more critical
towards the Banda regime they wrote the pastoral letter. The Protestant churches were
encouraged by the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) to support the
pastoral letter and the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) sought the assistance of the
Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland (CCBI), since it felt ill-prepared for the
1993 referendum. While the churches existed all along they were only willing to critize
the regime after they were encouraged by international actors to do so. Independent
trade unions and professional association did not exist at all until 1992. Since an
independent civil society was basically non-existent as a result of the highly repressive
Banda regime, only the suspension of aid by the donors could force the highly aid
depend regime to embark on political liberalization.
See Cullen 1994: p. 74; and Pindani 1999: p. 67.
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Democratic Transition / Democratization
In chapter 5.3 the democratic transition / democratization in Malawi will be
analyzed. First, the formation of major opposition parties will be analyzed. Second, the
legal and constitutional changes / reforms that took place prior to the 1994 elections will
be examined. Third, the role of the military will be explored. Fourth, Malawi’s first
multiparty elections on 19 May 1994 will be examined and their results will be
analyzed. Fifth, the activities of the Muluzi government after the elections and the
second multiparty elections on 15 June 1999 will be considered.
5.3.1 The Formation of Opposition Parties
After the 1 993 referendum the two main pressure groups AFORD and UDF that
had emerged in the early 1990s transformed themselves into political parties. AFORD
portrayed itself as an intellectual party and a party with a clean record, since most of its
leading members did not hold any posts in the Banda regime. Therefore its leader,
Chakufwa Chihana, hoped that returning exiles would join AFORD. However, they
preferred to form their own parties. As a result of Chihana’s fairly authoritarian
leadership style, AFORD experienced numerous leadership quarrels, which hampered
its ability to establish a coherent leadership and to establish an efficient party structure,
especially outside the Northern Region. The party made various unsuccessful attempts
to recruit people who were not from the north. As a result AFORD received very little
support in the Central and Southern regions in the 1 994 elections. In contrast to
AFORD, many of UDF’s senior officials, including its leader Bakili Muluzi, were
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senior MCP officials until they were expelled from the party or fell out with Banda and
left. During the electoral campaign AFORD tried to take advantage of that by calling
the UDF “MCP-B”. The markedly different past of their party leadership lead to an
increasing polarization between the two parties prior to the 1994 elections and made a
merger between the two parties next to impossible. While UDF’s main support basis
was in the Southern Region, it was somewhat more successful than AFORD in
mobilizing support in the other two regions partly due to the fact that it had more money
at its disposal, since many of its supporters were successful businessmen that were
excluded from the ruling MCP elite. Programmatically there was little difference
between AFORD and UDF. For instance, both supported the continuation of the
structural adjustment programs started by Banda. In the case ofAFORD this was
somewhat surprising given the trade-unionist background of its leader Chihana. Not
only did Chihana support SAPs he also “refused to ‘address social and economic issues’
1 88
and this affected his ability to build a broad national base”.
5.3.2 Legal and Constitutional Changes / Reforms
After the 1993 referendum various opposition leaders initially called for the
resignation of Banda and the formation of an interim government. However, Banda
insisted on remaining president until the elections. Subsequently, in August 1993 during
a meeting of representatives of the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) and the Presidential
Committee on Dialogue (PCD) it was agreed to form the National Consultative Council
Among the parties formed by returning exiles were the United Front for Multiparty Democracy
(UFMD), the Malawi Democratic Union (MDU), the Congress for the Second Republic of Malawi
(CSR) and the Malawi Democratic Party (MDP).
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(NCC). The NCC was composed of seven representatives each of Malawi’s registered
political parties including the smaller ones. Civil society organizations like the churches
were not part of the NCC. The NCC was to formulate policy and legislative measures
for the transitional period and the holding of the multiparty elections. It was also
mandated to draft a new constitution. The NCC formed a number of sub-committees
that dealt with various issues such as new electoral laws and procedures, constituency
boundaries and the drafting of a new constitution before the elections. As a result of the
formation of the NCC the broader based PAC declined in importance, which made it
much more difficult for Malawi’s emerging civil society to influence the course of the
democratization process. In November 1993 Malawi’s still largely rubber-stamp
legislature met to repeal various oppressive laws such as the one enabling the
government to detain someone without trial. Furthermore the provision making Banda
President for Life was deleted. In December 1993 Banda appointed representatives of
all political parties to an independent Electoral Commission, which was bound to follow
the recommendations of the NCC. For instance, the NCC recommended to increase the
number so seats in parliament so as to more accurately reflect population densities.**^ In
February 1994 the NCC convened a constitutional drafting conference in Blantyre.
During the following ten weeks the members of the NCC drafted an interim
Ihonvbere 1997: p. 234. See also wa Mutua 1994: p. 50; van Donge 1995a: pp. 243-249; Meinhardt
1997: pp. 202-212; and Brown 2000: pp. 334-338.
“Early in February 1994, members of the [Electoral] Commission toured the country to examine the
existing boundaries and numbers of constituencies. In undertaking their examination, the
Commissioners weighed the importance of population distribution, geographical features, means of
communication and administrative boundaries, etc. Taking all these factors into account, the
Commission created 36 more constituencies, increasing the total number from 141 to 177 [33 in the
Northern Region and 68 and 76 in the Central and Southern Regions respectively]” (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1994: p. 11).
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constitution
. Since the constitution was to be adopted before the elections on 1 7 May
1994, its drafting “was hurried, not particularly open and dominated by the various
political parties, not independent constitutional experts or civic organizations”.'^'
Furthermore, issues related to constitutional reform were hardly addressed by the
political parties in their campaigns prior to the 1994 elections. While the new
constitution was a significant improvement compared with the old one, it was not as
radical a departure from the old one as it could have been if the drafting process had not
been dominated by politicians. Most of the politicians in the NCC wanted to make
modest rather than substantive changes, such as the introduction of a system of
proportional representation or a significant reduction of presidential powers, since this
was not in their interest.
5.3.3 The Role of the Military
Under the Banda regime considerable tensions developed between the police
and the paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) on the one hand and the military
on the other hand. Especially after 1983 when the military blocked Banda’s attempt to
appoint his close confident John Tembo to the position of interim vice president.
Thereafter Tembo made every effort possible to expand the MYP and the police with
the aim of creating an alternative military force to rival the military. This made the
military very suspicious of the MYP and the police, which were used by Banda and
Tembo to carry out repressive measures. In contrast to the MYP and the police, the
A constitutional committee of the new multiparty parliament was to finalize the interim constitution.
Brown 2000: p. 289.
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military was not used by Banda to carry out repressive measures against his opponents.
Consequently, it managed to stay outside politics, retained a high degree of
professionalism and was fairly free of corruption. Besides the churches Malawi’s
military was the only national institution that operated to a large extend independently
from the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). This enabled the military to play a
constructive role during the democratization process. In March 1992 when students
protested in Zomba “junior army officers stationed nearby offered the students
encouragement and protected them from police violence [...]. The following month,
senior and middle-ranking army officials met with the president and made clear that
they would not be used for MCP partisan purposes and repress Malawians calling for
multipartyism”.'^^ In September 1993 the Banda regime and the NCC agreed to disarm
the MYP, which was under the direct control of Tembo. Once it became clear that
Tembo was not willing to honor this agreement, junior military officers launched
“Operation Bwezani” in early December 1993 after two unarmed soldiers were killed
by the MYP. In this operation soldiers attacked and destroyed MYP offices all over the
country and seized large caches of weapons. By doing so the junior military officers
made clear that they felt more loyal to the NCC than the government and that they were
not willing to allow the MYP and the police to block the democratization process. The
dismantling of the MYP that functioned as the military wing of the MCP also ensured
that there was somewhat more of a level playing field prior to the 1994 elections.
See Ng’Ong’Ola 1996; pp. 98-104; Lwanda 1996: pp. 190-197; Meinhardt 1997; pp. 267-268; Banda
1998: pp. 321-324; and Brown 2000: pp. 182-184 and pp. 289-291.
Brown 2000: p. 156.
See Meinhardt 1997: pp. 243-244; Mchombo 1998: pp. 35-36; Decalo 1998: pp. 86-91; Newell 1999:
pp. 216-218; Muluzi 1999: pp. 172-174; and Brown 2000: pp. 156 and
186-189.
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5.3.4 The 1994 Elections
While the dismantling of the MYP by the military deprived the Banda regime
and the MCP of a tool they would most likely have used to boost their chances at
winning in the upcoming elections, they still had other means at their disposal to
influence the outcome of the elections in their favor. The main strategy of the MCP was
to bolster its power base in the Central Region and to hope that, with the opposition
vote split between the Northern and the Southern Region, it could hold on to power like
Moi had done in Kenya in December 1992. MCP officials actually sought the advise of
six KANU ‘strategists’ “who had come to Malawi posing as election monitors”.'’^
Consequently it was mainly in the Central Region where the Banda regime used the
police and members of the Nyau secret cult to intimidate opposition supporters and to
prevent or disrupt their campaigns. By and large the government owned radio station,
MBC, complied with the guidelines'^^ for media coverage that were issued by the
independent Electoral Commission. The MBC played an important role in
disseminating various kinds information about the upcoming elections. However,
despite the watchful eye of the Electoral Commission there was still a certain tendency
ofMBC to give more attention to the MCP and its presidential candidate Banda. For
instance, on 14 May 1994, when the celebrations of Banda’s birthday took place in
Ihonvbere 1997: p. 235.
The purpose of these guidelines was “to ensure that full and fair coverage is given without
censorship, to the campaigns of all registered political parties during the period of campaigning and
up to the close of the poll in the parliamentary and presidential elections” (quoted after
Commonwealth Secretariat 1994: p. 14).
For instance, MBC organized phone-in programs on which members of the Electoral Commission
answered questions about the electoral process. MBC also produced programs like Campaign
News” and “Know Your Candidate” which featured candidates from all the contesting parties.
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Blantyre, MBC devoted much airtime to this event, while a large UDF rally on the same
day received no coverage. As already mentioned above the electoral campaign of the
main parties MCP, UDF and AFORD focused on personalities rather than on issues.'’*
The only exception was UDF’s promise to provide free and universal primary education
if it won the elections. Convinced that he could win on his own AFORD’s presidential
candidate Chihana ignored various public calls to work with the UDF to topple the
Banda regime. For instance, in the parliamentary elections three-quarters of Malawi’s
177 constituencies were three-way contests, since neither AFORD nor UDF was willing
not to nominate a candidate in favor of the other party. This raised the specter of a
Kenyan-type scenario in the upcoming elections. However, as a result of the strong
influence of regionalism on Malawian politics this did not happen.'”
Malawi’s first multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections since
independence took place on 17 May 1994. The presidential candidate of the UDF,
Bakili Muluzi, emerged as the winner of the presidential elections with 1,404, 754 votes
(47.16 %). The presidential candidate of the MCP, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, came
in second with 996,363 votes (33.45%); while the presidential candidate ofAFORD,
Chakufwa Chihana, finished a distant third with 552, 862 votes (18.90%).^” The
electoral participation was fairly high with 80.5% of all registered voters and 68% of
Venter and Ihonvbere pointed out that the poorly focused, opportunistic and superficial campaigns of
AFORD and UDF discouraged and frustrated many Malawians. As a consequence only 3.8 million
voters registered for the 1994 elections compared with 4.7 million for the 1993 referendum (See
Venter 1995: p. 176; and Ihonvbere 1997: p. 236). For a comparison of the 1994 election manifestos
ofMCP, UDF and AFORD see Kaunda 1998: pp. 59-61.
See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994: pp. 14-20; Venter 1995: pp. 171-177; Ihonvbere 1997: pp.
231-236; and Patel 2000: pp. 174-175.
The presidential candidate of the Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), Kamlepo Kalua, mustered a
paltry 15, 624 votes (0.52%).
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eligible voters. The table in Appendix J and the figures in Appendices K-M show quite
clearly that voting took place mainly along regional lines^®' with the Northern Region
voting overwhelmingly for Chihana, the Central Region for Banda and the Southern
Region for Muluzi. The fact that the Southern Region is Malawi’s most populous region
ensured that the UDF candidate emerged victorious. While ethnicity is of some
relevance as well, regionalism plays a much more important role as a source of identity
than ethnicity in Malawi. For instance, Chihana’ s support from his own ethnic group,
the Tumbuka, only accounts for two of the five districts he won and Muluzi’s support
from his ethnic group, the Yao, only accounts for three of the ten districts he won.
Furthermore non-Tumbuka and non-Yao ethnic groups supported different opposition
candidates depending in which region they lived. However, ethnicity can be used to
explain Banda’s strong support among especially the rural voters in the Central Region
who belong to Banda’s own ethnic group the Chewa. Muluzi’s UDF also managed to
win the largest number of seats in Malawi’s parliament with 85 out of 177. However, it
did not achieve an absolute majority of the seats. Banda’s MCP received 56 seats and
Chihana’ s AFORD 36 seats. The tables in Appendices N and O and the figures in
Appendices P-R show that regionalism also determined voters’ preferences in the
parliamentary elections. AFORD won all of the 33 seats of the Northern Region, UDF
won all but five of the 76 seats of the Southern Region and MCP won 5 1 of the 68 seats
of the Central Region.
Deborah Kaspin pointed out that while voting took place mainly along regional lines, there
have been
variations intra-regionally and intra-ethnically (See Kaspin 1995: p. 612).
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5.3.5 The 1999 Elections
Since UDF did not receive a parliamentary majority in the 1994 elections, it
tried to form a coalition with AFORD. However, AFORD’s leader, Chihana, initially
declined to form such a coalition, since President Muluzi was unwilling to meet his
demand for an executive vice-presidency and eight ministries. To strengthen his
bargaining power towards Muluzi, Chilhana signed a “Memorandum of Common
Understanding” with the MCP on 20 June 1994. Many AFORD supporters were
shocked by this move by Chilhana, which underlined his aversion to consultative
decision-making and his hunger for power. The formation of this opportunistic alliance
rejuvenated the MCP, which in turn helped AFORD to overcome its financial
difficulties. However the AFORD/MCP alliance did not last very long, since it was
disliked by certain elements within both parties for different reasons. On 26 September
1994 Muluzi appointed Chihana as second Vice President and offered AFORD four
cabinet positions by further increasing his already bloated cabinet to 35 in an effort to
break the governmental paralysis that resulted from the MCP/AFORD control of
parliament. The resulting AFORD/UDF coalition government provided Muluzi with a
stable majority in parliament to carry out his legislative agenda. In June 1996 Chihana
pulled his party out of the coalition government and courted the MCP once more while
accusing the UDF of massive corruption, nepotism and bribery. However, the AFORD
ministers remained with the government assuring Muluzi a parliamentary majority.
AFORD demanded that by-elections be held claiming that the AFORD ministers had
Chirwa 1994: pp. 17-20; Venter 1995: p. 177; Kaspin 1995: pp. 611-620; Kalipeni 1997: pp. 152-
167; Meinhardt 1997: pp. 274-294; Chirwa 1998: pp. 65-69; Reynolds 1999: pp. 147-149; and
Brown 2000: pp. 320-334.
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crossed the floor to UDF. In response to Muluzi’s refusal to hold by-elections, AFORD
and MCP accused Muluzi of poaching their members and manipulating parliament in
order to preserve his majority”^®^ and boycotted the parliament for about 10 months. In
April 1997 the impasse was broken with the help of the Catholic church and the MCP
and AFORD MPs returned to parliament and formed once more a parliamentary
alliance.^^'^
Right before the 1994 elections parliament adopted Malawi’s new constitution
on an interim basis with the provision that it had to be finalized within a year’s time. In
February 1995 a constitutional review conference took place, which was attended by
274 delegates from political parties and different institutions of civil society such as the
churches, trade unions and Malawi’s law society. Many of the delegates were not very
well prepared and there was hardly any input from the rural population prior to the
conference. Furthermore, since the decisions of the conference were not binding, the
final decisions regarding Malawi’s new constitution were made by parliament. The
UDF/AFORD coalition ignored the conference decisions, which it did not agree with
such as the abolition of the position of a second vice president, which was created to
convince Chihana to join the government. On 10 May 1995 parliament adopted
Malawi’s new constitution, which was not much different from the interim constitution.
In sum, the process of drafting Malawi’s new constitution was dominated by political
Rake 2001: p. 316.
See Venter 1995: pp. 178-180; Banda 1998: pp. 61-62; Brown 2000: pp. 339-342; and Rake 2001: p.
315-316.
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parties with little input by civil society. “The constitution thus lacks popular legitimacy,
especially in a society with virtually no experience in democracy”.^®^
While the Muluzi government tried to bring about a break with the past right
after the 1994 elections, which was evident in the closing of three prisons that were
notorious for human rights abuses under Banda, the establishment of a truth
commission and the introduction of free primary education, over time its commitment
to democratic principles such as the rule of law and its respect for the constitution
eroded significantly. Between 1995 and the 1999 elections the Muluzi government
undertook various measures to increase its executive powers. For instance, in December
1995 all local government bodies were dissolved. Even so the new constitution required
the government to hold local elections in 1995, they were repeatedly postponed while
the central government controlled Malawi’s 27 districts. Like in this case, the executive
frequently ignored constitutional and legal obligations that did not suit it. Furthermore,
the Muluzi government has been slow in establishing new institutions such as the Law
Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman as
mandated by the constitution. Once established they were often inefficient and biased
206
towards the ruling party.
Prior to the elections on 15 June 1999 the Muluzi government undertook various
measures to improve its chances at winning especially after MCP and AFORD agreed
to present a joint presidential ticket, which posed a serious threat to Muluzi and his
UDF. In July 1998 Muluzi appointed an entirely new Electoral Commission. While the
Brown 2000: p. 290. See also Meinhardt 1997: 352-354.
See Brown 2000: pp. 303-3 14.
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Commission also included members from the opposition parties, its chairman, Justice
William Hanjahanja, was leaning strongly towards the UDF. In January 1999 the
Electoral Commission proposed to the National Assembly to create 70 new
parliamentary constituencies, of which 42 (or 60%) were in the UDF dominated
Southern Region. As a result of fierce protests from the opposition parties and
international donors a compromise was reached whereby only 1 6 new constituencies
were created (5 in the Central Region and 1 1 in the Southern Region). Also the voter
registration process was biased towards the UDF at least in its initial stages, “with
registration proving far more difficult in the Northern and Central Regions than in the
Southern Region”.^®^ Again, only after combined pressure by the opposition parties,
local NGOs, and international donors was brought to bear on the Electoral Commission
it agreed to extend the voter registration period by two weeks. The Electoral
Commission also tried to block the joint ticket of the opposition parties in the
presidential election under which Gwanda Chakuamba of the MCP would stand for
president and Chakufwa Chihana ofAFORD for vice-president. However, Malawi’s
High Court ruled that the joint ticket was legitimate. During the campaign the Muluzi
government heavily utilized government finances and state property for party purposes.
For instance, government four-wheel drive vehicles “were extensively used by UDF
candidates, giving them a significant advantage in moving around the vast sprawling
rural constituencies. When addressing rallies, candidates are expected to provide cash
and gifts to local dignitaries and community projects; UDF candidates were best able to
Wiseman 2000: p. 639.
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meet such expectations generously”.^®* Finally, despite calls from Malawi’s Roman
Catholic bishops, Malawian NGO’s and the international donor community to provide
fair access to radio broadcasting for all parties, the Muluzi government unrepentantly
manipulated the Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC) for its purposes throughout
the campaign, which led some observers to call it the Muluzi Broadcasting Cooperation.
Less than a week before the elections Malawi’s High Court ruled that MBC’s coverage
of the campaign did not comply with its duty to be impartial, however, coming that late
the ruling made little difference.^®^
The 15 June 1999 elections in Malawi saw an extremely high turnout with over
92% of registered voters. Muluzi won the presidential race with 2,442,685 votes
(51.37%), while his challenger Chakuamba received 2,106,790 votes (44.30%). “In the
parliamentary elections Muluzi’s UDF increased its seats in the new parliament from 84
to 92 while the MCP won 66 seats and AFORD 29 giving the opposition alliance 95
seats, a theoretical majority in the legislature. There were also four independent
candidates”.^'® Nationally, the voting patterns in 1999 where quite similar to those in
1994 as is evident from the tables in Appendices S and T. In the presidential elections
Muluzi dominated the Southern Region where he gained 78.3% of the vote while
Chakuamba dominated in the Northern and Central Regions where he gained 88.6% and
62.4% respectively. In the parliamentary elections “each of the three major parties
dominated one region but elsewhere enjoyed limited support except in a few specific
Wiseman 2000: p. 642.
See Wiseman 2000: pp. 638-642; Patel 2000a: pp. 175-181; Patel 2000b: pp. 25-38; Kadzamira
2000: p. 58; and Africa Confidential, Vol. 40, No. 13, p. 6.
Rake 2001: p. 316.
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areas
. While sporadic violence did occur during the campaign as well, it was
nothing compared with the violence that erupted after the results where announced on
18 June 1999. Opposition leaders declared that they would not recognize Muluzi’s
victory and accused him of cheating. This provoked serious violence especially in the
Northern Region, where party-related religious tensions erupted as a result of which
seventeen mosques were burned, since Mulizi is a Muslim. Due to the efforts of the
churches and various individuals the situation was soon contained. Subsequently the
opposition tried to challenge the election results unsuccessfully in Malawi’s High
Court.^’^
5.3.6 Summary
Julius Dionvbere pointed out that the humiliation of the Banda regime in the
1993 referendum contributed significantly to its willingness to make concessions to the
opposition prior to the 1994 elections.^ Furthermore, Malawi’s high degree of aid
dependability also limited the ability of the Banda regime to take measures aimed at
ensuring it would win the 1994 elections. Such measures would have been unacceptable
to Malawi’s donors and would have further delayed the resumption of aid, which was
critical for the functioning of Malawi’s economy. Therefore, the Banda regime went
along with the recommendations of the National Consultative Council (NCC) by and
large. For instance, it established a fairly independent Electoral Commission, which was
able to ensure that the Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation more or less complied with its
Wiseman 2000: p. 645.
See Meinhardt 1999b: pp. 8 and 10-11; Wiseman 2000: pp. 642-645; Patel 2000b: pp. 40-45; and
Brown, Richard 2001: p. 593.
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guidelines for media coverage during the campaign for the 1994 elections. Also the
military played an important role in leveling the playing field prior to the 1994 elections
when it disarmed the paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). This deprived the
MCP of an important tool to intimidate the opposition throughout the country. As a
result the intimidation of the opposition was mainly limited to MCP's stronghold, the
Central Region. The formation of the two main opposition parties mainly along regional
lines jeopardized the ability of the opposition to win the 1994 elections somewhat.
However, due to the fact that the Southern Region, which is UDF’s stronghold, is also
Malawi’s most populous region Muluzi replaced Banda as Malawi’s president as a
result of the 1994 elections, which were considered free and fair by various
international observers. While Malawi adopted a new interim constitution in 1994 and
finalized it in 1995, the drafting process was dominated by the three main political
parties without much influence by civil society. This also explains why the new
constitution was not as radical a departure from the old one, especially regarding the
presidential powers, as it could have been, if the drafting process would have been
broader based. Even so the Muluzi government initially undertook some measures to
bring about a break with the past, its tendency to ignore constitutional and legal
provisions that were not in its interests and its attempts to influence the 1999 elections
in its favor call into question its commitment to basic democratic principles and don’t
increase the prospects for democratic consolidation.^'"*
See Ihonvbere 1997: p. 234.
See chapters 5.3.1 to 5.3.5 of this thesis.
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5.4 Prospects for Democratic Consolidation
So far democracy has more or less survived in Malawi, however the process of
democratic consolidation has not yet started. The relative independence of Malawi’s
judiciary has contributed to the survival of democracy in Malawi. The judiciary,
especially Malawi’s High Court, is highly professional and hardly politicized. This is
evident by the fact that “High Court decisions have repudiated presidential orders
dismissing municipal officials, nullified executive efforts to handpick traditional
authorities, and even given jail terms to governing party municipal officials who have
ignored court injunctions’’.^’^ The High Court also played an important role in leveling
the playing field prior to the 1999 elections. For instance, it ruled that the MCP/AFORD
joint ticket was legitimate and it ruled that MBC’s coverage of the campaign did not
comply with its duty to be impartial. The relative independence of Malawi’s judiciary
enabled the opposition to address its grievances within and not outside (i.e. through
violence) the political system. This ensured political stability and played a major role in
ensuring democratic survival so far. If the independence of Malawi’s judiciary
continues, this will undoubtedly increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in
Malawi.^’^
As a result of the highly authoritarian Banda regime it was impossible for an
independent and vibrant civil society to emerge until the early 1990’s. This is evident
by the fact that the Catholic bishops only wrote their pastoral letter in March 1992 after
they had been encouraged to do so by the Pope. Throughout the 1990s Malawi’s
von Doepp 2001
:
p. 232.
See von Doepp 2001
:
pp. 235-237.
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churches kept a fairly high political profile. For instance, they conducted various civic
education campaigns and they criticized the Muluzi government on various occasions.
By doing so they contributed to the survival of democracy in Malawi. Except for the
churches, Malawi s civil society is still rather weak and its organizations have little or
no presence outside major urban areas. Furthermore, Malawi’s NGO’s often have only a
rather small financial and human resource base. In other words they are little more than
“briefcase” NGOs. Malawi’s civil society needs to be strengthened through sustained
donor support and the building of networks with NGO’s in other countries to increase
the prospects for democratic consolidation in Malawi. Only then they will be able to
make an important contribution to the establishment of a democratic political culture,
which is one of the building blocs of consolidated democracies.^'^
During the 1990’s a fairly stable party system emerged in Malawi consisting of
three parties (AFORD, MCP and UDF). Their political support is mainly determined by
regionalism while ethnicity plays only a minor role. There are hardly any ideological or
policy differences between them which explains why their support is mainly based on
regionalism and on personalities. To overcome the regional fragmentation of Malawian
politics the political parties must find ways to appeal to voters in regions of the country
where they had little influence / following in the past. This could be best achieved by
developing clear ideologies / policies that would attract the votes of different groups of
Malawian society such as peasants, the business community, workers, women and
youth on a national basis. Clear policies / programmes could be developed in areas such
as land reforms, social and economic issues, the protection of the environment and
See Ott 2000: pp. 154-155; Chirwa 2000: pp. 1 16 ; Brown 2000: p. 351; and von Doepp 2001: p.
233.
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foreign relations. Besides developing clear ideologies / policies Malawi’s parlies also
need to develop democratic decision making structures within themselves. Currently a
process is under way in Malawi that most likely will lead to the emergence of new
political parties prior to the 2004 elections. MCP is divided into two factions. One is
lead by John Tembo and the other by Gwanda Chakuamba. As a result of Chihana’s
autocratic leadership style AFORD could split as well. Finally, the former UDF
Education Minister Brown Mpinganjira formed an opposition pressure group called the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 2001, which most likely will be transformed
into a political party as well. These new political parties are basically emerging as a
result of personal animosities and not as a result of significant ideological / policy
differences. This does not augur too well for the prospects of democratic consolidation
in Malawi.^'^
As explained above respect for the rule of law and the constitution are not
among the comer stones of the Muluzi government. Malawi’s current constitution only
allows the same president to be in office for two consecutive terms. However, rather
than stepping down after his current term ends in 2004, Muluzi is considering to amend
the constitution so as to be able to mn for a third term. There are basically two options
to do this. Either a referendum and a simple majority in the National Assembly or no
referendum and a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. Muluzi seems to have
managed to lure enough opposition MPs into his camp to have a two-thirds majority and
thus does not have to bring this issue before the people in a referendum, which would
See Phiri 2000: pp. 84-85; Patel 2000b: 45-50; Brown 2000: pp. 375-377; and Economist
Intelligence Unit, Malawi Country Report, March 2002, pp. 1-2.
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be the more democratic option.^’’ Church leaders, prominent lawyers and university
students are against such a constitutional amendment. They now view Muluzi who was
once revered as a national hero as the biggest threat to Malawi’s fledgling democracy.
In response to criticism of his third term ambitions he banned all demonstrations on this
issue in May 2002 saying he feared they might degenerate into street fights.^^®
Since in power the Muluzi government has failed to make any progress in
reducing poverty and the gap between rich and poor has widened. In 2001 Malawian
officials sold the country’s 167,000-ton emergency grain reserve and have not
accounted for the proceeds. This further aggravated the negative impact of one of the
worst droughts ever, which the country is currently experiencing. In rural Malawi many
people are so desperate for food that they have no other option than eating the roots of
banana trees, tree stems and wild leaves, which have little nutritional value. This
underpins very clearly that without significant progress in reducing the appalling
poverty of many Malawians democratic consolidation will continue to remain a very
22
1
remote possibility.
On 4 July 2002 Malawi’s National Assembly narrowly rejected a constitutional amendment bill that
would have enabled Muluzi to stand for a third term. 128 votes would have been necessary to pass
the bill. 125 lawmakers voted in favor, 59 against and five abstained.
See Chitsulo 2001
:
pp. 3-4 and 6; and the article entitled “A Surprising Crackdown in Malawi.
Leader Who Symbolized Democracy Changes Some of the Rules” by Rachel L. Swams in The New
York Times of Sunday, 30 June 2002, A4.
See Kaunda 1998: pp. 61-63; and the articles entitled “Famine Sweeps Southern Africa.
Millions
Suffering in Crisis Created by Nature, Exacerbated by Man” by Jon Jeter in The
Washington Post o^
Friday, 10 May 2002, A1 and A34; and “Meager Harvests in Africa Leave Millions at the
Edge of
Starvation” by Rachel L. Swams in The New York Times of Sunday, 23 June 2002, A1
and A8.
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CHAPTER 6
ZAMBIA
The Republic of Zambia is a land-locked country in South-Central Africa. It
covers a total area of 752,614 sq km (290,586 sq miles). Appendix U contains a map of
Zambia that shows its nine provinces as well as major cities and towns. According to
UN estimates Zambia’s population was 9,169,000 in mid 2000, which is equivalent to
1 2.2 inhabitants per sq km. This is a rather low figure by African standards, however,
“Zambia is the third most urbanized country in mainland sub-Saharan Africa, with 41%
of its population of 5,661,801 at the September 1980 census residing in towns of more
than 5,000 inhabitants [...]. Some 78% of the urban population was, in fact, located in
the 10 largest urban areas, all situated on the Tine of rail’, extending south from the
Copperbelt, through Lusaka, to the Victoria Falls, forming the major focus of Zambia’s
economic activity”. No fewer than 73 different ethnic groups live in Zambia. They
speak more than 80 languages and they all belong to the Bantu group. Among the major
ethnic / language groups are the Bemba who mainly live in the north-east and in the
Copperbelt; the Nyanja who live in the Eastern Province and in Lusaka; the Tonga who
223
live in the Southern Province; and the Lozi who live in the west.
Williams 2001: p. 1105.
See Williams 2001: p. 1 105; and Southall 2001: p. 555.
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6.1 Historical Context
Starting in the 1930s the British developed a copper mining industry in their
colony Northern Rhodesia. This “led to massive labour migration from rural areas and
made Zambia the most urbanized country in Africa. Urbanization, labour migration and
education provided the background to early assertions of African identity, which led
increasingly to opposition to colonial author!ty”.^^^ Since workers were initially
prohibited by the colonial authorities to form trade unions, they formed “welfare
societies” instead. The political organization especially of mine workers fostered the
development of a working-class consciousness among them and laid the foundation for
the working-class involvement in politics, which became one of the comer stones of
Zambian politics. In 1951 the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC)
was formed under the leadership of Harry Nkumbula to oppose the establishment of the
Central African Federation (CAF) by federating Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland. The establishment of the CAF in 1953, which enabled the white settlers
in Southern Rhodesia to exploit Northern Rhodesia’s mineral wealth, lead to an
intensification of the anti-colonial stmggle in Northern Rhodesia. During the second
half of the 1950s differences arose within the ANC on what course the anti-colonial
stmggle should take. As a result Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, who favored a
more radical approach than Nkumbula, left the ANC and formed the United National
Independence Party (UNIP). Under the leadership of Kaunda UNIP became the driving
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force in the stmggle for independence, which was attained on 24 October 1964.
van Donge 2000: p. xxii.
See Meyns 1993: p. 479; van Donge 1995b: p. 195; Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 48-50; van Donge 2000: p.
xxiv; Mthembu-Salter 2001: p. 1 106; and Southall 2001: p. 556.
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6 . 1.1 The First Republic: 1964-1972
Even so President Kaunda favored a one-party system, from 1964 to 1972
Zambia remained a multiparty system. Kaunda initially hoped that he could achieve his
goal of a one-party system through the ballot box and consensual techniques.
Consequently, during the first years of independence “UNIP relied heavily upon tactics
of coercion and positive inducement to convince ANC supporters that their political and
economic interest could be better served through UNIP - hence the slogan; ‘It pays to
belong to UNIP’”.^^^ However, the ANC did not dissolve itself and continued to be
supported by the Tonga of the Southern Province. In the late 1960s UNIP was
weakened by factionalism. In 1966 the United Party (UP) was formed by Nalumino
Mundia in the Lozi-dominated Western Province and subsequently gained strength as a
result of the factionalism within UNIP, which led various UNIP members that belonged
to the Lozi ethnic group to join the UP. UP was banned in August 1968 after its ability
to mobilize political support in the Copperbelt led to violent clashes within UNIP.
Subsequently UP leaders directed their followers to join the ANC. As a result the ANC
did fairly well in the parliamentary and presidential elections that took place m 1968.
Factionalism along ethnoregional lines within UNIP continued to undermine its position
as the dominant political party. In 1971 former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe, who
belonged to the Bemba ethnic group, left UNIP and formed his own party, the United
Progressive Party (UPP). UPP was supported mainly by disgruntled groups, Bemba as
well as non-Bemba, who left UNIP since they felt that they were at a disadvantage in
Chikulo 1979: p. 202.
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the competition for limited national resources that took place within UNIP, The
transformation of a major faction within UNIP into an opposition party (UPP) posed a
major threat to UNIP’s dominant role, especially in the light of emerging economic
difficulties as a result of declining copper prices. In February 1972 Kaunda outlawed
the UPP and detained its leaders and on 13 December 1972 he announced the formation
of a “one-party participatory democracy”. By doing so he outlawed not only the sole
remaining opposition party, the ANC, but also any future initiatives to establish
• •
• 278
opposition parties.
6.1.2 The Second Republic: 1973-1990
In August 1 973 a new constitution entered into force. This constitution made
Zambia officially a one-party state. The 1973 constitution gave the sole party, UNIP,
supremacy over all political activities as well as the government and recognized that
UNIP’s Central Committee was the main policy-making authority. As a result of
UNIP’s supremacy Zambia’s parliament was reduced to a “rubber stamp” that merely
endorsed decisions taken by the Central Committee of UNIP. Between 1973 and 1990
parliamentary elections took place on a regular basis. They can be characterized as
semi-competitive, since voters could basically choose between up to three UNIP
candidates. Kenneth Kaunda was president of the state and the party. The 1 973
The ANC received 2 1 .9% of the votes in the parliamentary elections and its presidential candidate,
Harry Nkumbula, received 18.2% of the votes in the presidential elections (see Krennerich 1999; p.
953).
See Tordoff/ Scott 1974: pp. 107-1 1 1; Chikulo 1979: pp. 201-204; Burdette 1988: pp. 64-94;
Tordoff 1988: pp. 10-12; Bratton 1992: pp. 82-83; Meyns 1993: pp. 479-480; Burnell 1994; p. 20;
Nkanza 1994: pp. 196-197; von Donge 1995b: p. 195; Mthembu-Salter 2001; p. 1 106; and Southall
2001: p. 556-557.
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constitution gave him vast powers such as the power to detain someone without trial.
However, he did not use these powers too excessively mainly because of his Christian
beliefs and his rootedness in the concept of Zambian Humanism, which he developed.
In this context Gordon White pointed out that “Kaunda’s version of mono-partyism was
a relatively ‘soft’ one, in which attempts to repress, harass or co-opt opposition were
combined with efforts at appeasement and accommodation”.^^^ As long as his
government’s authority was not directly challenged criticism was tolerated to a certain
extent. It mainly came from the press, churches and trade unions.
Between 1964 and 1972 a fairly critical press emerged in Zambia. While the
government exercised more control over Zambia’s two main newspapers the “Times of
Zambia” and the “Zambia Daily Mail” since the early 1970’s by gradually nationalizing
them, they maintained their ability to be critical of certain government policies by using
the praise-blame approach and satire to a certain extent. In 1972 the Chnstian
Council of Zambia (CCZ) and the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) founded a
fortnightly paper called the “National Mirror”. This paper was often quite critical of the
government and uncovered various corruption scandals. Towards the end of the 1980s
the “National Mirror” enabled “those trade unionists, business leaders, professionals,
intellectuals and clergymen who had little or no access to the state-owned Times and
White 1995: p. 67.
See Tordoff 1988: pp. 12-27; Bratton 1992: pp. 83-84; Bates / Collier 1995: pp. 1 16-1 18; van
Donge
2000: p. xxxii; and Southall 2001: p. 557.
2^'
“In this approach used mainly by the press in their editorials, the [..] writer will praise the
president
for his supposed exemplary behaviour and at the same time seriously taking to task
some government
official for failing to follow a policy directive issued by him” (Lungu 1986: p. 392).
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9)232Mail to criticize the government. Zambia’s churches were quite critical of the
government s population control and education policies. Regarding the latter they
objected quite strongly to the intention of the government to introduce “scientific
socialism’’ or Marxism into the curriculum of all Zambian educational institutions. As a
result of its large and labor-intensive copper-mining industry Zambia developed one of
Africa’s largest and most sophisticated trade union movements.^^^ In 1965 the Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was formed as an umbrella organization for 18
affiliated unions. Among the unions under the roof ofZCTU the Mineworker’s Union
of Zambia (MUZ) is the largest and most powerful one. The Zambian National Union
of Teachers (ZNUT) is also quite influential. In 1974 Frederick Chiluba was elected as
president of ZCTU. Despite efforts of the government to bring the trade unions under its
control, they managed to maintain a high degree of autonomy^^'^ and were one of the
most vocal critics of the Zambian government. Trade union leaders such as Frederick
Chiluba frequently criticized government programs and policies, especially economic
policies, in newspapers like the “Times of Zambia” as well as protest rallies and backed
up their criticism with a number of strikes. During the 1970’s the organized labor
movement grew steadily and by 1980 ZCTU had 380,000 members, which was almost
double UNIP’s paid membership. Besides the press, the churches and the trade unions
Banda 1997: p. 13.
More than 80% of Zambia’s formal sector workers are organized in trade unions.
For instance, the ZCTU asserted its status as an independent interest group through the election of
leaders who declined to accept patronage posts offered by UNIP.
In 198 1 Chiluba was imprisoned for several month for resisting government attempts to control the
unions. He was released after a court ordered to government to do so. “Subsequently he repeatedly
rejected offers of a place on UNIP’s central committee as President Kaunda attempted to neutralize
him by co-optation” (Wiseman 1996: pp. 44-45).
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also the students at the University of Zambia and Zambia’s Law Association and
Economics Club were quite critical of the government. For instance, between 1971 and
1984 Zambia s students organized four large demonstrations against government
corruption.^^^
6.2 Political Liberalization
While Zambia’s per capita income dropped from US $700 in 1964 to US $290
by the end of the 1980s, its external debt rose from US $623 million in 1970 to more
than US $7 billion in 1990, which made Zambia one of the world’s most heavily
indebted countries on a per capita basis. A number of factors were responsible for these
negative economic developments such as the falling world market price for copper,
Zambia’s main source of export earnings, increasing oil prices, government policies
skewed against agriculture, unrealistic exchange-rate policies, and the maintenance of
inefficient parastatals. As a result of these developments / policies Zambia’s “economic
situation had reached crisis proportions [by the end of the 1980s] as the country
experienced massive food shortages, 1 00 percent annual inflation and deteriorating
social services”. To obtain new loans President Kaunda started to implement an IMF
structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1985. “The programme entailed the removal
of price controls and subsidies
,
as well as the devaluation of the Zambian currency - the
Kwacha”.^^^ The removal of subsidies for Zambia’s main staple, maize meal, led to
See Gertzel 1984: pp. 79-117; Lungu 1986: pp. 389-409; Burdette 1988: pp. 95-132; Bratton 1992:
pp. 84-85; Bratton 1994: pp. 112-116; Wolbert 1994: pp. 30-32; Bourgault 1995: p. 215; Wiseman
1996: pp. 44-45; Banda 1997: pp. 9-14; and Southall 2001: p. 559.
White 1995: p. 65.
Chikulo / Sichone 1996: p. 3.
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food riots and labor unrest in late 1986 and early 1987. Subsequently, the Zambian
government abandoned the SAP in May 1987 in favor of an indigenous alternative
called the “New Economic Recovery Program” under which subsidies and price
controls were restored. However, this program ran aground soon and Kaunda had no
other choice than to return to the implementation of another SAP in mid 1989. This set
the context for a new round of popular protests in mid 1990 that took on a political
dimension in contrast to the foot riots in late 1986 and early 1987, which had been
focused basically on the price of maize meal.^^^
On 19 June 1990 the Zambian government doubled the prize of maize meal to
meet the IMF demand of subsidy cuts for basic food products. This led to three days of
riots and looting in Lusaka and nearby regional towns in which 26 people were killed.
Many protestors blamed Kaunda and UNIP as well as the one-party system for
Zambia’s economic crisis. On 30 June 1990 a group of army officers around Lt.
Mwamba Luchembe attempted, unsuccessfully, to carry out a coup d’etat to protest
against the drastic food price increase. In the course of the attempted coup Luchembe
burst into a radio station in Lusaka and announced that the Kaunda government had
been overthrown. Minutes later thousands of Zambians were in the streets of Lusaka
celebrating. Even so the coup attempt quickly fizzled the reaction to it by the public
underlined how unpopular the Kaunda government was.^"^°
Influenced by the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 the ZCTU General Council
decided to spearhead a campaign for the restoration of the multiparty system in Zambia
See Moma 1991: pp. 32-33; White 1995: p. 67; and Chikulo / Sichone 1996: pp. 2-3.
See Joseph 1992: p. 199; Bratton 1992: pp. 85-86; and Chikulo / Sichone 1996: p. 3.
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and in early 1990 the chairman of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, called upon President
Kaunda to hold a referendum on the reintroduction of the multiparty system. In July
1990 various opposition groups held a national conference and formed the National
Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy, which later on became the Movement
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The Committee was a broad-based coalition
bringing together a wide variety of groups such as the trade unions, Zambia’s business
community and its churches. Its members came from all of Zambia’s ethnic / language
groups. The Committee was chaired by Arthur Wina, a former Finance Minister of the
Kaunda government. He was supported by two deputies, Frederick Chiluba and Vernon
Mwanga, who had served as Foreign Minister in the Kaunda government. The former
was in charge of organization and operation and the latter was in charge of publicity.
During the months following its establishment the Committee organized several
opposition rallies in Lusaka and other major cities that brought together huge crowds
chanting the opposition slogan “The hour has come!”.^"*'
In April 1990 Kaunda gave his consent to the opposition demand for holding a
referendum on the reintroduction of the multiparty system. However, as the year went
on it became quite obvious from the huge crowds that turned up for the various
opposition rallies that such a referendum was not necessary as its outcome was already
quite clear. Consequently, leading members of UNIP, the National Interim Committee
and Catholic bishops urged Kaunda to introduce the multiparty system without holding
a referendum and on 24 September 1990 he agreed to do so during a meeting of UNIP’s
See Bratton 1992: p. 86; and Chiluba 1995: p. 63.
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National Council. On 4 December 1990 Zambia’s parliament repealed Article 4 of the
constitution making the reintroduction of the multiparty system possible.
The dramatic economic decline during the 1980s together with the political
changes in Eastern Europe that were relatively well covered by the Zambian media
played an important role in bringing about political liberalization in Zambia. While
hoping that the world market price for copper, Zambia’s main source of export
earnings, would recover again, Zambia’s government borrowed a lot of money making
the country one of the most heavily indebted countries on a per capita basis. This left
the Kaunda government with no other choice than to implement various SAPs to
become eligible for new loans from the IMF. Under these SAPs the government had to
cut subsidies for Zambia’s main staple, maize meal, which led to foot riots in December
1986 and in June 1990. While the riots in December 1986 mainly focused on the price
of maize meal, those in June 1 990 took on a political dimension at least partly as a
result of the events in Eastern Europe. The rioters identified the single-party system as
the source for their and Zambia’s economic problems. Furthermore, because of the
economic decline the Kaunda government lost its ability to dispense resources to client
groups. As a result many of them turned to the opposition in the hope for a better deal.
The opposition to the Kaunda government was spearheaded by the trade unions, which
are the core of Zambian civil society. Due to Zambia’s comparatively high degree of
urbanization (just over 50% in 1990) and the large concentration of formal industrial
employment in the Copperbelt Zambia has one of Africa’s strongest trade union
movements, which was able to maintain a high degree of autonomy during the 1970s
See Bratton 1992: p. 86; van Donge 1995b: pp. 200-201; and Chikulo / Sichone 1996: p.4.
104
and 1980s. The large number of formal sector workers that were organized in Zambia’s
trade unions could fairly easily be mobilized for political action. They were also the
ones that were particularly negatively impacted by the subsidy cuts. This enabled the
leaders of the MMD to organize various large rallies against the Kaunda government in
Lusaka and other urban centers forcing it to allow the reintroduction of the multiparty
system. The existence of a strong trade union movement that could be mobilized against
the Kaunda regime enabled Zambia’s opposition to bring about political liberalization
without Zambia’s donors having to impose explicit political conditionalities. However,
the economic conditionalities they imposed in the context of SAPs contributed to the
delegitimatization of the Kaunda government and enabled opposition leaders to
mobilize the urban population against the one-party system.^'^^
6.3 Democratic Transition / Democratization
In chapter 6.3 the democratic transition / democratization in Zambia will be
analyzed. First, the formation of major opposition parties will be analyzed. Second, the
constitutional changes that took place prior to the 1991 elections will be examined.
Third, the 1991 elections will be looked at. Fourth, major political developments prior
to and the 1996 elections will be analyzed. Fifth, major political developments prior to
and the 2001 elections will be examined.
See Baylies / Szeftel 1992: pp. 79-81; and White 1995: pp. 66-69.
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6.3.1 The Formation of Opposition Parties
On 4 January 1991 the National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy
was officially registered as a political party under the name Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD). Subsequently other political parties^'''^ were registered as well.
However, only MMD posed a significant challenge to UNIP in the 1991 elections.
Therefore the following remarks will be limited to MMD.
Prior to the 1991 elections the MMD could be viewed as a broad “temporary
coalition of trade unionists, ex-politicians, professionals, students, intellectuals,
businessmen, commercial farmers and religious leaders’’^'^^ that had one common goal,
namely, to replace the Kaunda government. In early 1991 various UNIP politicians
resigned from their posts and joined the MMD. At the same time the Zambian Congress
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as well as Zambia’s largest single union, the Mineworkers
Union of Zambia (MUZ), declared their support for the MMD. The support of the trade
unions enabled MMD to quickly establish a party infrastructure all over the country. For
instance, trade union offices throughout Zambia became recruiting centers for the newly
established party and towns “served by railroads, provincial and district capitals, and all
public institutions with trade-union branches became major organizing centers for the
MMO”.^"*^ MMD’s first national convention took place in Lusaka from 27 February to 2
March 1991. During this convention MMD’s presidential candidate for the upcoming
elections was elected. Among the four candidates Frederick Chiluba received 683 votes.
Some of them were the National Democratic Alliance (NADA), the National Party for Democracy
(NDP) and the Democratic Party (DP).
White 1995: p. 68.
Ihonvbere 1996: p. 117.
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while MMD’s interim chairman, Arthur Wina, only received 208 votes.^"" The business
people within the MMD were not too happy with the fact that a trade unionist was
elected as MMD s presidential candidate and there was an immanent danger that the
MMD could split. However, Wina himself stressed the need for unity as a precondition
for winning the upcoming elections. By doing so he helped to prevent a split ofMMD.
Besides the party’s presidential candidate the national convention also elected a
National Executive and a shadow cabinet. Except for the Eastern Province, which was a
UNIP stronghold, individuals from all other provinces were elected. While “Chiluba’s
election indicated the MMD’s determination to look beyond its elite core for national
support”, “it was not so much a mass party as an organisation led by the relatively
privileged, who garnered broad-based support out of broad-based discontent”.^"**
6.3.2 Constitutional and Electoral Reforms
In early 1991 the Kaunda government appointed a Constitutional Commission to
draft a new constitution for the Third Republic. The Commission was chaired by Dr.
Patrick Mvunga. “Members of the Mvunga commission travelled throughout Zambia,
soliciting advice from business, community and government leaders. The MMD, which
was offered two of the 23 seats on the commission, refused to participate in this process
and objected to the strongly pro-UNIP character of the individuals consulted”.^"*^ In
June 1991 the Constitutional Commission submitted its report. Among its
The other two candidates were Edward Jack Shamwana and Humphrey Mulemba. Shamwana
received a dismal 24 votes, while Mulemba got 168.
Baylies / Szeftel 1992: p. 85 and p. 86. See also Africa Confidential, Vol. 32, No. 5 (8 March 1991),
pp. 5-6; and Wolbert 1994: p. 49.
National Democratic Institute / Carter Center 1992: p. 28.
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recommendations were the creation of the post of vice-president, the expansion of the
National Assembly from 135 to 150 seats, the establishment of a constitutional court,
and the establishment of a bicameral system of parliament. The MMD rejected the draft
constitution proposed by the Commission and threatened to boycott the upcoming
elections if the National Assembly ratified the recommendations of the Commission.
MMD opposed the draft constitution of the Commission, since it vested too much
authority in the president and too little in the National Assembly. For instance, under
the draft constitution the president was able to choose cabinet ministers from outside the
National Assembly and he could unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly as well as
veto its legislation. As a result of mediation efforts by university students^^® and the
Anglican church a compromise was reached on 3 1 .luly 1991. Under this compromise
only members of the National Assembly could be appointed to the cabinet, the
presidential power of declaring material law was abandoned, and “any imposition of a
state of emergency beyond seven days was to be approved by the National
“In an effort to promote compromise during debate over the proposed constitution, university
students organized a one-day convention in Lusaka on July 19, 1991. Representatives of nine
political parties, including President Kaunda and MMD President Chiluba, attended the convention.
Although the atmosphere was strained, the meeting resulted in Kaunda’s agreement to meet with
opponents of the proposed constitution during the following weekend before parliament reconvened”
(National Democratic Institute / Carter Center 1992: p. 28).
“On Tuesday, July 23, Kaunda and Chiluba met one-on-one, for the first time since Chiluba’s
election as leader of the MMD, to discuss constitutional issues. In the meeting, which was held at the
Anglican Cathedral and chaired by Bishop Stephan Mumba, Kaunda and Chiluba agreed that while
the National Assembly would continue to consider the constitution, more time would be allowed for
consultations with other parties about possible amendments. The meeting substantially eased tensions
and made possible a compromise on the constitution” (National Democratic Institute / Carter Center
1992: p. 29).
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Assembly
. The National Assembly adopted the new constitution on 24 August
1991 253
On 24 August 1991 the National Assembly also adopted a new Electoral Act.
Under this Act the size of the National Assembly was increased from 125 to 150^^'*. “In
order to take into account the resultant 25 new seats, constituency boundaries had to be
revised and re-drawn”.^^^ This was done by the Electoral Commission. The creation of
the 25 new electoral districts was biased in favor of rural constituencies where UNIP’s
support was thought to be strongest. Furthermore the number of registered voters per
constituency varied between 6,376 and 70,379. These variations again favored voters in
rural constituencies. After he initially opposed neutral external and internal electoral
observers. President Kaunda finally agreed to such observers from established
international bodies and emerging local civic groups prior to the elections that
were scheduled for 31 October 1991.^^*
Ihonvbere 1996: p. 118.
See Bratton 1992: pp. 87-88; National Democratic Institute / Carter Center 1992: pp. 28-29; van
Donge 1995b: pp. 201-202; Mbao 1996: pp. 9-23; and Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 118-1 19.
In addition to 150 constituency members that were elected on a first-past-the-post basis in single-
member constituencies with a simple majority (plurality), the National Assembly was supplemented
by eight nominated members.
Chikulo 1996:p. 26.
International observers were sent by the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute, the
Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
25^
“Two new civic groups were established locally to conduct pollwatching: the Zambia Independent
Monitoring Team (ZIMT), an association of professionals; and the Zambia Election Monitoring
Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), a broad coalition of organizations representing churches,
students, women, layers, journalists and nongovernmental development agencies” (Bratton 1992: p.
94, footnote 9).
See Bratton 1992: pp. 88-89; Bjomlund / Bratton / Gibson 1992: pp. 413-417; and Chikulo 1996: pp.
25-26.
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6.3.3 The 1991 Elections
One of the most striking features of the electoral campaign prior to the elections
on 31 October 1991 was the almost complete absence of issue-based / issue-oriented
debates among the two main contenders, MMD and UNIP. None of them provided the
voters with a clear perspective on how they intended to solve Zambia’s severe socio-
economic crisis if elected. “Surprisingly, not even the ZCTU showed any need to
promote workers’ interest by influencing MMD policy. The defeat ofUNIP was seen as
a panacea for all problems, or at least as a first step towards their solution’’.^^^ Chiluba
and MMD blamed the Kaunda government for the bad shape of Zambia’s economy^^®
without offering any substantive ideas on what policies were necessary to turn the
economy around. Rather than focusing on key issues the two main contenders Chiluba
and Kaunda and their party cohorts mainly used inflammatory rhetoric and exchanged
wild accusations while on the campaign trail. For instance, Kaunda claimed that MMD
was plotting an armed revolt with the support of army officers and the Angolan rebel
leader Jonas Savimbi in case of defeat, while Chiluba claimed that “UNIP was
harboring a secret commando unit in Malawi and called for an international
peacekeeping force to supervise elections and the transition”.
While MMD’s campaign mainly focused on urban areas where its rallies were
attended by huge crowds of people who were fed up with the Kaunda government,
UNIP’s campaign focused mainly on rural areas. In an attempt to increase its support in
Chikulo 1996:p. 26.
For instance, in its media campaign the MMD drew attention to the decline of the public service and
the bad shape of the country’s infrastmcture by showing pictures ofpotholed highways.
Bratton 1994: p. 120. See also Wolbert 1994: p. 50; and van Donge 1995b: pp. 204-208.
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rural areas UNIP tried to please Zambia’s 280 hereditary chiefs in various ways. For
instance, they were included among UNIP’s parliamentary candidates and they were
offered positions in the government and the party. Furthermore, the salaries of
traditional rulers were increased and in 1991 the UNIP government distributed four-
wheel drive vehicles to senior chiefs, notably in the Eastern Province. In another
attempt to gain an advantage in the 1991 elections Kaunda waited until September 1991
until he finally embarked on a process of “de-linking” UNIP from government
institutions, which was carried out quite halfheartedly. This enabled UNIP candidates to
continue to take advantage of the blurred distinction between their party and the Kaunda
government to aid their campaigns. For instance, “government offices were used as
campaign headquarters and were often plastered with UNIP campaign materials, and
both government and party officials running for parliamentary seats were seen driving
government vehicles on the campaign trail”.^^^ While the print media provided a fairly
balanced coverage of the campaign, the reporting of the government-controlled
Zambian National Broadcasting Company (ZNBC) was biased in favor of Kaunda and
UNIP. However, during the campaign MMD won various court cases that helped to
level the playing field to a certain extent. For instance, they won an injunction barring
the director-general ofZNBC, who was biased towards UNIP, from supervising
ZNBC’s news reporting until after the elections and in another court injunction ZNBC
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was forced to air MMD campaign spots.
Bjomlund / Bratton / Gibson 1992: p. 418.
See Ham 1991: pp. 45-48; Novicki 1992: pp. 13-17; Bjomlund / Bratton / Gibson 1992: pp. 413-420;
Bratton 1992: pp. 89-91; Bratton 1994: pp. 117-122; Bourgault 1995: pp. 217-218; van Donge
1995b: pp. 202-208; and Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 120-124.
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The parliamentary and presidential elections on 31 October 1991 resulted in an
overwhelming victory for the MMD and its presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba.
In the presidential elections Chiluba received 75.8% of the votes cast, while Kaunda
only received 24.2%. In the parliamentary elections MMD received 74.3% of the votes
cast, while UNIP received 24.7%. In seats MMD won 125, more than two thirds, while
UNEP won 25. The tables in Appendices V and W show that MMD’s support was quite
high in all provinces except the Eastern Province, which remained a UNIP stronghold,
since it was Kaunda’ s home base. Chiluba’ s and MMD’s support was strongest in the
Copperbelt, which reflects Chiluba’ s strong support among the mine workers who were
most severely effected by the economic decline. Except for the Eastern Province,
“MMD’s support was widespread, rural and urban, and did cut across ethnic groups’’.^^'*
Many Zambians, regardless where they lived or what etlinic group they belonged to,
wanted change. They hoped that removing Kaunda from office would remove all their
problems. However, they soon found out that this was not the case as will be illustrated
below.^^^
6.3.4 The 1996 Elections
Chiluba’s cabinet appointments after the 1991 election gave proof of the
dominant position of businessmen within the MMD. While at least thirteen of the 24-
member cabinet were businessmen, only two came from the trade union movement.
Furthermore, at least half of his ministers came from his own ethnic group, the Bemba.
Ihonvbere 1996: p. 125.
See Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 124-125; and Krennerich 1999: pp. 951 and 958.
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The dominant position of Bemba-speaking businessmen within the Chiluba government
soon led to tensions within the MMD. In April 1992 a group of politicians and
intellectuals mainly from the Southern and Western provinces formed the Caucus for
National Unity (CNU) within the MMD to protest against the dominant position of
businessmen from the Luapula and Northern provinces within the government. In early
March 1993 Chiluba declared a state of emergency following the discovery of UNIP
documents detailing an alleged conspiracy to destabilize the government by inciting
civil disobedience and unrest capitalizing on the rapidly deteriorating economic
situation, which was caused mainly by the government’s rigorous implementation of
SAPs. Subsequently a number of prominent UNIP members, including Kaunda’s
three sons, were arrested and detained without charges.^^^ Various ministers and MMD
MPs were opposed to the declaration of a state of emergency, which they viewed as an
overreaction by the government and a threat to Zambia’s fledgling democracy. In
response to the declaration of a state of emergency and allegations of corruption and
drug trafficking against members of the Chiluba government various high ranking
politicians left the government and the MMD in 1993 and subsequent years and formed
their own political parties. For instance, the first Minister of Legal Affairs of the MMD
government, Rodger Chongwe, formed the Liberal Progressive Front (LPF). Guy Scott,
who had been Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries founded the National Lima
Party (NLP) together with the head of the Zambia National Farmers Union, Ben Kapita.
The head of the National Party (NP), Humphrey Mulemba, had been Minister of Mines
As a result of SAP induced subsidy cuts the price for basic food staples such as maize meal increased
drastically. Public sector retrenchment and privatization left thousands of workers unemployed.
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and Mineral Development, while the head of the Agenda for Zambia (AZ),
Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, had been Minister of Science, Technology
Education and Vocational Training in the Chiluba government. Finally, the leaders of
the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), Dean Mung’omba and Derick Chitala, played
an important role in the founding of the MMD and had been Deputy Ministers in the
Chiluba govemment.^^^
On 9 December 1993 Chiluba appointed a 25-member Constitutional Review
Commission, which was chaired by John Mwanakatwe. The Mwanakatwe Commission
received and reviewed submissions from individuals, civic organizations and political
parties from all over the country.^^^ In June 1995 the Mwanakatwe Commission
released its report and a draft constitution. “The draft constitution still vested executive
powers in the presidency and still provided for the election of the president by direct
popular vote. But Article 82 (1) stated that a person would qualify to be a presidential
candidate if (a) he or she was a citizen of Zambia bom in Zambia; (b) his or her parents
were Zambian citizens bom in Zambia; [...]. Secondly, Article 82 (2) stated that a
person who has been elected twice previously would not qualify as a presidential
candidate”.^^® The main motivation beyond these provisions, which were submitted to
For a detailed account of this conspiracy, which became known as “Zero Option” see Ihonvbere
1996: pp. 224-245.
See Ham 1993: pp. 31-33; Baylies / Szeftel 1997: pp. 1 15-1 16; Bartlett 2000: pp. 441-443; and
Mthembu-Salter 2001: pp. 1108-1109.
269 Commission agreed that in order to reach as many people as possible, it should cover provincial
centers and selected districts as well as other areas with a concentration of population. The
Commission travelled extensively throughout Zambia between March and September 1994, and
conducted 46 public sittings in all nine provinces which attracted a total of 996 petitioners” (CCC
1996: p. 16).
Mphaisha 1996: p. 69.
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the Mwanakalwc Commission by the MMD, was to bar former President Kenneth
Kaunda whose parents were from Malawi and who already had been president for 27
years from beeoming UNIP’s presidential eandidate for the 1996 elections.
Furthermore, in the draft constitution the Mwanakatwe Commission removed the
requirement for police permits for the holding of meetings and included provisions that
enhanced the freedom of the press. In its report the Mwanakatwe Commission
recommended that the draft constitution should be adopted by a Constituent Assembly
that would be more representative than the MMD-dominated National Assembly. In the
light of this recommendation the Zambian public expected that the adoption of the new
constitution would be preceded by broad-based public discussion and debate. However,
this was not in the interest of the Chiluba government, which instructed the ZNBC-
Television to cancel scheduled discussions of the draft constitution at short noticc.^^^ In
September 1995 the Chiluba government finally released its White Paper on the
Mwanakatwe Report. In it the government virtually rejected all new rights and
enhancements in the proposed Bill of Rights, while accepting the controversial
recommendations regarding the presidential candidates. Furthermore, the Chiluba
government rejected the recommendation that the new constitution be adopted by a
Constituent Assembly and a national referendum. It argued that the new constitution
On 29 October 1994 Kaunda announced his return to active politics and in May 1995 he defeated
Kebby Musokotwana for the UNIP presidency. Many of his rallies drew large crowds.
“The procrastination of the government did not deter privately owned newspapers, some non-
governmental organisations and civic leaders from commenting on the draft constitution. The Law
Association of Zambia, the Zambia Civic Education Association and the Legal Resources
Foundation, for example, defied subtle government attempts to stifie public debate
and went ahead
with holding public seminars and workshops on the new constitution” (Mphaisha 1996: p. 70).
In
March 1996, members of the civil society in a ten-day Citizen’s Convention produced a
document
known as the Green Paper, which was a reaction to the Government White Paper and
represented
the citizens’ contributions to the Constitution debate. Unfortunately
the Government chose to ignore
the Green Paper” (CCC 1996: pp. 17-18).
should be adopted by the National Assembly. The reason behind this was that “Chiluba
wanted to avoid the option of a Constituent Assembly, coupled with the holding of a
national referendum, to ensure that constitutional clauses were retained that restricted
qualifications for presidential candidates. He believed that UNIP stood no chance of
regaining power without Kaunda. As such, he felt that democratisation should be
promoted only to the extent that it did not jeopardise his presidency”.^"^^ Consequently,
on 28 May 1996 the National Assembly, in which the MMD had a two-thirds majority,
adopted a Constitution Amendment Bill that mainly contained provisions aimed at
preventing Kaunda and his vice presidential running mate. Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta,
from standing in the 1996 elections. In response UNIP and six smaller parties
announced that they would boycott the 1996 elections.^^"^
The constitutional amendments described above were not the only issue that
gave rise to controversy prior to the elections on 18 November 1996. Another such
issue was the voter registration process. Rather than providing appropriate funds to the
Electoral Commission the MMD government contracted an Israeli company (Nikuv
Computers Ltd.) to carry out the voter registration. By the end of the voter registration
period only 2.3 million voters had been registered out of approximately 3.8 million
eligible voters. Cumbersome procedural requirements and inadequate publicity were
among the reasons for this disappointing result. Furthermore, the process itself was full
of problems. For instance, thousands of names were omitted from the register while at
the same time thousands of other individuals received duplicate registration cards. This
Mphaisha 1996: p. 71.
See Mphaisha 1996: pp. 68-72; Bratton / Posner 1999: pp. 392-395; Reynolds 1999: p. 154;
and
Mphaisha 2000: pp. 134-135.
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led various opposition parties to demand that “the entire registration exercise be
scrapped and that citizens over the age of 18 be permitted to vote with their national
registration cards”.^”^^ However, the government refused these demands.”^
Just about four weeks prior to the elections a new Electoral Commission was
sworn in. All its five members were either MMD members or pro MMD. This seriously
compromised the ability of the Commission to ensure that there would be a level
playing field prior to the elections. The campaign coverage of the government-
controlled media was clearly biased in favor of the MMD. For instance the newspaper
“Times of Zambia” allocated 88.15% of its news coverage to the MMD, while four
opposition parties combined shared the rest among themselves. In addition, independent
newspapers such as “The Posf’ that “published articles or editorials critical of the way
the election exercise was being conducted faced harassment by MMD supporters or the
police”. Besides taking advantage of its control over the Zambia National Broadcast
Cooperation (ZNBC) and two major newspapers the MMD also used government
vehicles and equipment of the Zambia Information Service for campaign purposes.
Furthermore, it distributed development funds, maize meal and fertilizer to attract
supporters in rural constituencies, while it sold council houses at bargain prices to win
support in urban areas. On top of this MMD campaigners threatened the withdrawal of
development funding from constituencies that would elect opposition candidates to the
Bratton / Posner 1999: p. 395.
See CCC 1996: pp. 45-52; Bratton / Posner 1999: pp. 394-395; and Mphaisha 2000: pp.132-133.
Bratton / Posner 1999: p. 397.
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National Assembly. Finally, like in 1991 policy issues were almost completely absent
from the campaign.^^*
Despite the fact that various local monitoring organizations^^*^ as well as
donors expressed serious concerns about deficiencies and irregularities in voter
registration, the constitutional provisions limiting participation, and the inadequacies of
the Electoral Commission the Chiluba government went ahead and held parliamentary
and presidential elections on 18 November 1996. Like in 1991 MMD and its
presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba, emerged victorious from the 1996 elections.
In the presidential contest Chiluba received 72.6% of the vote, while his main
challenger. Dean Mung’omba of the ZDC, received 12.7% of the vote. In the
parliamentary elections MMD received 61.0% of the vote, while ZDC received 13.8%
of the vote. However, because of the first-past-the-post electoral system MMD won 131
seats (87%) in the National Assembly, while ZDC only won two seats (1%). NP won
five seats (3%), AZ two (1%) and independent candidates won 10 seats (7%).^*' The
tables in Appendices X and Y show that support for Chiluba and the MMD varied
considerably across Zambia’s nine provinces. While support for Chiluba and the MMD
was strongest in the Copperbelt and Chiluba’s home province, Luapula, it was much
less strong in the Western and North-Western provinces. Among the major opposition
See CCC 1996; pp. 32-33 and 41-44; Banda 1997; pp. 24-63; Phiri 1999; pp. 58-60; van Donge
1998; pp. 84 and 97-99; Bratton / Posner 1999; pp. 396-397; and Bartlett 2001; pp.
87-89.
These local monitoring organizations were the Forum for a Democratic Process (FODEP), the
Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) and the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC).
By the end of March 1 996 Norway and the UK suspended balance of payments support. They linked
their actions to concerns about constitutional changes. Subsequently also Denmark withheld
debt
relief, Germany froze a portion of its aid to Zambia and the US announced a 10% cut in aid.
“The majority of successful independents were MMD members who were not adopted by their party
and former UNIP members who defied their party’s call for a boycott” (Reynolds 1999; p.
158).
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parties only ZDC did relatively well countrywide. The support of the other parties was
mainly limited to certain provinces. For instance, NP’s support was limited mainly to
the North-Western Province, while AZ’s support was mainly limited to the Western
Province. Compared with the 1991 elections, the 1996 elections revealed a tendency for
the Zambian party system to become less dominated by just one party. While MMD
became even more dominant in the National Assembly as a result of the first-past-the-
post electoral system, it only received 61.0% of the vote in 1996 compared with 74.3%
in 1991 in the parliamentary elections. This reveals a tendency of Zambian voters to
split their vote between the presidential and the parliamentary contest, which suggests
that “the individual qualities of parliamentary candidates may have been as much a part
of voter decision-making as party affiliation”.^*^ Finally, while voter turnout reached
about 58% in 1996 compared with about 45% in 1991, still only 33% of Zambia’s
• 283
voting age population had participated in the 1996 elections.
6.3.5 The 2001 Elections
On 28 October 1997 rebel officers, led by Capt. Stephen Lungu, captured the
national television and radio station in Lusaka from where they announced the
formation of a military regime. The officers who called themselves the National
Redemption Council claimed that they “had been motivated by the chaotic situation of
the country in which crime and corruption were rampant’ The attempted coup was
suppressed within a few hours by loyal military units who dislodged the insurgents from
Bratton / Posner 1999; p. 398.
See Burnell 1997: pp. 409-41 1; von Donge 1998: pp. 75-78; Branon
/
Reynolds 1999: pp. 158-159; Krennerich 1999: pp. 946-958; and
Burnell 2001; pp. 248-249.
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the broadcast station and the State House. In response to the failed coup the Chiluba
government declared a state of emergency on 29 October 1997, which enabled it to
detain people without trial for 28 days. Subsequently the government arrested 84
people, mostly soldiers it suspected to be involved with the failed coup. However,
among the arrested was also the leader of the opposition Zambian Democratic Congress
(ZDC), Dean Mung’omba, who was tortured while in detention according the credible
accounts. Upon his return from South Africa also the leader ofUNIP and former
President, Kenneth Kaunda, was arrested and imprisoned in a maximum-security goal
in central Zambia on 25 December 1997. He was accused of having helped to plan and
finance the attempted coup. In response to international criticism and an intervention by
the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, Kaunda was transferred to his Lusaka
home where he was placed under house arrest in January 1998. Following donor
pressure Chiluba lifted the state of emergency on 17 March 1998. On 1 June 1998 the
charges against Kaunda were dropped due to a lack of evidence.
In December 1998 businessman and former MMD official, Anderson Mazoka,
founded a new political party, called the United Party for National Development
(UPND). UPND managed to win 30 seats during local government elections on 30
December 1998. On 3 May 1999 it was announced that six opposition parties and a
pressure group^^^ would merge and form a new political party, called the Zambia
Cornwell 1997: p. 224.
See Cornwell 1997: pp. 224-225; Africa Confidential, Vol. 39, No. 6 (20
March 1998), p. 3; Southall
2001: pp. 561-562; and Mthembu-Salter 2001: p. 1110.
The opposition parties were the Agenda for Zambia (AZ), the Labour
Party, the Liberal Progressive
Front (LPF), the National Lima Party (NLP), the National Citizen’s Coalition
and the Zambia
Democratic Congress (ZDC). The press group was Sylvia Masebo’s National
Pressure Group.
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Alliance for Progress (ZAP). Both parties were mainly supported by MMD dissidents
but failed to agree on a merger mainly due to personal differences.^*”^
In 2000 and 2001 various high ranking MMD politicians left the party or were
expelled as a result of a struggle over who would become MMD’s presidential
candidate for the 2001 elections. Subsequently they formed their own political parties.
In July 2000 the former Minister of Energy and Water Development, Benjamin Y.
Mwaila, was expelled from the MMD after he had declared his intention to contest the
presidency in 2001 . Later on more than 1,000 MMD members resigned in support of
Mwaila, who in August 2000 founded the Republican Party, which later on merged with
ZAP, becoming the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP). Towards the end of 2000
increasing numbers ofMMD cadres began calling for an amendment to the 1996
Constitution, which limited the time in office of Zambia’s president to two terms, to
allow Chiluba to stand for a third term in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections. However, in early 2001 various prominent civil society organizations,
including the trade unions, the churches, the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) and
many smaller bodies, joined forces in opposing a third term for Chiluba and established
the anti-third term Oasis Forum, which organized protest rallies in every major town.
Scores of people wore green ribbons to show that they were against a third term of
Chiluba and every Friday at around 5 p.m. motorists, cyclists and pedestrians honked,
hooted and blew whistles for several minutes to protest against Chiluba’ s third term
aspirations. In mid April 2001 50 MMD deputies, including 21 ministers, signed a
petition opposing Chiluba’ s bid for a third term. On 2 May 2001 Chiluba dismissed all
See Africa Confidential, Vol. 40, No. 1 1 (28 May 1999), pp. 3-4; and Africa Confidential, Vol. 41,
No. 8(14 April 2000), pp. 5-6.
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those members from his cabinet who had signed the petition, including Vice-President
Christon Tembo, and had them expelled from the MMD. Subsequently Tembo founded
the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), while former Education Minister,
Godfrey Miyanda, established another political party, called the Heritage Party (HP).
On 5 May 2002 Chiluba announced on TV that he would not seek a third term, but he
left open the possibility of holding a referendum on amending the constitution to allow
presidents to run for a third term. In late August 2001 Chiluba announced that Levy
Mwanawasa would be his favored candidate for the upcoming elections and
subsequently MMD’s 37-member National Executive Committee (NEC) nominated him
as MMD’s presidential candidate. In response MMD’s National Secretary, Michael
Sata, resigned out of protest against Mwanawasa’ s nomination and later left the MMD
to form his own political party, called Patriotic Front (PF).^^*
On 27 December 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections took place in
Zambia. No less than eleven parties nominated candidates for the presidential elections.
Out of them four received double digit results. The MMD candidate. Levy Mwanawasa,
received 29.15% of the vote and was elected as Zambia’s new President, since a simple
majority was sufficient for that. The UPND candidate, Anderson Mazoka, finished
second with 27.2% of the vote. FDD’s candidate, Christon Tembo, came in third with
13.17% of the vote, while UNIP’s candidate, Tilyenji Kaunda, finished fourth with
10.12% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections MMD won 69 seats (46%) out of
150. UPND won 49 seats (32.67%), UNIP won 13 seats (8.67%), FDD won 12 seats
See Chisupa 2001: pp. 5-8; Kunda 2001: pp. 14-16; Mthembu-Salter 2001: p. \\\1\ Africa Analysis,
No. 367 (9 March 2001), p.l3; Africa Confidential, Vol. 42, No. 18 (14 September 2001), pp. 3-4;
and Africa Confidential, Vol. 42, No. 21 (26 October 2001), p. 4-6.
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(8%) and HP won 4 seats (2.67%). PF and ZRP won one seat (0.67%) each and one
independent candidate was elected to the National Assembly as well. With more than
70% the voter turnout was considerably higher than in 1996 when only about 59% of
the voters had voted. However, only 55% of eligible Zambians were registered to vote.
In contrast to the 1996 elections, which were only monitored by local observers, the
2001 elections like the 1991 elections were monitored by international observers as
well. The 2001 elections were monitored by the Carter Center as well as the European
Union (EU). Both entities expressed serious concerns about irregularities that occurred
prior, during and after the elections. The EU Electoral Observation Mission^*^ pointed
out that the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) failed to enforce a level playing
field during the electoral campaign. For instance, the state-owned print and broadcast
media clearly favored the MMD in their campaign reporting.^^° Furthermore, state
resources such as government vehicles were used in MMD campaigns. The EU
observers also noted numerous logistical problems during the polling period. For
instance, ballot boxes and papers arrived late at various polling stations and the ECZ
assigned the same number of polling staff to each polling station regardless of whether
it had to cope with 400 or 4,000 voters, which caused long delays mainly at urban
polling stations and as a result not all voters who wanted to vote could do so. Finally,
the EU observes pointed out that the official results, which were published by the ECZ
on 16 January 2002, “cannot be relied upon as an accurate record of the voting on 27-31
The EU sent sixteen long term observers and eighty-six short term observers to Zambia.
This was most evident when ZNBC cancelled a long planned and carefully organized live debate
with the presidential candidates on the eve of the poll in order to transmit an hour long interview with
President Chiluba, which was an obvious campaign broadcast on behalf of the MMD and its
presidential candidate. By doing so ZNBC disobeyed a High Court order instructing it to transmit the
debate.
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December 2001”.^^' According to the final statement of the EU observer mission
twenty-two constituencies showed a difference of 900 votes or more regarding the votes
that were cast in the presidential and in the parliamentary elections and in 83 of the 150
constituencies no invalid ballots were recorded at all. Considering the extremely close
outcome of the presidential contest between Mwanawasa and Mazoka, the logistical
shortcomings on polling day and the serious flaws in the counting and tabulation
procedures the EU observers concluded that they were “not confident that the declared
results represent the wishes of the Zambian electors on polling day”.^’^
6.3.6 Summary
The clear victory of Chiluba and the MMD in the 1991 elections can be
attributed at least partly to the following factors. Many voters blamed Zambia’s
economic decline and the high unemployment upon the Kaunda government and hoped
that voting him out of office would be a first step towards reversing the economic
decline. Furthermore, because of the copper mines Zambia has one of Africa’s highest
degrees of urbanization which facilitated the development of a fairly large trade union
movement that managed to maintain a high degree of autonomy prior to the onset of the
democratization process. The support of the trade unions enabled the MMD to use their
well-established organizational framework to quickly establish an efficient and effective
infrastructure throughout the country. Finally, MMD was an inclusive coalition that
brought together urban and rural dwellers, mine workers, the unemployed, businessmen,
EU Elections Observation Mission, Final Statement on the Zambian Elections 2001, 5 February
2002, p. 3 (This statement is available at: http://www.eueu-Zambia.org).
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academics, students and civil servants from all of Zambia’s regions and ethnic groups.
MMD’s ability to remain united significantly contributed to its overwhelming victory in
1991. MMD’s large victory in 1991 led to the creation of a predominant party system.
However, mainly due to the fact that MMD brought together so many different groups
with different interests its predominant position eroded slowly during the course of the
1990s. This was already evident to a certain extent in the 1996 parliamentary elections
when MMD received 61.0% of the votes compared with 1991 when it received 74.3%
of the votes. Chiluba’s intention to stand for a third term in the 2001 elections had a
catalytic effect on the erosion ofMMD’s dominant position. In 2000 and 2001 various
leading MMD politicians opposed Chiluba’s bid for a third term some out of principle
and some out of self-interest, since they wanted to become Zambia’s next president. As
a result most of them were expelled from the MMD by Chiluba and subsequently they
established their own parties. For instance, the two former Vice-Presidents, Godfrey
Miyanda and Christon Tembo, established the Heritage Party (HP) and the Forum for
Democracy and Development (FDD) respectively. As a result of the 2001 elections
MMD lost its predominant position completely. However, its presidential candidate still
managed to win with 29.15% of the vote at least according the official results, the
accuracy of which has been called into question by local and international observers,
mainly because the opposition was too fragmented and could not agree on a common
candiddate. The fragmentation of the opposition can mainly be attributed to personal
EU Elections Observation Mission, Final Statement on the Zambian Elections 2001, 5 Febmary
2002, p.4. The official results of the 2001 Elections are available on the web site of the Electoral
Commission of Zambia (http://www.elections.org.zm). See also Lee 2002: pp. 26-28.
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animosities among various opposition politicians who all believed that their support was
strong enough to win the presidency themselves.^^^
6.4 Prospects for Democratic Consolidation
While the initial transition from Kaunda to Chiluba was regarded as exemplary
for other African countries, the way things unfolded after 1991 was much less
exemplary and significantly reduced the prospects for democratic consolidation. The
constitutional reform efforts between 1993 and 1995 are a case in point. The initial
appointment of the Constitutional Review Commission in December 1993 and its
efforts to conduct public hearings across the country were steps into the right direction.
However, it soon became obvious that President Chiluba was not really interested in a
broad-based constitutional review process. His primary interest was to secure his
reelection in 1996 in the light of the growing popularity of his predecessor Kenneth
Kaunda. This is evident by the fact that he rejected all the proposals of the Mwanakatwe
Commission that would have improved the civil and political rights of Zambians as well
as its proposal that the new constitution be adopted by a Constituent Assembly and a
national referendum, while he only agreed with the proposals that barred Kaunda from
running in the 1996 elections.^^"*
The efforts of the Chiluba government to implement various SAPs and to
privatize state owned companies such as the copper mines also did not increase the
prospects for democratic consolidation. The actions taken by the Chiluba government to
See Bratton 1994: pp. 122-125; Graham 1997: p. 99; Brunell 2001: pp. 246-247; and chapters 6.3.1
to 6.3.5 of this thesis.
See Mphaisa 1996: pp. 68-72; and chapter 6.3.4 of this thesis.
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liberalize the Zambian economy basically “have made a narrow elite, close to the MMD
hierarchy, extremely rich and brought in some US $350 million in foreign investment.
They have also have made urban Zambians much poorer, unable to pay fees for school
and health care”.^^^ Between 1991 and 1996 Zambia’s gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita fell from US $463 to US $401 and over 85 per cent of the population live in
poverty. Empirical studies such as the one by David Simon have shown that high rates
of poverty have a negative impact on rates of political participation. Based on his
research in Zambia Simon pointed out that “the propensity to participate increases with
household expenditure and decreases with negative assessments of recent changes in
economic status. [...] [P]overty is an obstacle to electoral participation, and thus to
democratic consolidation”. It can also be argued that Zambia’s economic decline
during the 1990s contributed to the coup attempt on 28 October 1997. While it was not
successful, it provided the pretext under which the Chiluba government cracked down
on the opposition and severely curtailed the civil and political liberties of Zambians by
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imposing a state of emergency, which was only lifted as a result of donor pressure.
While Zambia’s donors are not responsible for corruption and mismanagement,
which undoubtedly contributed to its economic decline during the 1990s, they made it
next to impossible for the Chiluba government to prove to its supporters that democracy
can go hand in hand with reducing poverty. Poverty reduction simply cannot be
achieved through drastic cuts of public expenditure on social welfare or through the
large-scale privatization of national assets without enabling the poor to benefit from
that
Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 13 (21 June 1996), p. 1.
Simon 2002: p. 39.
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through micro-credit programs for instance. Through their insistence that the Zambian
government implement fairly drastic and politically disruptive SAPs Zambia’s donors
undoubtedly contributed to the fall of Kaunda, but by pushing Chiluba to continue on
the exact same course his predecessor had reluctantly embarked upon, they did not
increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Zambia. In this context Burnell
pointed out that “the narrowing of Zambia’s economic and social policy options by the
international financial institutions makes it difficult for [Zambia’s opposition] parties to
offer the electorate radically different solutions to the country’s serious financial,
economic and social problems. They can compete in the sense of opposing the people in
power, but have only very limited scope to contest government policy”.^^* This means
that the implementation of SAPs made it less likely that political parties, which can be
differentiated mainly by ideology or programmatic concerns rather than by
ethnoregional criteria, will emerge in Zambia in the foreseeable future. In short, the
implementation of neo-liberal SAPs during the 1 990s did not increase the prospects for
democratic consolidation in Zambia.^^^
Even so the prospects for democratic consolidation in Zambia are not all that
great, there are some positive signs as well. Among them are Zambia’s high rate of
urbanization and the existence of a relatively large middle class. Furthermore, Zambia
has a fairly vibrant and diverse civil society, which played a crucial role in thwarting
Chiluba’s third term ambitions in 2001. Finally, Zambia’s new President, Levy P.
Mwanawasa, might be more willing to fight corruption and carry out substantive
See Simon 2002: pp. 23-42; and chapter 5.3.4 of this thesis.
Burnell 2001: p. 259.
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reforms than Chiluba. Even so, his coming to power as the result of a seriously Hawed
election highlights once more the need for substantive reforms.^”*’
See White 1995: p. 70; Mkandawire 1999: pp. 125-133; and Burnell 2001: pp.
259-260.
See chapter 6.3.5 of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
The main purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for identifying which
independent variables may explain the different trajectories the democratization process
has taken in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s. This will be done by
comparing the historical context, political liberalization, democratic transition /
democratization and the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia. Among the issues to be addressed in this context are the nature of the ancien
regime, the role of donors, the structure of civil society, the formation of political
parties, the multiparty elections and the constitutional reform process.
7.1 Historical Context
In Malawi as well as in Zambia, opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland (FRN) was an important element of the struggle for independence and
facilitated the formation of political movements.^°* In the years prior to independence
differences emerged between the political leaders who were involved in the anti-
colonial struggle in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. In Kenya these differences led to the
formation of two political parties, namely, the Kenya African National Union (KANU)
and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The former brought together the
larger, more educated, more urbanized, and more politically mobilized ethnic groups,
while the latter brought together the less educated, less urbanized and less mobilized
These political movements were the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) in Malawi and the Northern
Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC) in Zambia.
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ethnic groups who feared that KANU would not give adequate consideration to their
interests. In Zambia a new political party (UNIP) emerged out of the Northern Rhodesia
African National Congress (ANC), which was founded in 1951. The relatively early
formation of a political party in Zambia had its roots in the high degree of urbanization
due to the establishment of copper mines by the British and the resulting politicization
of the mine-workers. UNIP’s leadership favored a more radical approach to the anti-
colonial struggle than the ANC. In contrast to Kenya and Zambia, in Malawi different
parties with a considerable following did not emerge prior to independence. This was
mainly due to the fact that the fairly young leaders of the independence movement gave
the returning medical doctor and political leader, Hastings Banda, too much power.
While they were hoping Banda would lead the struggle for independence and then retire
from politics, Banda used his powers to transform the Malawi Congress Party (MCP),
which was supported by various ethnic groups across Malawi’s three regions, into his
personal instrument and to crush any kind of opposition. Shortly after Malawi had
gained its independence in 1964 Banda dismissed various cabinet ministers who
disagreed with him on a wide range of programmatic and ideological issues. By then
Banda had already established a highly authoritarian regime. Therefore the dismissed
cabinet ministers were no longer able to form an opposition party and were forced into
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exile instead.
As former British colonies Kenya, Malawi and Zambia gained independence
under parliamentary systems that were designed after the Westminster model of
democracy. However, all three countries changed their constitutions soon after they had
See chapters 4. 1 ; 5. 1 ; and 6. 1 of this thesis.
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gained independence. They all replaced their parliamentary systems with presidential
systems and their multiparty systems with one-party systems. Malawi, which already
had a defacto one-party system prior to independence^°\ was the first country to
establish a dejure one-party system in 1966. By then its parliament was a mere rubber
stamp whose MPs were hand picked by Banda. Kenya became a defacto one-party state
for the first time in 1964 when Kenyatta succeeded in persuading literally all members
ofKADU to join KANU by using a combination of carrots and sticks. However, the
influx of fairly conservative KADU politicians such as Daniel arap Moi led to tensions
within KANU between moderate and more radical politicians. As a result Kenya’s first
Vice-President, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, left KANU and founded a new political party,
the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) in 1966. However, his attempt to establish a party that
could be clearly distinguished from KANU on the basis of a different ideological and
programmatic orientation and not on the basis of being supported by a different ethnic
group, failed. In subsequent by-elections out of the 29 MPs that had left KANU to join
KPU only nine, mainly members of the Luo ethnic group from the Nyanza Province,
retained their National Assembly seats. Kenyatta was not willing to tolerate another
political party besides KANU and in 1969 KPU was banned and its leaders detained.
Even so Kenya did not become a dejure one-party state until 1982 the formation of a
new political party would not have been tolerated after KPU was banned in 1 969. This
is obvious be the fact that Moi changed to constitution to make Kenya a dejure one-
party state in response to another attempt by Odinga to form an opposition party.
MCP received 99% of the vote of enfranchised Africans in the 1961 Legislative Council elections.
The fact that only nine out of 29 former KANU MPs retained their seats can at least partly be
attributed to ethnic pressure and rigging.
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Among the three countries compared in this thesis Zambia retained a fairly well
functioning multiparty system much longer than Malawi and Kenya, namely, from 1964
until 1972. Unlike Kenyatta in Kenya, Kaunda in Zambia did not succeed in convincing
the members of the ANC to join UNIP. ANC managed to maintain its support from the
Tonga ethnic group in Zambia’s Southern Province. In 1966 politicians from the Lozi
ethnic group in the Western Province formed a new political party, the United Party
(UP). After it was banned in August 1968 its leaders joined the ANC and as a result it
did fairly well during the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1968. In 1971
UNIP’s dominant position within the multiparty system was seriously threatened when
Zambia’s former Vice-President, Simon Kapwepwe, who belonged to the populous
Bemba ethnic group, founded a new political party, the United Progressive Party (UPP).
In response Kaunda, who had originally hopped to achieve his goal of a one-party
system through the ballot box and consensual techniques, announced the formation of a
“one-party participatory democracy” in December 1972 and in August 1973 Zambia’s
new constitution entered into force making Zambia a dejure one-party state.^®^
Among the three countries compared in this study Malawi was the most
authoritarian. Just a few years after independence Banda had established complete
control over Malawi’s political system. An important tool in controlling every aspect of
the country’s political life were the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). By 1987 this
paramilitary force had about 60,000 members who served as the eyes and ears of the
regime, especially in rural areas. Besides the MYP the Banda regime adopted highly
repressive laws to suppress any form of opposition in the country. For instance, under
See chapters 4. 1 ; 5. 1 ; and 6. 1 of this thesis.
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the Censorship and Control of Entertainment Bill of 1968 anyone who published
anything likely to undermine the authority of, or public confidence in, the
govemment”^^^ could be punished with imprisonment. Malawi’s two newspapers and
its radio station were owned and run by the government and foreign journalists were
barred from working in Malawi. Independent civil society organizations did not exist
and even the church was scrutinized by the Banda regime.^^^
While Kenyatta in Kenya suppressed competition between political parties, he
allowed a certain degree of competition within KANU as long as this did not directly
challenge his authority. For instance, under the system of semi-competitive elections
established by him more than one KANU member could compete in each constituency
for a seat in the National Assembly, which led to a relatively high turn-over and
reshuffling of personnel within Kenya’s clientelist structures. Furthermore, under
Kenyatta Kenya’s political system had a professionally run and fairly independent
judiciary, relatively free print media
,
and a fairly vibrant civil society. Kenya’s civil
society included professional associations such as the Law Society of Kenya (LSK),
economic interest groups such as trade unions and business associations as well as
church organizations of various denominations and ethnic welfare associations. Under
Moi’s presidency the Kenyan political system became more authoritarian especially
since the mid-1980s. Moi banned all ethnic welfare associations, introduced the dejure
one-party system and replaced the secret ballot in the party primaries with a queuing
system. As a result of the introduction of the queuing system the National Assembly
Quoted after Cullen 1994: p. 18.
See chapter 5.1 of this thesis.
134
was deprived of its watchdog role vis-a-vis the executive. Moi also reduced the
independence of Kenya’s civil society by forcing the Central Organization of Trade
Unions (COTU) and Kenya’s largest women’s organization to affiliate with KANU,
which was increasingly used to control Kenya’s political life.^®’
Besides maintaining a multiparty system much longer than Kenya and Malawi,
Zambia also had the most vibrant and independent civil society among the three
countries. During Zambia’s Second Republic (1973-1990) even the state controlled
print media retained their ability to criticize the government - at least to a certain extent.
The church run newspaper, “National Mirror”, played an important role in uncovering
various corruption scandals. Also Zambia’s students were quite active during the
Second Republic. For instance, between 1971 and 1984 they organized four large
demonstrations against government corruption. In contrast to Malawi and Kenya,
Zambia is much more urbanized and its working class is highly organized. For instance,
by 1980 Zambia’s Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had 380,000 members, which
was almost twice as high as that of UNIP. Despite Kaunda’s efforts to bring the trade
unions under his control he failed to do so^'^, which enabled the trade unions and ZCTU
under the leadership of Chiluba to remain one of the most vocal critics of the Zambian
government during the Second Republic. In sum, while also Zambia’s National
Assembly was merely a rubber stamp and UNIP was used to control political life like
MCP in Malawi and KANU in Kenya, Zambia still was the least authoritarian regime
Unlike Malawi, many foreign correspondents were based in Kenya’s capital Nairobi.
See chapter 4. 1 of this thesis.
One possible explanation for this could be that the trade unions were relatively well funded as a
result of membership fees and therefore offers of well paid government positions to ZCTU s leaders
were not all that attractive.
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pnor to the onset of the democratization process in the early 1990s. This can be at least
partly explained by the fact that Kaunda did not use his presidential powers as
extensively as Banda did in Malawi and Moi did in Kenya because of his Christian
beliefs and his rootedness in the concept of Zambian Humanism.^"
7.2 Political Liberalization
Neither Moi nor Banda or Kaunda were willing to embark on political
liberalization by themselves. All three leaders argued against the return to a multiparty
system. It was a combination of internal and external pressure that brought about
political liberalization in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.
In Kenya, churches and lawyers played an important role in criticizing the
increasingly authoritarian character of the Moi regime since the mid-1980s. They were
uniquely positioned to do so because of the following reasons. First, they occupied a
“political space which government could not interfere with without dragging down the
entire political and ideological facade of constitutionalism and legalism”. Second,
they possessed organizational advantages they could use to protect themselves and
others. For instance, church sermons were less subject to state controls and bans. This
enabled especially younger clergy to preach the Gospel against state oppression.
Furthermore, Kenya’s churches and lawyers had various ties to churches and lawyers in
other countries, which made it less likely that the Moi regime would put them under too
much pressure, since it did not want to draw the attention of the international
311
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See chapter 6. 1 of this thesis.
Muigai 1993: p. 26.
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community on its authoritarian practices and human rights abuses. The deteriorating
economic situation and the increasing alienation of Kikuyu leaders with the Kalenjin-
dominated Moi regime were among the causes for a broadening of opposition to the
Moi regime in 1990. During that year the churches and lawyers were joined by leading
Kikuyu politicians in their demands for Kenya’s return to the multiparty system.
However, this was still not sufficient to put the Moi regime under enough pressure to
bring about a return to the multiparty system. After all, Kenya’s internal opposition had
a fairly limited social base. It’s support was confined mainly to the urban middle and
upper classes, while peasants and workers were not able to mobilize massive opposition
against the Moi regime, since they did not posses an independent organizational
structure outside KANU. Therefore only considerable donor pressure in form of
political conditionalities forced the highly aid dependent Moi regime to return to the
multiparty system in December 1991.^'^
In Kenya and in Malawi the churches played an important role in bringing about
political liberalization. However, unlike Kenya where various church leaders acted on
their own initiative when criticizing the Moi regime, Malawi’s Catholic bishops only
wrote the pastoral letter of 8 March 1992 after they were encouraged by the Pope to do
so. This underlines the highly repressive character of the Banda regime that did not
allow any form a dissent and that created a climate of fear throughout the country.
However, once the ice was broken by the Catholic bishops Malawi’s Protestant
churches also began to criticize the Banda regime and demanded political changes. For
instance, in August 1992 the Christian Council of Malawi (CCM), which represents
See chapter 4.2 of this thesis.
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various Protestant churches, sent an open letter to the government demanding the
holding of a referendum to enable the people to decide whether they want a multiparty
system. However, like in Kenya the churches and other civil society groups alone were
not able to bring about multiparty politics. Only donor pressure forced the highly aid
dependent Banda regime to agree to the opposition demand to hold a referendum.^
Banda was convinced that the majority of Malawians would favor the continuation of
the one-party system. This perception demonstrates how detached he was from the
majority of Malawians. Regarding the procedural details of the referendum it was again
the international community in form of the United Nations that was able to convince
Banda to agree to the opposition demands to hold the referendum at a later date and to
use one instead of two ballot boxes.^'^
Like Kenya, Zambia experienced economic decline during the 1980s. However,
unlike Kenya, where the economic decline helped to broaden the already existing
opposition to the Moi regime, Zambia’s dramatic economic decline basically brought
about political liberalization. The economic decline deprived the Kaunda government of
the financial resources needed to maintain its extensive patronage networks. To obtain
new loans the government had to implement various SAPs. The social costs that
resulted from their implementation, which required drastic subsidy cuts for Zambia’s
main food stable, maize meal, galvanized Zambia’s urban poor into action against the
Kaunda government, which they blamed for their misery. Unlike Malawi, where
workers engaged in some spontaneous and uncoordinated protests against the Banda
It can be argued that the positive effect of suspending aid to Kenya in November 1991 encouraged
donors to apply similar measures towards Malawi in May 1992.
See chapter 5.2 of this thesis.
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regime, in Zambia the trade unions were able to organize massive protests against the
Kaunda government. Zambia’s trade unions, which maintained a high degree of
autonomy during the 1970s and 1980s, were at the forefront of the opposition against
Kaunda and formed the core of Zambia’s civil society. Unlike Kenya, where the
opposition base was limited to the middle and upper class, in Zambia the opposition
movement also included the significant portion of the urban working class that was
organized in the trade unions. This gave the opposition movement in Zambia the ability
to mobilize many more people against the Kaunda government on a sustained basis than
the opposition movement in Kenya was able to mobilize against the Moi government. In
sum, the existence of a strong trade union movement that could be mobilized against the
Kaunda regime enabled Zambia’s opposition to bring about political liberalization
basically on its own. In contrast to Kenya and Malawi, Zambia’s donors did not have to
impose political conditionalities to bring about political liberalization because of the
existence of a strong trade union movement. However, the economic conditionalities
they imposed in the context of SAPs contributed to the delegitimatization of the Kaunda
government and enabled opposition leaders to mobilize the urban population against the
one-party system.^
7.3 Democratic Transition / Democratization
The comparative remarks on democratic transition / democratization in Kenya,
' Malawi and Zambia will be analyzed as follows. First, the process of party formation in
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prior to and the results of the multiparty elections in Kenya (1992 and 1997), in Malawi
(1994 and 1999), and in Zambia (1991, 1996 and 2001) will be considered from a
comparative perspective. In this context the question to which extent there was a level
playing field prior the elections will be addressed among other issues. Third, the
constitutional reform process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s will be
analyzed.
7.3.1 Formation of Political Parties^*^
After the dejure one-party system ceased to exist in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia, various new political parties emerged. In Kenya the Forum for the Restoration
of Democracy (FORD), which was formed in August 1991 as a broad based pressure
group for constitutional reforms and multiparty democracy, became the first political
party to be registered on 31 December 1991 after Section 2(A) of the constitution had
been repealed. It was soon followed by the Democratic Party (DP) ofMwai Kibaki.
Ethnic considerations were the driving force behind the formation of DP. Since the
leading figures ofFORD Odinga and Shikuku belonged to the ethnic groups of the Luo
and the Luhya respectively, members of Kenya’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu,
feared that their interests would not be adequately represented within FORD and urged
the Kikuyu, Mwai Kibaki, to found his own political party. While FORD managed to
attract a lot of support in early 1992, it ultimately failed to transform itself from a
pressure group into a unified and viable party. A couple of months prior to the 1992
elections it split into two parties, FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya. The main reason for
The focus will be on political parties that gained a significant amount of votes during the elections.
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FORD’S split was that its two most influential leaders, the Kikuyu Kenneth Matiba and
the Luo Oginga Odinga, both wanted to become Kenya’s next president. After the 1992
elections new political parties emerged mainly as a result of three high profile
defections from FORD-Kenya. While ethnicity was the driving force behind the
revitalization of the National Development Party (NDP) as a result of Raila Odinga’s
defection, the revitalization of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the founding of
Safina were not motivated primarily by ethnic considerations. The Luo Raila Odinga
basically left FORD-Kenya, since he was not able to take over the party’s leadership
from the Luhya Kijana Wamalwa. Paul Muite and Kiraitu Murungi left FORD-Kenya to
establish Safina as a multiethnic platform for reform together with Richard Leaky. Peter
Anyang Nyong’o left FORD-Kenya and joined the SDP in the hope of establishing a
party that focused on the social costs of SAPs.^'^
While in Kenya only one pressure group for multiparty democracy emerged
during the period of political liberalization. In Malawi, two such pressure groups
emerged. One was the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), which was led by the trade
unionist Chakufwa Chihana from Malawi’s Northern Region. AFORD was supported
mainly by northern intellectuals many ofwhom had served lengthy prison terms for
dissident political activities. The other one was the United Democratic Front (UDF),
which was led by the businessman Bakili Muluzi from Malawi’s Southern Region. UDF
was supported mainly by businessmen of the southern city of Blantyre, Malawi’s
commercial center. Many of UDF’s members like Muluzi himself had been members of
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) who had fallen out with Banda. After a clear
See chapters 4.3.1; and 4.3.3 of this thesis.
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majority had voted for the multiparty system in the 1993 referendum AFORD and UDF
transformed themselves into fairly stable political parties. As in Kenya, the leaders of
both parties wanted to become Malawi’s next president. However, unlike Kenya one of
them, Muluzi, was able to do so, since the opposition vote was split only between two
major parties and not between three like in Kenya and since the playing field prior to
the elections was more level in Malawi than in Kenya as will be shown in chapter 7.3.2.
Between the 1994 and the 1999 elections no new parties of any significance emerged in
Malawi. However, it is likely that new political parties will emerge prior to the 2004
elections.^'^
As in Kenya and Malawi, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was
formed in Zambia as a pressure group during the period of political liberalization.
Unlike FORD in Kenya, MMD managed to maintain enough cohesion prior to the first
multiparty elections to avoid breaking apart even so there was a danger of that
happening during the MMD convention in early 1991 when a number of powerful
businessmen expressed their displeasure with the election of the trade unionist
Frederick Chiluba as MMD’s presidential candidate. However, soon after the 1991
elections, which were won overwhelmingly by the MMD, it became obvious that the
MMD had “failed to transform itself from a loose coalition of elites opposed to Kaunda
to an integrated political party committed to well articulated ideological goals of
development”. The main reason for this was that only thing that kept the diverse
interests within MMD under one roof was their opposition to Kaunda. After MMD had
See chapters 5.2; 5.3.1; and 5.4 of this thesis.
Osei-Hwedie 1998: p. 233.
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won the elections there was nothing left to keep them under one roof. As a result
various new parties emerged in two waves. The first wave occurred prior to the 1996
elections. It started as a response to the dominant position of Bemba-speaking
businessmen from Zambia’s Luapula and Northern provinces within the Chiluba
government, which led to the marginalization of politicians from other regions and
ethnic groups. Subsequently they left the MMD and formed their own political parties.
For instance, the former Minister of Mines and Mineral Development, Humphrey
Mulemga, who was from Zambia’s North-Western Province left the MMD and founded
the National Party (NP), while the former Minister of Science, Technology Education
and Vocational Training, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, who was from Zambia’s
Western Province, left MMD and established another party with the name Agenda for
Zambia (AZ). However, like in Kenya ethnicity and regionalism was not the driving
force beyond the formation of all new political parties. Like Safina in Kenya, Zambia’s
National Lima Party (NLP) was formed with the intention to appeal to voters from all of
Zambia’s regions and ethnic groups. In NLP’s case its founders hoped to appeal to
farmers from all of Zambia’s nine provinces. The second wave occurred before the
2001 elections as a result of a struggle over who would become MMD’s presidential
candidate. The formation of the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP), the Forum for
Democracy and Development (FDD), the Heritage Party (HP), and the Patriotic Front
(PF) can be attributed to that. All these parties were founded by high-ranking members
of the Chiluba government who had either left the MMD or were dismissed by
Chiluba.^^'
See chapters 6.3.1, 6.3.4, and 6.3.5 of this thesis.
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Most of the political parties that emerged since the early 1990s in Kenya
Malawi and Zambia did so along ethnic and / or regional lines. The main reason for this
was the absence of ideological or programmatic differences between them. In other
words, “the lack of emphasis on political issues and the negligible role of class in
politics, leave [..] [ethnic and regional] attachments as the force most readily mobilized
in politics by the competing elites”.^^^ Furthermore, the actions of most politicians in
Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the past ten years have been guided predominantly
by personal opportunism. Political careerism and competition over spoils were the main
driving forces beyond politicians action and not serious disagreements over ideology or
programs. This also explains why most of them felt no strong commitment to any one
party and crossed freely between them. Finally, the main motivation behind the
formation ofnew political parties often was to provide a means for their leaders to
realize their presidential aspirations as was the case in Zambia prior to the 2001
•1
elections.
7.3.2 The Multiparty Elections
In Kenya, Malawi and in Zambia the incumbents applied a variety of measures
prior to the each multiparty election to influence its outcome in their favor. However,
there was considerable variation concerning the extent to which these measures resulted
in a playing field that was not level. In Kenya President Moi used a variety of measures
prior to the 1992 and the 1997 elections to ensure that there was no level playing field.
Osei-Hwedie 1998: p. 231.
See Osei-Hwedie 1998: pp. 231-244; and Burnell 2001: pp. 244 and 253.
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For instance, prior to the 1992 elections the Moi regime made it next to impossible for
the opposition parties to run effective campaigns throughout the country. Provincial
administrations frequently delayed the registration of local branches of opposition
parties and permissions for the holding of political rallies of opposition parties were
frequently denied, while KANU held many rallies without even having to obtain a
permit. Even worse, the Moi government declared parts of the Rift Valley Province and
the entire North-Eastern Province as “KANU-only” areas and denied opposition
politicians any kind of access. Also Kenya’s Electoral Commission was everything but
independent. Moi refused to reconstitute the Commission to include commissioners
acceptable to all parties. He preferred to stick to the commissioners he had appointed
prior to the reintroduction of the multiparty system. Therefore it came as no surprise
that the Commission failed to redraw the boundaries of Kenya’s 188 constituencies to
ensure the principle of one person one vote. Instead it left in place constituency
boundaries that clearly favored KANU. The Commission in tandem with the local
administrations also mismanaged the voter registration process leaving thousands of
young Kenyan’s unable to register. Finally, the campaign coverage of the government
controlled Kenya Broadcasting Cooperation (KBC) was clearly biased in favor of
KANU. Kenya’s fairly independent print media could not counterbalance the biased
coverage by KBC in the face of low literacy levels especially in rural areas.^^'’
In marked contrast to Kenya, the playing field was much more level in Malawi
prior to the 1994 elections. Unlike Moi, Banda appointed representatives of all political
parties to Malawi’s Electoral.Commission. Malawi’s Commission set up committees to
See chapter 4.3.2 of this thesis.
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deal with a wide range of issues such as civic education, the media, election
administration, and violence and intimidation. The high degree of independence of
Malawi’s Commission was underlined by the fact that it censured the MCP without
reservation “when it tried to intimidate voters or to use government resources for its
campaign and propaganda”.^^^ Furthermore, Malawi’s Electoral Commission also
managed to quite some extent to prevent MCP from using the Malawi Broadcasting
Cooperation (MCP) in its favor by issuing and enforcing compliance with its media
guidelines. In short, while the Banada regime also tried to influence the outcome of the
1994 elections in its favor especially in its stronghold, the Central Region, the playing
field was considerably more level in Malawi than it was in Kenya prior to the first
multiparty elections. This seems to be quite surprising considering the fact that the
Banada regime was more authoritarian than the Moi regime prior to the onset of the
democratization process. Among the possible explanations for this striking difference
could be that the humiliation of the Banda regime in the 1993 referendum contributed to
its willingness to make concessions prior to the 1994 elections. Furthermore Malawi’s
high aid dependency and the old age of Banda, who was quite sick and detached from
the people, made it less likely that Banda would manipulate the political process in his
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favor to the extent Moi did in Kenya.
As in Kenya and Malawi, the government in Zambia tried to influence the
outcome of the first multiparty elections in its favor. Similar to Kenya but unlike
Malawi, Zambia’s Electoral Commission was biased in favor of the government. For
M’Inoti 1998: p. 634.
See M’Inoti 1998: pp. 631-637; and chapters 5.3.2; and 5.3.4; of this thesis.
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instance, when it drew 25 new electoral districts it favored rural constituencies where
UNIP’s support was thought to be strongest. Furthermore, UNIP used state resources to
support its campaign and the campaign reporting of the Zambian National Broadcasting
Company (ZNBC) was clearly biased in favor of Kaunda and UNIP. However,
considering the broad-based support MMD enjoyed all over the country, Kaunda’s and
UNIP’s efforts to influence the outcome of the elections in their favor did not really
have an impact on the outcome of the elections.^^’
Compared with the first multiparty elections the playing field prior to the second
multiparty elections was somewhat more level in Kenya and much less level in Malawi
and in Zambia. Compared with the 1992 elections there have been some modest
improvements regarding the 1997 elections in Kenya. For instance, opposition members
were appointed to the Electoral Commission and the opposition parties could campaign
somewhat more freely in the entire country and had access to the government-run
media. However, it would be wrong the believe that the playing field was level prior to
the 1997 elections, since many of the reforms aimed at leveling the playing field prior to
the 1997 elections were implemented just a few weeks prior to the elections and
therefore did not really make that much of a difference anymore. In Malawi, the Muluzi
government applied some of the same measures the Moi government did in 1992 prior
to the 1999 elections to increase its chances to win them. For instance, Muluzi
appointed a new Electoral Commission in July 1998, which was more pro UDF than the
old one. This became quite obvious when the Commission proposed to create 70 new
electoral districts out of which 42 would have been in the UDF dominated Southern
See chapters 6.3.2; and 6.3.3 of this thesis.
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Region. Furthermore the Commission tried to bloc the joint presidential ticket of MCP
and AFORD without success. The Muluzi government also used state resources and the
Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC) in its favor. That’s why MBC was called by
some the Muluzi Broadcasting Cooperation. In Zambia the Chiluba government not
only used state resources and the media in its favor and appointed a pro MMD Electoral
Commission that mismanaged the voter registration process, but it also changed the
constitution with the aim to bar its main challenger Kaunda from running.^^*
In Kenya, Malawi and Zambia policy debates hardly took place during the
campaigns. As a result the politicians used ethnicity and regional affiliations to mobilize
voters. Consequently, voting mainly took place along ethnoregional lines with ethnicity
being somewhat more salient in Kenya and regionalism being somewhat more salient in
Malawi. In contrast to Kenya and Zambia, in Malawi the two main opposition parties
AFORD and MCP managed to join forces prior to the 1999 elections and by doing so
almost unseated the Muluzi government and probably would have done so if there
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would have been a level playing field.
7.3.3 The Constitutional Reform Process
During the 1 990s Kenya, Malawi and Zambia undertook efforts to reform their
constitutions. There was quite some variation regarding this process between the three
countries. Prior to the first multiparty elections Malawi undertook the most significant
constitutional changes out of the three countries. In Malawi the National Consultative
See chapters 4.3.3; 5.3.5; and 6.3.4 of this thesis.
See chapters 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 5.3.4; 5.3.5; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; and 6.3.5
of this thesis.
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Council (NCC), which was composed of representatives of all of Malawi’s registered
parties, was mandated to draft a new constitution. It managed to prepare a constitution
that can be considered as a significant improvement especially in the area of political
and civil rights compared with the old one. However, the drafting process was rushed
and mainly dominated by Malawi’s political parties. Some of them like AFORD were
not really interested in making substantive changes such as reducing the powers of the
president, since their leaders hoped to become Malawi’s next president and therefore
did not want its powers to be curtailed. The general public was hardly involved in the
drafting of the new constitution and also the input of Malawi’s still rather weak civil
society was minimal. In February 1995 a conference took place to review Malawi’s new
constitution, which was adopted prior to the 1994 elections on an interim basis. This
conference was attended by representatives of Malawi’s political parties as well as
various civil society organizations. However, its decisions were not binding and the
final decisions were made by parliament, which simply ignored the decisions of the
conference it did not agree with such as the elimination of the position of a second vice
president. As a result the new constitution that was adopted in May 1995 was not much
different from the interim constitution and lacked popular legitimacy.
As in Malawi, also in Zambia efforts were made to draft a new constitution prior
to the first multiparty elections. However, unlike in Malawi the opposition refused to
participate in the work of the Constitutional Commission, since it objected to its pro-
government character. Consequently, the MMD rejected the draft constitution that was
proposed by the Commission and threatened to boycott the elections. It criticized that
See chapters 5.3.2; and 5.3 .5 of this thesis.
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too much power was vested in the president. As a result of mediation efforts by
university students and the Anglican church a compromise that resulted in some minor
changes was reached and Zambia s parliament adopted a new constitution in August
1991. Similar to Malawi, the input of the general population and civil society was
minimal during the drafting process. In December 1993 Chiluba established a
Constitutional Review Commission, which made an effort to obtain the views from
people all over the country. However, like in Malawi its recommendations were not
binding and the Chiluba government was not interested in a broad-based public
discussion and debate of the proposals of the Commission. It rejected all new rights and
enhancements in the Bill of Rights and only accepted its own recommendations to the
Commission that effectively barred Kaunda from contesting the 1 996 elections. In
short, constitutional reform under the Chiluba government did nor really deserve that
name, since it was used as a means to ensure Chiluba’s reelection in 1996.^^'
Unlike Malawi and Zambia, no constitutional reforms took place in Kenya prior
the first multiparty elections. The only constitutional changes that took place were
aimed at ensuring that Moi would win the elections. The lack of a level playing field
prior to the 1992 elections was one of the major reasons for Kenya’s civil society to
push for constitutional changes to create a more level playing field prior to the 1997
elections. In contrast to Malawi and Zambia where the ability of civil society to
influence the constitutional reform process was quite limited, in Kenya civil society was
the driving force behind it. For instance, Kenya’s Citizens Coalition for Constitutional
Change (CCCC) incorporated more than fifty civil society groups and had an estimated
See chapters 6.3.2; and 6.3.4 of this thesis.
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four million members. However, the Moi regime refused to talk with representatives of
civil society and managed to split the broad-based movement for constitutional change.
Prior to the 1997 elections Kenya’s political parties agreed on a package of minimal
reforms, which created a somewhat more level playing field. After the 1997 elections
Kenya’s civil society kept the issue of constitutional reform on the front burner by
launching a people-driven constitutional review process, which became known as the
Ufungamano Initiative. It remains to be seen whether its incorporation into the
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission increased its influence on the constitutional
reform process. In short, while the broad involvement of civil society groups in Kenya’s
constitutional reform efforts is encouraging, comprehensive constitutional reforms still
have not yet taken place and probably won’t take place as long as Moi is in power.^^^
7.4 Prospects for Democratic Consolidation
So far certain elements of democracy such as regular elections have more or less
survived in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia and a return to authoritarian rule is quite
unlikely in any of the three countries. However, the process of democratic
consolidation has not yet started in the three countries. While Malawi and Zambia
experienced a democratic change in leadership, Kenya has not yet done so. After the
quite promising changes in the leadership of Malawi and Zambia by the ballot and not
by the bullet as was the case in many other African countries in the past, the political
See chapters 4.3.2; 4.3.3; and 4.3.4 of this thesis.
In all three countries people have enjoyed significantly more freedoms under the multiparty system
than under the one-party system and are not willing to give up these freedoms again. Furthermore all
three countries are dependent on foreign aid and donors would not accept their backsliding into
authoritarian rule.
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developments in both countries after the first multiparty elections did not increase the
prospects for democratic consolidation. The leaders of both countries manipulated the
political process to ensure or at least to significantly increase their changes of winning
the second multiparty elections. However, when they tried to bring about constitutional
changes to run for a third term, they did not succeed mainly due to popular opposition.
In both countries various civil society groups such as the churches opposed the third-
term ambitions of Chiluba and Muluzi vehemently. The ability of civil society to
mobilize against undemocratic tendencies in both countries increases the prospects for
democratic consolidation. In the context of Malawi the relative independence if its
judiciary is quite positive and in Zambia its new President Levy Mwanawasa seems to
be quite serious in bringing about much needed reforms and in rooting out corruption.
For instance, in a fairly bold step on 1 1 July 2002 he asked Zambia’s parliament to lift
Chiluba’ s immunity so that “the government can put him on trial on charges of
corruption and abuse of office’’.^^'^ Kenya’s prospects for democratic consolidation will
depend to a certain extent on the outcome of the still ongoing constitutional reform
process. A new constitution that reduces the powers of the president would increase the
prospects for democratic consolidation. Compared with Malawi and Zambia, in Kenya
the conditions are more conducive for the development of a democratic political culture
throughout the country. For instance, more than 28,000 Kenyans from rural and urban
areas worked as local election observers during the 1997 elections. Furthermore, civil
“Zambians back president’s bid to try predecessor” by Shapi Shacinda, Reuters News, 1 2 July 2002.
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society organizations played a crucial role in pushing forward the country’s
constitutional reform process.
While certain elements of democracy became more entrenched in Kenya,
Malawi and Zambia during the last ten years, formidable challenges remain on the road
to democratic consolidation in all three countries. Among them are the high levels of
poverty, low literacy rates, the debt burden and the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS
disease. Furthermore, the salience of ethnicity and regionalism often reduces the
political process to a zero-sum game in which different groups try to gain control of the
state and its resources. The replacement of the first-past-the-post electoral system with a
mixed or a proportional electoral system as well as the formation of political parties that
appeal to voters across different ethnic groups and regions are among the measures that
might increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia.
See chapters 4.4; 5.4; and 6.4 of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The final chapter of this study has three parts. First, several independent
variables will be identified that may explain some of the variation in the dependent
variable. Second, it will be discussed which adjectives best describe what type of
democracy emerged in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the last ten years. This
discussion will be based on Diamond’s typology that was introduced in chapter two.
Finally, various measures will be suggested for possibly increasing the prospects for
democratic consolidation in the countries that are the focus of this thesis.
In contrast to case studies of the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia done independently from each other, the comparative method, which is applied
in this study, provides a better foundation for identifying which independent variables
can be used to explain the variation in the dependent variable. The dependent variable
of this study is the trajectory of the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi, and
Zambia during the 1990s. The variation in the dependent variable can be summarized as
follows: The first multiparty elections in Malawi and Zambia resulted in a peaceful
transfer of power from Banda to Muluzi and from Kaunda to Chiluba respectively,
while in Kenya Moi managed to win the first and the second multiparty elections.
During the 1990s a fairly stable party system emerged in Malawi, consisting of three
parties (UDF, AFORD and MCP), while in Kenya and in Zambia the party system was
much less stable. In Kenya various new political parties emerged after the 1992
elections and in Zambia a number of new political parties emerged basically in two
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waves prior to the 1996 and the 2001 elections. In Kenya, civil society was the driving
force beyond the constitutional reform process, while in Malawi and Zambia civil
society was hardly involved. Several of the independent variables that may explain the
variation in the dependent variable are described below.
The independent variable “structure of civil society” explains some of the
variation in the dependent variable. For instance, it can be used to explain why the
opposition was able to defeat Kaunda in Zambia but was unable to defeat Moi in Kenya.
The existence of a strong trade union movement, which was the core of Zambia’s civil
society during the period of political liberalization, enabled the opposition to easily
mobilize thousands of formal sector workers who were organized in trade unions
against the Kaunda government. This provided the opposition movement with broad-
based support. As a result of the severe economic decline and the social costs of the
SAPs that were implemented by the Kaunda government, it had become extremely
unpopular, which facilitated the formation of a broad-based protest movement, the
MMD. The MMD could use the already existing organizational structure of the trade
unions to quickly establish an efficient and effective party infrastructure throughout the
country. In Kenya the opposition movement was mainly led by clerics, lawyers and
former politicians. They were not in a position to organize equally large mass-protests
against Moi, since they did not have the same experience and organizational
infrastructure at their disposal as the trade union leaders in Zambia who were quite
experienced in organizing large strikes already prior to the onset of the democratization
process.
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In contrast to Kenya and Zambia, the independent variable “structure of civil
society” cannot be used to explain the different trajectories of the democratization
process in Kenya and Malawi, since a peaceful change in leadership occurred in
Malawi, which has a weaker civil society than Kenya, while none occurred in Kenya.
With regard to Kenya and Malawi the independent variable “role of donors” can be
used to explain at least to some extent why Muluzi was able to replace Banda and why
Moi was able to hold on to power. While in both countries donor-imposed political
conditionalities were primarily responsible for the replacement of the one-party system
with the multiparty system, in Malawi the degree of donor involvement prior to the first
multiparty elections was considerably higher than in Kenya. In Kenya the role of donors
was rather removed. They failed to ensure a level playing field prior to the elections and
they endorsed the results of the seriously flawed 1992 elections fearing instability if
they would not have done so. By refusing to apply more pressure against the Moi
government Kenya’s donors basically sabotaged the efforts of various domestic actors
to bring about a level playing field prior to the 1992 elections. In contrast to Kenya, in
Malawi the donors played a much more proactive role prior to the 1994 elections.
Coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) they assisted
with the drafting of a new constitution and they “participated in every step of the
transition process, guaranteeing that the plebiscite and the subsequent elections were
reasonably free and fair”.^^^
Another independent variable that is of some value in explaining why Kaunda
and Banda lost power in the first multiparty elections while Moi managed to hold on to
Brown 2000: p. 437.
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power is the degree to which the incumbents believed they would win the elections. In
Zambia and Malawi Kaunda and Banda were quite sure that they would win the
elections they convened. This explains why they gave the international community quite
some influence over the preparations for the first multiparty elections, which resulted in
a playing field that was fairly level. In contrast to Banda and Kaunda, Moi was very
well aware of the fact that his core support was limited to his own ethnic group, the
Kalenjin and some other smaller ethnic groups like the Maasai and that he would have
no choice of winning against an opposition that would bring together Kenya’s largest
ethnic groups, namely, the Kikuyu, the Luhya, and the Luo. For precisely this reason he
gave the international community much less room to ensure that there was a level
playing field prior to the elections and undertook various measures to increase his
chances to emerge victorious from the first multiparty elections as has been illustrated
in chapter 4.3.2.^^^
The independent variable “structure of civil society” is also quite useful in
explaining why civil society was the driving force beyond the constitutional reform
process in Kenya, while in was hardly involved in Malawi and Zambia. As has been
illustrated in chapter 4.2 Kenya’s legal profession managed to maintain a relatively high
degree of independence from the Moi government during the 1980s. This enabled
Kenya’s Human Rights Commission and Law Society as well as its section of the
International Commission of Jurists to become the driving force beyond the Citizens
Coalition for Constitutional Change (CCCC), which grew rapidly and included more
than fifty civil society groups and had an estimated 4 million members by the end of
See van de Walle 2002: p. 71.
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1997. Besides the lawyers also Kenya’s churches managed to maintain a high degree of
autonomy during the 1980s. The fact that especially Kenya’s younger clergy was
preaching the Gospel against state oppression since the late 1980s politicized their
congregations and explains why Kenya’s churches joined forces with its legal
community to push for constitutional reforms prior to and after the 1997 elections.
Furthermore the recruitment, training and posting of 28,000 local observers for the 1997
elections by a coalition that brought together the Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission (CJPC), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), and the
Institute of Education for Democracy (lED) played an important role in preparing the
ground for the Ufungamano Initiative for constitutional reform that emerged after the
1997 elections. In contrast to Kenya, the trade union movement was at the core of
Zambia’s civil society while its legal profession was by far not as active and numerous
as the one in Kenya, which explains why Zambia’s civil society was hardly involved in
the constitutional reform process. Compared with Kenya and Zambia, Malawi’s civil
society was very weak as a result of the highly authoritarian Banda regime, which
explains why Malawi’s civil society was hardly able to influence the drafting of its
interim constitution prior to the 1994 elections and its finalization thereafter. A
comparison of the structure of Kenya’s, Malawi’s and Zambia’s civil society reveals
that there is a correlation between the degree of authoritarianism of the ancien regime
and the structure of civil society.
A possible explanation for the fact that in Malawi a fairly stable party system
emerged during the 1990s while this was not the case in Kenya and to a lesser extent in
Zambia could be that in Malawi regionalism was the main cleavage along which
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AFORD and UDF were formed while in Kenya and Zambia ethnicity played a more
important role than regionalism as a cleavage along which political parties were formed.
According to the combined average rating of political rights and civil liberties
by Freedom House for 2001-2002''' Kenya, Malawi and Zambia received the following
ratings on a scale from 1
.0 (free) to 7.0 (not free)."’ Malawi and Zambia were both
classified as partly free with ratings of 3.0 and 4.5 respectively, while Kenya was
classified as not free with a rating of 5.5. Countries that are considered free by Freedom
House fall into Larry Diamond’s category of liberal democracies, countries that are
considered partly free fall into Diamond s category of electoral democracies, and
countries that are considered not free either fall into Diamond’s categories of
pseudodemocracies''^® or purely authoritarian regimes. Consequently, according to the
latest Freedom House ratings Malawi and Zambia could be characterized as electoral
democracies, while Kenya could be characterized as pseudodemocracy. Based on the
analysis of the political developments in Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s in
chapters five and six it seems to be justified to categorize them as electoral
democracies. During the years after the first multiparty elections, which have been
reasonably free and fair, both countries have experienced some democratic backsliding.
In both countries the constitutional reform process failed to increase ‘horizontal’
I
j
accountability by reducing the presidential powers in favor or the parliament and the
This rating is available on the web site of Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).
According the Freedom House a country with a rating between 1 .0 and 2.5 is considered free. A
country with a rating between 3.0 and 5.5 is considered partly free and a country with a rating
between 5.5 and 7.0 is considered not free.
Besides the term “pseudodemocarcy” also the terms “electoral authoritarian and hybrid are used
in the literature. In a recent article Diamond further divided electoval authoritarian regimes into
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judiciary. Furthermore, the freedom of the press was restricted in both countries
especially prior to the second multiparty elections. However, the most recent
developments in both countries, especially the upholding of the norm in favor of term
limits by civil society, suggests that the democratic backsliding has been reversed at
least for now. Based on the analysis of the political developments in Kenya during the
1990s in chapter 4 the author of this study has certain reservations with the
categorization of Kenya as a pseudodemocracy or as not free based on its 5.5 rating by
Freedom House. While both multiparty elections during the 1990s have been flawed
and political rights and civil liberties have been restricted to varying degrees, the fact
that Kenya’s vibrant and energetic civil society was the driving force beyond the
country’s constitutional reform process and that it recruited, trained and posted 28,000
local observers for the 1997 elections merits a somewhat better rating than 5.5 in the
author’s view. Furthermore, the fact that Moi won’t stand again in the upcoming
elections alone will most likely increase the power of Kenya’s legislature and judiciary
at least somewhat, since it will be hard for Moi to transfer his enormous personal power
to his successor even if he tries to handpick him or her. This alone of course is not
sufficient to increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya. In his recent
article Nicolas van de Walle makes another point that gives reason for cautious
optimism regarding the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia. He points to the phenomenon of institutional learning. “Since genuine
democracy involves acquired behavior on the part of both individuals and institutions it
stands to reason that the more experience a country has had with democratic decisions
competitive authoritarian ones and hegemonic electoral authoritarian ones (see Diamond 2002: p.
25).
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(whether taken by voters, lawmakers, judges, or the press) the more likely it is to
experience democratic learning. This is good news, particularly as this learning is likely
to occur even if those processes are imperfect”.^'*'
To increase the prospects for democratic consolidation Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia must carry out further constitutional and electoral reforms. These can be
divided into minor and more substantive reforms. Among the minor reforms would be
the introduction of the requirement that the president is elected with an absolute and not
just as simple majority. If none of the candidates receives an absolute majority in the
first round of voting, a run-off election would take place among the two top vote-
getters. This would facilitate the formation of broad-based alliances and reduce the
salience of ethnoregional considerations. Furthermore, constituency boundaries should
be drawn in such a way that each constituency contains more or less the same number
of voters and safeguards need to be in place to ensure the independence of the electoral
commission. For instance, instead of being appointed by the president its members
should be appointed or elected by parliament. Among the major reforms would be a
significant reduction of the presidential powers in favor of the parliament and the
judiciary. Furthermore a more inclusive political system should be designed to
transform the political process from a zero-sum game into more of a win-win situation.
An important step of creating such a more inclusive political system would be the
replacement of the first-past-the-post electoral system with a proportional or a mixed
electoral system. For instance, in a mixed system half of the MPs would be elected in
constituencies on a plurality basis and the other half would be elected via party lists on a
van de Walle 2002: p. 74. See also Herbst 2000: pp. 245-258; Ndegwa 2001: pp. 1-17; and van de
Walle 2002: pp. 72-79.
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proportional basis. Such an electoral system would ensure that half of the MP’s would
have direct ties to their constituencies and would be sensitive to issues of concern to
them, while the other half would be elected on a proportional basis, which would ensure
that also ethno-linguistic and religious minorities would achieve a certain level of
parliamentary representation. Evidence from South Africa and Namibia suggests that a
proportional or a mixed electoral system would encourage political parties to reach out
to voters from other ethnic groups or regions and by doing so would promote the
formation of cross-cutting cleavages around certain ideologies or policies. This would
over time reduce the salience of primordial and parochial criteria in electoral politics
and would replace them with different ideologies or policies, which would in turn lead
to the creation of more stable party systems over time.^'^^
Besides the various electoral and constitutional reforms outlined above bi- and
multilateral donors also could play a key role in increasing the prospects for democratic
consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. So far their involvement with these three
countries has been a mixed blessing. While they undoubtedly played an important role
in bringing about political liberalization in each of them either through imposing
economic or political conditionalities or both, they have not shown much of a
commitment to assist them to extend “democratic practices beyond periodic voting”.^'*^
In all three countries they were more concerned with political stability and economic
reforms (i.e. SAPs) than with the establishment of inclusive and participatory political
systems. As a matter of fact their insistence that Chiluba and Muluzi continue with the
See Sandbrook 1996: pp. 70-81; Monga 1997: pp. 168-168; Reynolds 1999: pp. 272-275; Phiri 2000:
p. 68; Baker 2000: pp. 19-21; May 2000: pp. 172-175; and Burnell 2001: p. 248.
Brown 2000: p. 452.
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implementation of the rigid SAPs, their predecessors had started, on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis undermined the democratic process in both countries. The external imposition of
SAPs by the World Bank and the IMF provided the democratically elected parliaments
and presidents of Malawi and Zambia with very little room for independent domestic
decision-making with regard to macroeconomic policies. By doing so they constrained
“the formal institutions of democratic rule that are a constituent part of
democratization”. The implementation of donor-imposed SAPs exacerbated already
existing social conflicts in Malawi and Zambia and made it next to impossible for
Chiluba and Muluzi to adequately address the concerns of the majority of their voters.
This led to an unprecedented wave of strikes in both countries in the years following the
first multiparty elections. Furthermore, the experience of Kenya, Malawi and Zambia
with SAPs makes it quite clear that they have failed to help these countries to make any
headway with reducing poverty, which is absolutely crucial for democracy to take hold.
If the bi- and multilateral donors of Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia are serious in assisting
them as well as other African countries in establishing sustainable democracies, they
have to find innovative ways to help them to carry out the necessary economic reforms
without undermining the democratic process. This first and foremost requires that they
provide more room for independent domestic decision-making with regard to
macroeconomic policies. By doing so they would enable political parties to develop
different policy platforms. Ultimately this could help to replace the current fragmented,
unstable and ethnoregionally based party systems with less fragmented and more stable
party systems that consist of political parties that favor different policies and try to win
Mkandawire 1999: p. 123.
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the support of voters from different ethnic groups and regions. Finally, support for
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa requires that donors make long-term commitments
and that they devise innovative programs. For instance, one such program could assist
African countries in setting up a system of party financing based on how many votes
they receive in the elections.^"^^
This thesis has shown that it is undoubtedly easier to replace single-party
systems with multiparty systems than to establish consolidated democracies. Even so
corruption, abuses of power and economic problems still exist in Kenya, Malawi and
Zambia, all three countries are measurably more democratic at the beginning of the 21’*‘
century compared with the late 1980s. Also the population in all three countries displays
a significant degree of popular support for democracy, which is evident in the
willingness ofmany of their citizens to walk for many miles and to patiently wait for
hours to cast their votes. Observers who are overly critical of what has been achieved
after ten years of democratic experiments in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia after decades
of authoritarian rule should keep in mind that democracy has taken decades to become
firmly established in other parts of the world and even if it is firmly established serious
irregularities can still occur as the 2000 presidential elections in the United States have
shown quite clearly. There is no doubt that democracy will take root in many countries
of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it will take time and the continued support of the
international community.
See Chabal 1998: pp. 300-303; Mkandawire 1999: pp. 119-133; Brown 2000: pp. 423-485; and
Murungi 2000: pp. 202-208.
See Bratton / Mattes 2001: p. 120; and van de Walle 2002: pp. 66-67.
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APPENDIX A
MAP OF KENYA
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APPENDIX B
KENYAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1992: RESULTS BY PROVINCE
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APPENDIX C
KENYAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1992: PIE CHART ILLUSTRATION
OF RESULTS BY PROVINCE
(”/o of votes for the four main candidates)
Danrel a:ao Moi (KANU)
Vlwa' Kibaki (OP)
Kenneth Mai;ba (FORD-As:lil Tana ethnic group
Oginga Odinga iFOBD-Kenva! provincial boundary Source The //eek-y Rev-ew. January • 1992
Source: Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 128
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APPENDIX D
KENYAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1992: DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
BY PROVINCE
Province KANU FORD
(K)
FORD
(A)
DP KNC KSC PICKTOTAL
Nairobi 1 1 6 8
Central 1 14 10 25
Eastern 21 1 9 1 32
North-East 8 1 1 10
Coast 17 2 1 20
Rift Valley 36 2 4 2 44
Western 10 3 7 20
Nyanza 7 20 1 1 29
TOTAL 100 31 31 23 1 1 1 188
Source: Throup / Hornsby 1998; p. 443
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APPENDIX E
KENYAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1997: RESULTS BY PROVINCE AND
CANDIDATE
Table 2: The 1997 Kenya General Elections; Presidential Vote by Province
Moi Kibaki Raila Kijana Ngilu
kanu dp NDPK FORDK SDP
Nairobi 75,272
20.56%
160,124
44%
Coast 229.084
61 .05%
50,540
13.4%
North
Eastern
46,121
73.08%
11,741
18.60%
Eastern 368,801
35,87%
296,262
28.81%
Central 55,822
5,59%
885,382
88.73%
Rift
Valley
1,140,109
69%
343.529
20.90%
Western 314,669
44.67%
9,755
1.38%
Nyanza 215.923
23.53%
138,194
15.05%
Total 2,445,801 1,895,527
59,415
16.23%
24,971
6,82%
39.707
10.85%
22,794
6.07%
11,156
2.97%
37.600
10.02%
210
0.33%
4,418
7.00%
466
0.58%
7,755
0.75%
7,009
0.68%
332.578
32.35%
6.812
0.68%
3,067
0.31%
29.473
2.95%
36,022
2.19%
102,178
6.22%
11,345
0.69%
13,458
1.91%
338,120
48.00%
3,429
0.49%
519,259
56.55%
14,623
1 .59%
15,309
1.57%
665,725 505,542 469,807
Source; Ajulu 1998; p. 281
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APPENDIX F
KENYAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1997: DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
BY PROVINCE
KANU DP NDPK F(K) SDP
Nairobi 1 5 1 0 1
Coast 18 2 0 0 0
N/Eastern 9 0 0 0 0
Eastern 14 8 0 1 10
Central 0 17 1 0 5
Rift Valley 39 7 0 3 0
Western 15 0 0 9 0
Nyanza 8 0 19 4 0
Total 104 39 21 17 16
Source, compiled from Parliamentary Election Results, Electoral Commission of Kenya. 1 5 January 1 998
Source: Ajulu 1998; p. 279
APPENDIX G
MAP OF MALAWI
M«p No 3M UNITED NATK>NS Cwtoor«pl»c SKtien
Novombo* ItM
Source: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Cartographic
Section
Map No. 3858, November 1994
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APPENDIX H
1993 REFERENDUM: RESULTS BY DISTRICT
(in %)
District Votes cast Invalid votes Valid votes Multi-party One-party
system system
North 70.6 1.0 99.0 89.3 10.7
Chitipa 70.3 0.7 99.3 91.2 8.8
Karonga 59.1 0.8 99.2 94.1 5.9
Rumphi 86.6 1.4 98.6 86.8 13.2
Nkhata Bay 46.5 1.4 98.6 92.6 7.4
Mzimba 83.3 1.0 99.0 87.2 12.8
Central 69.3 3.0 97.0 32.5 67.5
Kasungu 77.3 2.7 97.3 28.0 72.0
Nkhotakota 59.3 3.6 96.4 47.0 53.0
Ntchisi 81.1 1.7 98.3 21.9 78.1
Dowa 72.0 2.5 97.5 14.9 85.1
Mchinji 59.3 5.9 94.1 31.5 68.5
Lilongwe 65.1 3.3 96.7 28.2 71.8
Salima 83.2 2.4 97.6 45.1 54.9
Dedza 75.5 2.9 97.1 25.6 74.4
Ntcheu 70.8 1.1 98.9 74.7 25.3
South 64.4 2.0 98.0 85.2 14.8
Mangochi 57.2 1.8 98.2 90.9 9.1
Machinga 58.4 1.4 98.6 91.3 8.7
Zomba 65.6 0.9 99.1 86.7 13.3
Mulanje 55.2 4.4 95.6 79.3 20.7
Chiradzulu 83.7 4.2 95.8 89.2 10.8
BIantyre 85.0 0.9 99.1 86.7 13.3
Mwanza 55.5 1.8 98.2 71.5 28.5
Thyolo 82.4 1.6 98.4 81.3 18.7
Chikwawa 54.8 1.8 98.2 76.5 23.5
Nsanje 55.4 1.4 98.6 82.6 17.4
Total 67.1 2.3 97.7 64.7 35.3
Source: Meinhardt 1999a; p. 557
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APPENDIX I
1993 REFERENDUM: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS BY
DISTRICT
(Vote for the Multiparty System in y^^)
SP
m
=
> 80*
70 - 80«
40 - 60»
20 - 30«
< 204
24 Chltipa
23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Nkhata Bay
20 Mzimba
19 Kasungu
18 Nlihotakota
17 Ntchisi
16 Dowa
15 Mchinjl
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 ChiKwawa
1 Nsange
Source: Meinhardt 1997: p. 195
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APPENDIX J
MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1994: RESULTS BY DISTRICT
(in %)
District Votes Invalid Valid Muluzi Banda Chihana Kalua
cast votes votes
Chitipa 86.0 1.0 99.0 1.8 9.6 88.3 0.3
Karonga 84.6 2.1 97.9 2.9 5.2 91.6 0.4
Rumphi 86.7 1.1 98.9 4.7 5.6 89.4 0.4
Nkhata Bay 83.3 1.6 98.4 8.5 6.2 84.7 0.7
Mzimba 86.5 1.2 98.8 4.5 8.2 87.0 0.3
Kasungu 81.3 2.0 98.0 15.1 65.5 18.9 0.4
Nkhotakota 84.8 2.3 97.7 37.9 46.6 15.2 0.4
Ntchisi 80.0 3.4 96.6 30.9 65.2 3.5 0.5
Dowa 81.9 2.5 97.5 15.0 80.5 3.8 0.7
Salima 77.4 2.9 97.1 47.7 47.3 4.4 0.6
Mchinji 79.5 2.3 97.7 26.8 69.5 3.3 0.4
Lilongwe 85.6 2.1 97.9 20.2 71.7 7.8 0.3
Dedza 74.0 3.5 96.5 26.3 71.6 2.3 0.4
Ntcheu 76.6 2.5 97.5 72.0 23.8 3.7 0.6
Mangochi 81.1 1.9 98.1 88.7 7.5 3.3 0.5
Machinga 84.3 1.9 98.1 91.2 7.0 1.5 0.4
Zomba 82.5 1.8 98.2 84.1 11.2 4.1 0.6
Chiradzulu 70.0 1.9 98.1 89.1 9.0 1.5 0.4
Blantyre 82.7 1.5 98.5 78.4 13.2 7.9 0.6
Mwanza 79.8 3.2 96.8 69.1 25.1 4.6 1.2
Thyolo 77.3 2.6 97.4 71.4 19.9 7.7 0.5
Mulanje 66.4 3.4 96.6 66.7 20.8 11.8 0.6
Chikwawa 75.9 2.4 97.6 56.8 38.5 3.4 1 .3
Nsanje 81.4 3.4 96.6 42.6 52.9 2.9 1.6
Total 80.5 2.0 98.0 47.2 33.5 18.9
Source: Meinhardt 1999a: p. 562
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APPENDIX K
MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1994: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION
OF VOTES FOR THE AFORD CANDIDATE CHIHANA BY DISTRICT
> 80»
10 - 204
< 10%
24 Chitipa
23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Nkhata Bay
20 Mzimba
19 Kasungu
18 Nkhotakota
17 Ntchisi
1 6 Dowa
15 Mchin^i
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
1 Nsanje
Source: Meinhardt 1997: p. 281
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APPENDIX L
MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1994; GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION
OF VOTES FOR THE MCP CANDIDATE BANDA BY DISTRICT
> 80«
70 - 801
60 - 7q»
50 - 60%
40 - 50%
30 - 40%
;0 - 30%
10 - :-o%
< 10 %
24 Chitipa
23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Ntchata Bay
20 Msimba
19 Kasuriiju
18 Nkhotakota
1’’ Ntchisi
16 Dowa
15 Mclunji
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4 Mulanie
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
1 Nsanie
Source; Meinhardt 1997: 282
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APPENDIX M
MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1994: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION
OF VOTES FOR THE UDF CANDIDATE MULUZI BY DISTRICT
> « 0 »
70 - 80»
60 - 70»
50 - 60»
40 - 50«
30 - 40»
20 - 30»
10 - 20 *
< 10 »
24 Chitipa
23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Nkhata Bay
20 Mzimba
19 Kasunqu
18 Nkhotakota
17 Ntchisi
16 Dowa
15 Mchinji
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
1 Nsanje
Source; Meinhardt 1997: p. 283
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APPENDIX N
MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1994: RESULTS BY DISTRICT
(in %)
District Votes cast UDF MCP AFORD^
Chitipa 89.2 3.2 8.4 87.7
Karonga 85.7 2.2 7.6 87.4
Rumphi 86.8 5.0 4.9 89.1
Nkhata Bay 80.6 12.1 8.7 72.6
Mzimba 83.4 4.6 9.0 86.0
Kasungu 80.5 19.1 62.9 21.8
Nkhotakota 85.2 41.4 44.7 12.6
Ntchisi 80.2 33.2 62.6 4.3
Dowa 82.9 15.1 78.8 4.9
Salima 77.3 42.0 52.2 5.1
Mchinji 74.7 26.2 70.4 3.2
Lilongwe 82.8 19.7 74.0 6.1
Dedza 70.7 24.9 72.2 2.5
Ntcheu 77.3 69.0 24.9 4.3
Mangochi 78.2 85.3 8.3 6.0
Machinga 82.2 90.3 7.9 1.0
Zomba 80.4 81.1 10.0 5.9
Chiradzulu 84.4 86.4 9.9 3.0
Blantyre 73.5 75.0 15.8 7.6
Mwanza 79.6 68.7 24.8 3.9
Thyolo 75.4 68.2 21.0 9.4
Mulanje 78.6 62.4 20.6 15.8
Chikwawa 74.9 56.2 38.7 4.4
Nsanje 67.1 46.3 52.8 0.7
Total'’ 79.6 46.4 33.7 19.0
^ In the following districts AFORD presented a candidate only in some constituencies: Nkho-
takota (two out of five constituencies), Lilongwe (16 out of 17), Dedza (seven out of eight),
Machinga (three out of 1 0), Zomba (seven out of eight), Thyolo (seven out of eight), Nsanje (one
out of five).
Differences to 100% are due to the share of small parties.
Source: Meinhardt 1999a: 559
APPENDIX O
MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1994: SEATS PER PARTY BY
DISTRICT
District UDP MCP AFORD
Chitipa 0 0 5
Karonga 0 0 5
Rumphi 0 0 4
Nkhata Bay 0 0 7
Mzimba 0 0 12
Kasungu 0 7 2
Nkhotakota 2 2 1
Ntchisi 0 4 0
Dowa 0 7 0
Salima 2 3 0
Mchinji 0 6 0
Lilongwe 3 14 0
Dedza 1 7 0
Ntcheu 6 1 0
Mangochi 10 0 0
Machinga 10 0 0
Zomba 8 0 0
Chiradzulu 5 0 0
Blantyre 10 0 0
Mwanza 4 0 0
Thyolo 7 0 0
Mulanje 11 0 0
Chikwawa 5 1 0
Nsanje 1 4 0
Total 85 56 36
Source: Meinhardt 1999a: 561
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APPKNDIX P
MALAWIAN PARLIAMLNTARY KLFX"I’I()NS 1994: (iRAPlIK’
ILLUSTRATION OF VOTKS FOR AFORI) BY DIS'I RK
T
MALAWI
> 80*
70 - 80»
20 - 30»
10 - 20«
< 10*
24 Clutlpa
23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Nkhata Bay
20 Mzlmba
19 Kasungu
18 Nkhotakota
17 Ntchisi
16 Dowa
IS Mchlnji
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Hangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
S Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
1 Nsanja
Mcinhardt 1997: p. 289
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APPKNDIX Q
IMAI.AWIAN PARLIAMKNTARY KI.KC I IONS 1994: ORAPIIK
ILLUSTRATION OF VOTKS FOR MC'P BY DIS I RKT
> 70»
60 - 70*
SO 60«
40 - SOI
30 - 401
20 - 301
10 - 201
< 101
24 Chltipa
23 Karong«
22 Rumphi
21 Nkhata Bay
20 Mzlmba
19 Kasungu
18 Nkhotakota
17 Ntchisi
16 Dowa
IS Mchinji
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Oadza
11 Nt.chsu
10 Mangochl
9 Machlnga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
S Chlradzulu
4 Mulanj*
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
1 Nsanj*
Source: Mcinhardt 1997: p. 291
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APPENDIX R
MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1994: GRAPHIC
ILLUSTRATION OF VOTES FOR UDF BY DISTRICT
> 80%
70 - 80%
60 - 70%
50 - 60%
40 - 50%
30 - 40%
20 - 30%
10 - 20 %
< 10 %
24 Chitipa
23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Nkhata Bay
20 Mzimba
19 Kasungu
18 Nkhotakota
17 Ntchisi
16 Dowa
15 Mchinji
1 4 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
1 Nsanje
Source: Meinhardt 1997: p. 290
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APPENDIX S
MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1999: RESULTS BY REGION
(in %)
Region Moluzi
UDF
Chakuambm
MCP/AFORD
Others
(3)
North 9% 88% 2%
Centre 3 5Vo 61% 2%
South 77V. 18% 3%
TOTAL 51% 44% 2%
Source; Brown 2000: p. 327
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APPENDIX T
MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1999: RESULTS BY REGION
(seats and %)
Region UDF MCP AFORD Indepcn-
dCBt
TOTAL
North I (3%) 4(12%) 28 (85%) 0 (0%) 33 (100%)
Centre 16 (22%) 54 (75%) 1 (1%) 10%) 72(100%)
South 76 (87%) 8 (9%) 0 (0%) 3 (3%) 87(100%)
TOTAL 93 (4«%) 66 (34%) 29(15%) 4 (2%) 192(100%)
Source: Brown 2000: p. 329
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APPENDIX U
MAP OF ZAMBIA
Source: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section
Map No. 3731, Rev. 3, July 2000
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APPENDIX V
ZAMBIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1991: RESULTS BY PROVINCE
(in %)
199P Kaunda
(UNIP)
Chiluba
(MMD)
Valid
votes
Invalid
votes
Votes
cast
Central 25.6 74.4 96.9 3.1 37.9
Copperbelt 9.4 90.6 97.5 2.5 50.8
Eastern 74.1 25.9 95.2 4.8 49.4
Luapula 10.9 89.1 97.3 2.7 47.1
Lusaka 23.4 76.6 97.3 2.7 43.9
Northern 14.9 85.1 96.3 3.7 44.4
N.Western 29.8 70.2 97.4 2.6 42.7
Southern 14.8 85.2 97.0 3.0 43.6
Western 18.6 81.4 96.8 3.2 41.3
Total 24.2 75.8 96.9 3.1 45.4
' The percentages given refer to: votes per candidate in % of valid votes; valid votes and invalid
votes in % of total votes cast; votes cast in % of registered voters.
Source; Krennerich 1999: p. 958
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APPENDIX W
ZAMBIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1991: RESULTS BY PROV INCE
(in %)
1991 (percentages)
MMD UNIP NADA NPD DP Indep. TotaP
Central 72.8 26.9 - 0.2 — — 100
Copperbelt 89.1 10.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 100
Eastern 24.5 73.5 - - - 2.0 100
Luapula 87.5 12.5 - - - - 100
Lusaka 75.7 22.6 0.7 0.2 - 0.7 100
Northern 83.6 15.8 - - - 0.5 100
N.-Western 66.4 29.7 - - - 3.9 100
Southern 83.4 15.7 - 0.0 - 0.8 100
Western 79.9 19.2 - - - 0.9 100
Total 74.3 24.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.8 100
“ Due to rounding the added total of the percentages is not always 100.
Source; Krennerich 1999; p. 951
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APPENDIX X
ZAMBIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1996: RESULTS BY PROVINCE
(in %)
1996 Chiluba
(MMD)
Mung’omba
(ZDC)
Mulemba
(NP)
Mbikusita
(AZ)
Chakom-
boka
(MDP)
Valid
Votes"
Central 73.2 14.3 5.2 2.2 5.3 100
Copperbelt 86.3 7.7 3.3 1.0 1.7 100
Eastern 64.0 19.6 6.9 3.5 6.1 100
Luapula 85.4 6.0 1.7 4.9 2.0 100
Lusaka 74.4 17.1 3.7 2.8 2.0 100
Northern 80.5 1 1.9 2.5 1.2 3.9 100
N.Western 52.2 6.3 37.7 1.5 2.3 100
Southern 67.1 18.3 5.2 4.7 4.7 100
Western 43.1 15.4 8.1 29.5 3.9 100
Total 72.6 12.7 6.7 4.7 3.3 100
* Due to rounding the added total of the percentages is not always 100.
Source: Krennerich 1999: p. 958
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APPENDIX Y
ZAMBIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1996: RESULTS BY PROVINCE
(in %)
1 996 (percentages)
MMD ZDC NP NLP Others Indep. TotaP
Central 49.8 9.7 4.0 12.4 0.2 23.9 100
Copperbelt 70.5 9.3 5.3 7.3 0.2 7.4 100
Eastern 61.9 24.3 6.4 4.0 1.0 2.3 100
Luapula 70.2 10.6 2.4 6.3 0.1 10.4 100
Lusaka 64.3 15.6 4.4 5.4 0.4 10.0 100
Northern 63.0 12.9 3.6 2.8 - 17.7 100
N.-Westem 44.4 7.7 35.8 3.8 - 8.3 100
Southern 57.0 19.5 3.6 12.5 2.6 4.8 100
Western 49.8 16.3 10.0 0.5 15.0 8.3 100
Total 61.0 13.8 7.1 6.4 1.8 9.8 100
' Due to rounding the added total of the percentages is not always 100.
Source: Krennerich 1999: p. 952
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